The Changed Context
It’s been less than two months since the rapid fall of the Assad government in Syria on December 8, 2024. This also marked the end of 61 years of strongman dynastic rule by a family from the minority Shia-linked Alawite community in a predominantly Sunni Muslim country. It also marks the end of more than 13 years of civil war which started after the failed Arab Spring uprising by students and other protestors in 2011.
The dramatic end of a six-decade chapter in the country’s history in December 2024 can be regarded as another significant fallout of the broader Israeli genocide in Gaza, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDFs) actions in Lebanon and Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. These illegal interventions and actions ironically created the conditions for the surprise offensive spearheaded by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) which was supported mainly by the Turkiye-backed Syrian National Army (SNA).
The Turkiye, Saudi, Qatari and other US allied Gulf country supported rebel militias deftly exploited the fact that Iran, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Russia, Assad’s main backers, were distracted and thinly spread. These backers also probably calculated that Assad’s Syria was a lost cause and that they should cut their losses. The HTS and SNA also correctly calculated that without this backing, and with the threat of constant US-backed Israeli aerial bombing, Assad’s military would desert him by either quickly surrendering or disbanding, paving the way for their “new” Syria.
The new emerging interim coalition government in Damascus is led by HTS, its most prominent political and military group, but it is not the only rebel entity in power. HTS was previously known as Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, a designated terrorist group by the UN Security Council’s (UNSCs) Al Qaida and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Sanctions Committee. The Al-Nusrah Front was placed on the UN sanctions list on 14 May 2014. The designation shut the group out of the international banking system, denied it access to its assets and placed an arms embargo on it.
The US, EU and many other governments subsequently also placed HTS on their terrorist lists. Türkiye, a NATO member, also officially classifies HTS as a terrorist group. Despite this terrorist classification, HTS has, over the last five years, cemented a security partnership with Turkiye’s National Intelligence Organization, MIT, which was led from 2010 till mid-2023 by Turkiye’s current Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan. On 19 December, Mr. Fidan told Al Jazeera that Turkiye recognized the new administration in Syria as a “legitimate partner” and that the Turkish embassy in Damascus had reopened. He also said that HTS should be delisted as a terrorist organization by the international community, starting with the UN.
The leader of HTS, Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Julani, was listed on the UNs Al Qaida sanctions list, even earlier than HTS, on July 24, 2013. Al-Sharaa was a member of both ISIL and Al Qaida before cutting ties with both.
In 2021, he redefined himself and HTS as moderate and was even interviewed by PBS and CNN in 2022. The US which had a USD 10 million bounty on al-Sharaa’s head appears to have cancelled it soon after their senior State Department official met him wearing his western style suit in Damascus after the HTS-led interim government took power.
What Lies Ahead: A New Emerging Civil War?
On December 19, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said that while fighting has stopped in many parts of the country, civilians are still getting injured, killed, and displaced.
This was before the Syrian Resistance Movement (SRM), likely a pro-Assad group, announced its armed opposition to the interim government ten days later. SRM claimed its first attack on the new Syrian HTS-led government on January 5,2025 in Latakia City, in eastern Syria. On January 4, a likely Iran-backed organization, the Alawite Islamic Forum (AIF), also accused the HTS led interim Syrian government of failing to address instances of sectarian violence. Indeed, individual opposition fighters continue to target members of the minority Alawite community. SNA-SDF clashes have also increased in the last six weeks while in-fighting within the HTS led coalition, given its internal contradictions, is ongoing. Both are likely to escalate further.
Israel has chosen to exploit the vacuum created by the overthrow of Assad by establishing a ground presence and mounting air attacks on Syria with US support, using the previous presence of Iranian militias and Hezbollah as “pretext” for their illegal presence and attacks. Their illegal presence continues even though their “pretext” no longer exists with the HTS led government in power.
The Turkish Foreign Minister, on January 7 threatened “military operations” against the SDF which Turkiye considers terrorist and falsely equates with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Turkiye wants to eliminate both organisations. The SDF, has witnessed “defections” of many of its Arab constituents in Raqqa, Hasakah and Deir ez Zor since Assad’s fall. Some Arab tribal forces are now fighting it, increasing the SDFs resource and bandwidth constraints as it contends with separate, existential fights. Nevertheless, it has continued both to advocate for a decentralized government despite Turkish and HTS pressure. It also continues to push back against HTS demands for its disarmament, seeking to integrate into the “new” Syrian Defense Ministry as a military bloc which HTS has declined.
