Prime Minister Narendra Modi just completed his ninth visit to the US since taking office a decade ago. It came on the heels of the visit by the principal opposition leader Rahul Gandhi and it is valuable to assess the substance and atmospherics of both visits.
Let us look at the visits from two perspectives. First is the international dimension- in the context of the burgeoning and multidimensional Indo/US relationship which has been growing in significance in both countries. And, second, in the context of Indian domestic politics and that of the diaspora.
On the bilateral Indo/US relations front, the Modi visit was far more visible as it had the trappings of a visit by the head of government of a consequential ally and all the curtsies and protocol were duly accorded to the visit. The centerpiece of the agenda of his program was a summit meeting of the Quad heads of state. That received the lion share of the attention the visit garnered in the US medial and provided the opportunity to dwell on the status and future of that alliance and its significance in the context of the larger Indo-US engagement.
While the Quad is recognized as an element of US policy foreign policy in Asia; its practical heft is difficult to discern in the context of other extant US alliances and commitments with a focus on Asia e.g., the AUKUS and FVEY alliances between the anglophone countries. The rationale for the Quad to create a mechanism for cooperation between countries based on a shared unease at the emergent military power of China in Asia, still makes sense on paper. However, the specific nature of the priorities within the alliance, diverges across the Quad members. For the US the primary motive is to contain China’s ambition to become in the first instance a regional hegemon in Asia; and, ultimately, with a growing blue water navy, a potential challenger globally. The focus for the moment is to contain China’s “wolf warier” posture on Taiwan and the South China Sea. Given geography and history there is a logic for Australia and Japan to align with American objectives in maritime Asia. The logic of India participating in that effort is far less clear. India’s own conflict with China has a different foundation, based on a colonial history of contested cartography. The fall out from that issue is likely best contained by bilateral negotiation, without contaminating other areas of potential partnership, economic and otherwise between the two countries. Enlarging the animus to embrace the larger standoff in the South China Sea, does not seem to advantage India. A longer-term objective of containing Chinas blue water navy in the Indian ocean is theoretical one at the moment, and the contribution of the Quad to that is unclear.
The other thing that the visit highlighted about the Quad is that its health seems to be predicated on the leaders involved. With Biden on his way out and with the Japanese and the Australians also anticipating near-term transitions, the future of the Quad is unclear. It is very dependent on the outcome of the upcoming US election, and the divergent policies of the two candidates, including their fundamental differences on multilateralism and commitment to supporting the current rules-based world order. This meeting thus had a valedictory air, underlined by its being held in Biden’s home in Delaware, with uncertainty about future direction. It was significant that Modi did not meet either of the two candidates in the presidential contest. This was a prudent move. Even though one of the candidates has Indian antecedents, their respective stance towards India is uncertain, and given the parity of both in the opinion polls it was appropriate to await the outcome of the election. This balanced outlook is also reflected in the diaspora’s approach to the election. Harris has spoken warmly about her mother, but has not dwelt at length on her Indian pedigree. While there is enthusiasm for Kamala Harris’s India origins, there has been little visibility of diaspora Indians in her campaign. And the diaspora does not have the numbers in the critical swing states to tip the balance.
But the real cost of the focus on the Quad is that it uses up so much diplomatic space, to the extent that it can be seen as a distraction from developing a bilateral agenda between India and the US. That could bring a strong focus on the potential for a collaboration in sectors where there is clear synergy; and the opportunity to develop a multiyear road map for partnership. These synergies are recognized by many in the US; and three sectors come to mind- Clean Energy, EV mobility and Biotech. In the first two there’s a considerable nervousness in the US about China’s lock on those emergent markets and about Americas inability to compete effectively given cost structures etc. India could play a countering role through its abundance of engineering skills, potential for complementary off shore manufacturing and a large domestic market. There was an opportunity to broach these matters in the meeting of Modi with US CEOs in New York. A respectable passel of CEOs (predominantly Indians in the tech sector) did show up, but unlike prior occasions the energy was lacking and no significant new initiatives were announced. Bilateral relations seem to be at their strongest when both sides coalesce around specific agendas- e.g., Manmohan Singh and the nuclear deal- and such bold initiatives have been missing recently. A broad agenda of ministerial and private sector exchanges seems to be needed to energize this part of the partnership.
The third significant item on Modi’s schedule was a speech at the UN General Assembly. This was well delivered; but given the dwindling significance of the UN as a convening body, it did not cross any threshold of consequence.
Turning next to the impact on domestic Indian politics and the diaspora. The centerpiece here was an enthusiastically attended and carefully curated meeting with the diaspora community on Long Island. It is clear that Modi enjoys these forays and retains a strong appeal among a large portion of the diaspora. The meet and greet on this occasion followed the same pattern as on previous occasions – designed to deliver a strong feel-good factor for the live attendees and for maximum audiovisual impact in India. The enthusiasm in the meeting was palpable and mutual. The diaspora has been growing dramatically in terms of numbers and impact in both in the US and India. In the US it is 4.5 million strong (about 1.35% of US population) with a median income of $120,000, the highest of any immigrant group. The political profile has been growing commensurately both in local races and the national level. As the population is usually in urban and suburban settings their patterns of voting mirror their demographic setting with two thirds voting as Democrats; though recently significant voices have emerged on the Republican side too. Besides the high-profile tech CEOs there is a very large cadre of entrepreneurs, professionals and academics with a significant impact on all aspects of the US economy and this has been noticed in both the US and India creating a lot of interest in wooing the group and though a significant event or two engaging with the diaspora has become a standard item on an Indian Prime Ministerial visit.
However, on this occasion a couple of things were missing, when contrasted with prior iterations. Firstly; there were no significant invited guests from the host country – as we had previously, notably with Trump at the Howdy Modi rally in Houston a few years ago. And, secondly, given that there is no national election in India in the offing, the energy directed at the audience in India was diminished. In any event, it is a measure of India’s success as a democracy that external influences- including the burgeoning economic power of the diaspora- has little impact on outcomes.
In contrast to Modi, the Rahul visit was muted. It followed the pattern of other such trips he has made overseas in the recent past, to the UK and elsewhere. His preferred audience seems to be smaller, and the meetings frequently take place in an academic setting; which is where he seems at ease and in his comfort zone. His stature has risen considerably with the last general election result in India. But for the American media, it has not reached the threshold where he is begun to be seen as a leader in waiting. This colored the coverage of his visit in the press and the policy community. He did engage with members of both the Congressional Foreign Policy committee and, as a group and individually, with members of the “Samosa” caucus of Indian origin members of the US Congress. But these felt like courtesy calls and no significant outcome was recorded. The only headlines he garnered- and that in the India media – were for his off the cuff comments on parochial controversies in India – specifically on his perception of Sikhs in India feeling Insecure about not being able to display articles of their faith. He provided no specific evidence to back this assertion and it could have been seen a throw away comment; except that is played into pre-existing narratives and was immediately picked up in India. It is difficult to see how it played in the diaspora community, where most folks instinctively are selective in engaging with controversies in India.
Big picture, neither visit made any deep impression or accomplished anything durable. The uncertainties and distraction of the presidential election imposed a watchful waiting stance, pending the outcome of the election. But regardless of who wins there is a broad opportunity to develop new areas of partnership in the coming years, based on India’s growing global significance and the willingness of successive American administrations to evolve beyond the traditional narrow partnership alliances and frameworks.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Kanwarjit Singh is a physician working in the biotech sector in Southern California. Prior to that he worked at McKinsey and the Gates Foundation and has degrees in Physics from St Stephen’s College, Delhi, Economics from Oxford, Business from MIT and Medicine from Columbia.