Introduction
In May 2020, during the height of COVID, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), intruded in large numbers into some areas traditionally claimed and patrolled by the Indian Army in Eastern Ladakh. This resulted in a barbaric clash with casualties on either side. Since then, there has been a tense standoff which has persisted for over four years and has led to a re-orientation of our troops including rebalancing and induction of troops and weapons into Eastern Ladakh. The two armies deployed around 60,000 troops equipped with tanks, surface-to-air missiles, and other weaponry along the frontier. There is no doubt that both countries have always felt the need for lowering the temperatures, that had reached a boiling point in the summer of 2020. Since then, there have been numerous rounds of talks held at the Corps Commanders level as well as at the diplomatic level.
Historical Perspective
Aksai Chin, the area of the long-standing territorial dispute between India and China lies in the extreme North-East of Ladakh; a bleak uninhabited highland which in the past was visited only by the inhabitants of adjacent territories in quest of salt and by occasional hunters. In 1950, Tibet was invaded and annexed by the Chinese and the absence of any Indian troops in Aksai Chin led to the construction of a major road linking Sinkiang and Tibet, the existence of which remained unknown to India till 1959. India had virtually lost Aksai Chin without any blood on the blade.
The dispute over the Eastern boundary of Ladakh can be traced back to the military expeditions of General Zorawar Singh of the Sikh Empire to Tibet in 1841-42 and the Treaty of Chushul of 1842, the creation of the kingdom of Jammu & Kashmir after the Anglo- Sikh War in 1846 and military expeditions launched into the Kunlun Mountains.
The survey of the boundary was carried out by William H Johnson in 1865 and showed the boundary to include all areas between the Karakoram Pass and Kunlun Mountains to be part of Jammu & Kashmir. But later, the British changed the boundary along the crest of the Kunlun Mountains, North of River Yarkand, which they felt would be more defensible in case of an invasion. There was also another line described as the McCartney-McDonald Line. The Chinese 1959 Claim Line as proposed by Chou Enlai was based on the McCartney-McDonald Line. Subsequently, the Chinese had advanced in 1962, and post the unilateral ceasefire they selectively withdrew in certain areas. At present, the current contestation is over the issue of overlapping claims lines.
The two countries worked towards an agreement in 1988, delinking the boundary issue from their overall bilateral relationship and worked toward a political solution. Over the two decades that followed, they agreed on measures to maintain the status quo, a working boundary called the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and protocols to reduce the risk of escalation and limits on garrisons along that line. But obstacles in the way of an agreed-upon border also became stark. Clarifying the status quo–or where the LAC lies–proved a huge challenge. Moreover, as Chinese confidence and ambition grew in the late 2000s, China hardened its position on the question. Hence hostile encounters between troops increased in tempo and mistrust developed.
Resolving Disagreements
In negotiations since the Galwan clash, both sides have been reported to have resolved disagreements over the alignment of the LAC at three friction points: Galwan Valley, Gogra-Hot Springs, and Pangong Lake area. The statement issued regarding “patrolling arrangements along the LAC in the India-China border areas, leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that arose in these areas in 2020” pertains to Depsang and Demchok the remaining two areas.
Demchok is close to the Southernmost part of the LAC in Ladakh, near the border with Himachal Pradesh. It lies near important infrastructure and supply routes, which are crucial for maintaining India’s connectivity to remote border areas. The dispute hinges on the precise alignment of the LAC along the Charding Nullah. During the 1962 conflict, the region was the area of Chinese incursion. This was the place where China has been objecting to Indian activities of development of infrastructure, as well as grazing rights of locals.
Depsang is a flat area of Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) in the Northern portion of Ladakh. The Nort hern half is flat terrain which allows for easy movement of troops and vehicles, including tanks, while the Southern area is broken ground which only allows foot patrols through a narrow bottleneck. It was at this bottleneck that the Chinese had objected to Indian patrols and blocked them, thus preventing patrolling of PP 10-13. This was also the site of confrontation in 2013.
The strategic importance of the Depsang Plains in particular is underscored by its location. It is located just 30 kilometers Southeast of Daulat Beg Oldie Post near the Karakoram Pass in the North. This area serves as a critical gateway to key military infrastructure and supply lines for India. It is also the Sector where the PLA has intruded most deeply, obviously in an attempt to keep the Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road under direct observation and fire, something that is totally unacceptable militarily to India.
On 21 October 2024, the Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, announced that India and China had reached an arrangement for patrolling by both sides along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh. On 22 October, China confirmed the development, which could lead to both countries resolving the military standoff in the region. Two days after that, Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Brics summit in Kazan, Russia.
This brought some respite, for the time being, to a four-year standoff in the high mountains of the Himalayas that had severely strained ties between the two countries.
Days after the agreement satellite images showed withdrawal in the Depsang and Demchok regions. Both armies agreed to conduct coordinated patrols once a week in the Demchok and Depsang areas. It has been since reported that the first round of patrolling has been completed in early November. Verification patrols have been conducted by both sides to confirm the disengagement process as agreed upon.