The US effectively cut its support to the SDF under Trump 1.0, leaving only 900 US soldiers in Syria, linked to its Al-Tanf military base. It is almost certain that Trump has made a “deal” with Erdogan and that the Syrian Kurds will be totally abandoned once again by the Americans under Trump 2.0.
The difference in how the SDF and Turkiye define the PKK/KGK and its role in the SDF makes a ceasefire in northeastern Syria very difficult to obtain. All these continuing and even escalating conflicts, taken together, are creating a dangerous cycle. Most groups are refusing to disarm and there is a real risk of Syria coming apart under pressure from a variety of terrorist groups, local militias and Israeli airstrikes. As a result, the “new” Syria is already fertile ground for a larger armed conflict and new civil war if the current situation is left unchecked.
The nightmare scenario is that the Islamic State could re-establish its stronghold in the fledgling “new” Syria and export or inspire more terrorism around the world as appears to have been the case in New Orleans, USA on New Year’s Eve 2025.
Al-Sharra’s statements on addressing sectarianism have been vague at best. HTS is unlikely to stand in the way of Turkish military and SNA efforts to try and militarily exterminate the SDF and YPG. This is likely to lead to another protracted military conflict and further help the resurgence of the Islamic State in Syria since the SDF with US support was the main organisation that defeated and held it in check it in the past.
On another front, Iran is clearly making new attempts to support anti- HTS forces especially through Alawite led forces. It will also continue to stoke conflict over the Shia Sayyada Zeinab Shrine in Damascus. Recent skirmishes in southwestern Syria also demonstrate that HTS does not yet have full control over terrain in the south of the country.
Can Syrians Expect a “Normal” Life in the “New” Syria?
There were understandable scenes of relief and even joy on the part of some Syrian citizens after the liberation of their country from the brutality of the Assad regime. These were even more understandably short-lived and interspersed with great sadness, horror and anger at the unaccounted disappearance or murder of loved ones. These emotions were on visible display when the Sednaya Prison, north of Damascus, also known as the “Human Slaughterhouse” was opened to the public.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights says half a million people have been killed in the civil war between 2011-2024. It estimated in January 2021 that 30,000 detainees were killed by the Assad regime through torture, ill-treatment and mass executions since 2011 in Sednaya prison alone.
Given this horrific recent history and the prospect of a new emerging civil war in the “new” Syria, there does not appear to be any respite for the Syrian people in the short-term, whether they are already inside the “new” Syria or are refugees hoping to return in the short-term to long broken homes and families.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine a return to any kind of normalcy in the short run for the average Syrian family. An important step towards long run normalcy will be the creation of an independent national “truth and reconciliation” commission. Normalcy cannot return till such a body has credibly completed its formidable tasks and fearlessly delivered its findings, reparations and recommendations. Unfortunately, it is hard to imagine even the establishment of such a commission in the near-term. Two other essential important pre-conditions for normalcy; independent elections and the writing of a new Constitution have both been delayed for at least three years. The HTS-led government says that the conditions are not appropriate for these to happen earlier.
Respect for the UNSC Terrorist List and the 1951 UN Refugee Convention
The designation of HTS as a terrorist listed group by the UNSC presents significant challenges to it and Syria. There is clearly no rush on the part of the UNSC to delist it as was clear at its 8 January 2025 meeting when a divided Council for most of Syria’s civil war between March 2011 and early December 2024, seemed united on this one issue. The UNSC and experts in the international community appear to be largely united in the view that it will be critical to see concrete developments on the ground that demonstrate progress towards a credible, inclusive “new” Syria respecting women’s rights, protecting religious and ethnic minorities, not just al-Sharaa’s words, before there is any delisting of HTS and some of its associated groups from the UNSC terrorist list.
Geir Pederson, the UN Envoy on Syria recently stated that the easing of sanctions is the first step to rebuilding Syria and addressing the needs of the Syrian people which will require a smooth end to sanctions and “appropriate action on designations” of top leaders. He also added that such rebuilding “could only be addressed with broad support” from the whole international community.
Neither the UN nor any other Western government has so far recognized the HTS-linked government. Normalcy can only return when such recognition is given. Normalcy will also be impossible to achieve if Syrian refugees in third countries cannot or will not return. Neither the United States under Trump 2.0 or a European Union member country or even Turkiye can currently legally send back any Syrian refugees or asylum seekers to the “new” Syria since it is a state led by a UN, US, EU and Turkiye designated terrorist organization. If they seek to do so, they will be in violation of the legally binding United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the1951 Refugee Convention), especially its principle of “non-refoulement”( Article 33). Refoulement refers to the forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are liable to be subjected to persecution. Both international and EU law prohibit “refoulement” and while the US is not a signatory to the UNs 1951 Refugee Convention, the USCIS, as recently as 1 January 2018 under Trump 1.0 stated that the principle of “non-refoulement” under human rights law guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm. This principle is binding on all states, irrespective of their status as parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention.
The Magnitude of the Syrian Humanitarian and Development Crisis and Challenge
UNHCR recently stated that Syria remains the world’s largest refugee crisis. Since 2011, more than 14 million Syrians out of a population of 23 million had fled the country to escape the civil war. Another 7.2 million Syrians are internally displaced, with 70% of the population still requiring humanitarian help. The UNs World Food Program (WFP) in its recent appeal, indicated that over 12 million people, or over half the population, are in the grip of hunger. According to UNICEF, about 90% of Syria’s 23 million people are poor.
It is enormously challenging to provide humanitarian assistance to those currently in Syria, let alone to any returning refugees. Sanctions for more than a decade have had an enormous impact on the Syrian people, especially those most vulnerable. The economy is largely based on a cash system as both the country and its people are unable to access credit. Many essential goods have been restricted since imports have been subject to sanctions on dual-use products such as fertilizer and water pumps. Crucial service providers such as banks, airlines, and many businesses voluntarily withdrew from what became a pariah state.
The HTS caretaker government cannot significantly and meaningfully undertake even purely short-term humanitarian and reconstruction work in the “new” Syria without full international support. As the UNs Special Envoy on Syria said, sanctions need to be relaxed, and near-term waivers given for humanitarian, reconstruction and development purposes.
The US, recognizing this, issued General License 24 to expand authorizations for six months, subject to monitoring and review, just before the January 8, 2025, UN Security Council meeting. This ensures that US sanctions do not impede activities to meet basic human needs, including the provision of public services or humanitarian assistance. The UN, through the OCHA, WFP, UNICEF, WHO and other agencies has dramatically increased its humanitarian assistance and appeals for Syria. Türkiye has committed to building one million houses for returning refugees. But much more is urgently needed, given the unprecedented scale of the humanitarian, reconstruction and development crisis facing Syria and its people.
Major Geo-Political and Regional Consequences: Winners and Losers in the Short-Run
It is hard to predict anything in the “new” emerging Syria for more than the short-term, defined as one-year. Indeed it would be foolish to even attempt to do so.
President Erdogan and Foreign Minister Fidan are moving quickly, in the short-term, to consolidate Turkiye’s influence over the new Syrian government and state. Turkiye and its broader geo-political ambitions are the biggest winner in the “new” Syria,” at least in the short-term. President Erdogan’s dream of a neo-Ottoman Empire and leadership of the Sunni Muslim world has been given a boost at a sorely needed time for him and his AK Party. There is now even grandiose talk in some Turkish governmental circles of the 21st century being a “Turkiye Century”.
Putin’s Russia and Iran, on the other hand, as well as the Lebanese Iran backed Hezbollah, which relied heavily on Iranian supply routes through Syria, appear to the biggest losers, at least in the near-term.
Putin’s Russia has suffered a strategic political defeat in Syria from which it will be difficult for him and his country to easily or quickly recover. Russia is focusing on negotiations with the interim Syrian HTS-led government to maintain its military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus but it is unlikely that it can rely on these bases for even the medium term, let alone the long-term. These bases were crucial for its power projection not just in the Mediterranean, but also Africa and the Black Sea regions. While Putin may hope to replace its Syrian bases with Iranian military bases in the medium-term because of the January 17, 2025, Iran-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement, this notably lacks a defence clause. In any case, Iranian ports and military facilities are nowhere near as favourable to Russia geographically and in geo-political terms as the ones in Syria.
Iran is still struggling with coming to terms with its defeat in Syria and appears to be taking an approach which is openly antagonistic to the HTS-led interim Sunni government by stirring Shia-linked Alawite groups and causes. It is too early to gauge if their de-stabilization tactics will succeed. What seems clear however is that they will not be able to use Syria as a major supply route for Hezbollah in Lebanon as has been the case for decades.
While the US is closely watching developments, it has been in informal contact with HTS and its allies for a few years and is likely to make a deal with Turkiye, effectively abandoning the Syrian Kurds and SDF early in Trump 2.0, if this has not already happened.
The US is happy that the “new” Syria has altered regional West Asia geo-politics in favour of its allies in the region, weakening especially Iran and Russia, both avowed enemies. Since both the US and Israel are keen to weaken Iran and the US wishes to debilitate Russia, it is likely they will support the HTS-linked alliance and hope to bring the “new” Syria into the Western alliance in West Asia and the broader Middle East. Despite, the contradictions with the HTS led alliance and its Islamist roots and credentials, the US will, therefore continue to rationalize Al-Sharaa as a moderate, modern leader. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt will, in the name of accommodating Islamist empowerment, will likely support reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts through the HTS-led alliance. The UAE may be more wary of the HTS-led alliance, but it will probably also be pressured to support early relief and reconstruction efforts.