According to the agreement, each side will conduct one patrol per week in both regions. Indian and Chinese troops will alternate weekly patrols in each area, which is expected to support de-escalation efforts and confidence-building measures.
The two countries had already completed “partial” disengagement in four other transgression points — the Galwan Valley, Hot Springs, Pangong Lake and Gogra — by creating a demilitarised “buffer zone,” with the Chinese stepping back a few kilometres while remaining within India-claimed lines. The Indian Army’s patrolling remained temporarily suspended at those buffer zones located within the Indian perception of its LAC.
Last month, the Army Chief, General Upendra Dwivedi had said that India wants the status on the frontier in the Western Himalayas to be restored to its pre-April 2020 position when the standoff began and the situation will remain sensitive until then. The two sides have resolved the “low-hanging fruits” and now need to address difficult situations, while adding that there was “positive signaling” from the diplomatic side and execution on the ground was dependent on Military Commanders of the two countries.
While the Minister of External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said the pact is “a product of very patient and very persevering diplomacy” and that it will resume military patrolling the way it was before the 2020 clash. “Hopefully, we will be able to come back to peace and tranquility. And that was our major concern because we always said that if you disturb peace and tranquility, how do you expect the rest of the relationship to go forward.”
The patrolling agreement benefits both sides, with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also regaining patrolling rights in certain areas that had been restricted since 2020. PLA’s 2020 incursions had severely restricted Indian Army patrols at key points in the Depsang Bulge and Demchok. The establishment of buffer zones in areas like Galwan, Khugrang, Gogra-Hot Springs, and Pangong Tso that had helped to reduce tensions must now be removed and patrolling as prior to 2020 must commence. The agreement allows Indian troops access to patrolling points (PP) 10 to 13 in the Depsang Plains, while in Demchok, patrolling will extend to Charding Nullah.
Successful de-escalation would mark a crucial step towards normalising relations between the two countries. If China is accommodating regarding Depsang and Demchok, a resolution of the Sino-India territorial dispute in Eastern Ladakh could be possible.
Climatic Conditions
For many of us sitting comfortably in our homes and enjoying the onset of winter, cannot even imagine the climatic conditions that prevail over the Northern Ladakh plains and mountains. To state that disengagement has taken place and patrolling has recommenced is easier said than done due to many factors. Firstly, is the trust deficit. China has to demonstrate much more, for any kind of trust to build up. Secondly, it will take time to fully access the disengagement through regular patrolling and physically seeing with your own eyes the intentions of the adversary. Thirdly, is the physical patrolling right up to all the areas that our patrols used to go to prior to 2020. Most importantly, we need to understand that such clarity can emerge only after the thaw, that is post April 2025. This is so because, Winter in this Sub Sector generally commences in October and extends through April imposing a formidable and unrelenting environment. Temperatures consistently plummet to -30°C and below. The air itself carries a bitter chill that freezes exposed surfaces within minutes. Heavy snow blankets the terrain, covering mountains, valleys, and every rugged detail under a thick, pristine layer, transforming the landscape into a vast, white expanse. Snowfall during winters is frequent and dense, accumulating into deep drifts that reshape the region’s contours and obscure familiar landmarks, complicating navigation. Strong winds, often reaching speeds of 50 km/h, sweep across the area increasing the wind chill factor. These winds frequently generate sudden blizzards, reducing visibility to near-zero levels and enveloping the landscape in a dense, blinding fog of snow, hampering the movement of troops and logistics. At elevations often exceeding 14,000 feet, the oxygen levels can be as much as 60% lower than at sea level, leading to acute symptoms of hypoxia, including dizziness, confusion, impaired physical performance, and High-Altitude Sickness such as HAPO, HACO and AMS. Soldiers operating in such conditions must contend with increased heart rates and elevated blood pressure as their bodies struggle to deliver sufficient oxygen to vital organs. The lack of oxygen exacerbates fatigue during physical exertion, making every task—from carrying and maintenance of equipment to engaging in combat operations—more strenuous. Even acclimatized personnel may experience altitude sickness, manifesting as headaches, nausea, and a reduced ability to perform at peak efficiency, which can significantly impact operational readiness. Daylight brings little respite, though the sun shines brightly, it offers minimal warmth. Sunlight reflects off the snow in an intense glare, necessitating constant eye protection. By nightfall, frost settles heavily on every surface, encasing equipment, and roads in a thick layer of ice that requires substantial effort to clear. The winter weather dominates the environment, creating a harsh and unyielding setting that requires constant adaptation and vigilance.
Such conditions render physical area domination and regular patrolling nearly impossible during the winter. Therefore, it will be safe to assume that the true picture and intention of our counterparts will only emerge after April 2025.
Reading Between the Lines
The Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan while speaking at an event at the India International Centre on 20 November 2024, suggested that the India-China border dispute was a result of differing understanding of maps and “we cannot really say which is correct and which is wrong.”