India and the “new” Syria
Bilateral relations between India and Syria are historic for civilizational reasons. Both countries were on the Silk Road through which civilizational exchanges took place for centuries. Syriac Christianity, originating in ancient Syria, created the first Christian communities in Kerala.
Both countries were members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Syria, under the Assads, supported the Indian stance on Kashmir, while India till recently under its current government, was seen as a clear supporter of the Palestinian cause as well as Syria’s position against Israel on regaining the Golan Heights. In 2010, then Indian President Patil, on a visit to Syria, called on Israel to return the Golan Heights. Sadly, since then, there has been a sea change in India’s position on Israel under the Modi BJP government, most recently evidenced by its noticeable silence on Israel’s genocide in Gaza.
Bashar al-Assad who visited India in 2008 wanted to strengthen relationships, but India did not take either him or Syria seriously. Instead, Israel and the pro-US Gulf States became India’s allies, especially after Prime Minister Modi came to power in 2014. India also became part of the West Asia Quad (India, Israel, UAE and the United States). As such, in West Asia/Middle East regional terms, it has been aligned more with the pro-US Gulf States and Saudi Arabia and more recently even Israel, rather than Assad’s Syria.
In the context of the “new” Syria, India’s historical and current strategic ally and friend, Russia, is a big regional and geo-political loser of Assad’s fall as is another long-time friend, Iran, at least in the short-term. On the other hand, the main regional and geo-political winner thus far, Turkiye, is a close ally and brother of Pakistan, India’s arch enemy, and a long-term supporter at the UN of its stance on Kashmir. India has not spoken out against Netanyahu’s Israel’s illegal presence in Syria which will not endear it to Syria’s interim government, Turkiye or the Palestinians even though it was not a supporter of the Assad regime.
The Indian government has no direct relationship or entry points with the new HTS-led interim government. However, India is likely to follow the cue of the US, Saudi Arabia and pro-US Gulf States and the West Asia Quad of which it is part. It could also learn lessons for how to deal with the “new” Syria from how it is currently proposing to deal with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. In the short run, while not providing recognition to the Syrian government, if it remains on the UNs terrorist list, India can and should provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to the Syrian people, perhaps in close consort with the UAE, its fellow West Asia Quad member.
A Possible Future Scenario: “New” Refugees from the “New” Syria?
The West Asian and broader Middle East, North America, Australasia and Europe regions must prepare to accept a new wave of Syrian refugees comprising minority Alawite, Syrian Kurds and other disaffected groups impacted by continuing strife in the “new” Syria. This time they will not be able to rely either on Turkiye to take any of these groups since Turkiye is the enemy of both the Syrian Kurds and is unlikely to take non-Sunni Shia-linked Alawite and other minorities.
Nor can Europe, the most proximate and preferred destination for “new” refugees, rely on Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran or any other already overburdened Middle Eastern country to accept these likely new Syrian refugees since many of these countries are now fighting existential battles for their very survival amidst a flow of never-ending Palestinian refugees. Nor can it rely on the US or Canada to take any refugees under Trump 2.0 and the likely new conservative right-wing government in Canada after Trudeau’s early resignation. Australia is not a migrant friendly country and, in any case, is too far, so the burden this time will fall almost entirely on Europe through, perhaps, an Iraq land route.
When it comes to Syria in particular, most European countries with the notable exceptions of Germany (under Merkel), Sweden and Luxembourg cannot be viewed as having complied with the UN Convention’s requirements during Syria’s civil war between 2011-2024. Europe, this time around, would do well to respect the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees which was ironically created to protect fleeing Europeans from Nazi Germany.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Kamal Malhotra is Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Boston University Global Development Policy Center and has recently also Guest Lectured at the NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad and the School of Interwoven Arts and Sciences (SIAS), Krea University, India. Prior to his retirement from the United Nations in September 2021, Mr. Malhotra had a rich career of over four decades as a management consultant, in senior positions in international NGOs, as co-founder of a think-tank, FOCUS on the Global South, and in the United Nations (UN) including as its Head in Malaysia, Turkiye and Vietnam (2008-21). He was UNDPs Senior Adviser on Inclusive Globalization, based in New York, USA, for most of the prior decade. Mr. Malhotra is widely published.