Responding to a question on the current situation along the LAC and how India’s map had been shrinking since 1947 with respect to China, he said, “On the question that since 1947, India finds its map shrinking and shrinking, if we were China in 1950 and had a look at their map, they would also have found that their map is shrinking, partly because of us… they claim the state of Arunachal Pradesh. This dispute goes on, we can’t really say which is correct and which is wrong.”
Therefore, some questions do arise, to do with the ambiguity of the maps and lines, which have grave security implications. Has the current LAC adopted a dynamic nature and has it been changing? If we go by the 1959 Chinese Claim Line in Eastern Ladakh, then will we have gained or lost territory? Is something afoot in Arunachal Pradesh next? Has there been an understanding arrived at between India and China, that remains a missing dot in the common man’s mind? What really changed for a settlement to suddenly arrive?
On 21 November 2024, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus, our Defence Minister Rajnath Singh met his Chinese counterpart Admiral Dong Jun, in Vientiane, Laos, to review the situation along the LAC and the ongoing efforts to ease military tensions following the recent disengagement. Mr Rajnath Singh stated, “Considering that both countries are and will continue to remain neighbours, we need to focus on cooperation rather than conflict.” The RM also called for reflecting on the lessons learnt from the border clashes of 2020, and taking measures to prevent the recurrence of such events and safeguarding peace and tranquillity along the India-China border. He emphasised and looked forward to greater trust and confidence building between the two sides through de-escalation.
Here too, some questions do crop up. As said by our defence minister, that we will continue to remain neighbours (of which both sides have little choice), and need to focus on cooperation… What cooperation does he have in mind? Cooperation comes after complete trust and in matters of Indian territory it has to be an absolute, no cooperation possible here. And secondly, the point about lessons learnt. Who is learning lessons? It is us, more than anyone else. We need to learn the lesson, not to trust, and be prepared for such an eventuality, which can happen anytime. Only that this time the result should be different.
There is one aspect that is non-negotiable, the soldier on the border cannot understand the concept of differing lines and perceptions. The Line of Actual Control (LAC), is the line, where troops are so deployed to control the area up to that line, by patrolling, visual domination, and fire. He will understand only one line, which he shall protect with his life. Give him that clarity.
Conclusion
China has tried to alter the status quo in the border region in violation of existing treaties and covenants, by moving troops into sensitive areas and provoking confrontations, in the process transforming India’s security calculus.
As far as India is concerned, it has maintained that status quo ante with respect to the pre-2020 positions need to be restored. While the disengagement will lead to some improvement in bilateral ties it is crucial to ensure equilibrium or stability in this complicated relationship. Both sides need to build up trust and thereafter move ahead with regard to disengagement, de-escalation and de–induction of troops.
Resolving issues pertaining to patrolling may seem insignificant when viewed in the larger context of the LAC being contested and un-delineated and un-demarcated but it is in our interest as well as in the interests of the Chinese that there has been positive movement forward.
Speaking at the HT Summit on 16 November the External Affairs Minister said that; ‘the latest disengagement is only part of a process that must lead to a de-escalation and a resolution of the other issues linked to the bilateral relationship and does not signify a reset in ties at this stage”.
But to quote Harsh V Pant in the ‘Foreign Affairs’ “China and India have no desirable “normal” status quo to return to. Challenges abound in the bilateral relationship, and China’s ambitions continue to circumscribe India’s ability to act at the regional and global levels. Many flash points remain along the border and could be reactivated at any time by Xi’s aggressive regime. Although Prime Minister Modi has tried harder than his predecessors to hold a strong line against Chinese expansionism, India’s economy remains hugely dependent on China.”
Hence, we need to continue building our capabilities and capacities as well as enhance our infrastructure to be able to face any adversary with resolve.
There is no question that the violation of the LAC was a strategic error and, in that context, this diffusion is a step in the right direction. Restoration of trust is the only way forward to build bilateral relations. But both sides still have considerable distance to cover.
There is no doubt that India is alone in its fight in looking after her land borders and interests.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Maj Gen VK Singh, VSM was commissioned into The Scinde Horse in Dec 1983. The officer has commanded an Independent Recce Sqn in the desert sector, and has the distinction of being the first Armoured Corps Officer to command an Assam Rifles Battalion in Counter Insurgency Operations in Manipur and Nagaland, as well as the first General Cadre Officer to command a Strategic Forces Brigade. He then commanded 12 Infantry Division (RAPID) in Western Sector. The General is a fourth generation army officer.
Major General Jagatbir Singh was commissioned into 18 Cavalry in December 1981. During his 38 years of service in the Army he has held various command, staff and instructional appointments and served in varied terrains in the country. He has served in a United Nations Peace Keeping Mission as a Military Observer in Iraq and Kuwait. He has been an instructor to Indian Military Academy and the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. He is a prolific writer in defence & national security and adept at public speaking.
