Introduction
For the first time since the end of World War II, and the Cold War getting recessed in 1991, the world is contending with three conflicts playing out simultaneously in three continents. The Russia-Ukraine War, the first war in Europe since World War II. The conflict in West Asia namely the Israel–Gaza War following the Hamas attack on 07 October 2023 which has expanded to include Lebanon and Hezbollah, Iran and its proxies. There have been attacks by Houthi’s on both Israel and international shipping through the Red Sea. And now the region is witnessing the crisis in Syria which resulted in the sudden fall of the Assad rule. Following this a myriad of players supported by various external actors have emerged, with the current rule being in the hands of HTS, which owes its origin to the Al Qaeda. Further Israel is taking advantage of the flux by occupying areas in the buffer zone and capturing Mount Hermon.
This apart there are lingering tensions in the East and South China Sea, where an expansionist China under President Xi has its eyes on Taiwan, whom it wants to absorb into China.
Each of them individually has the ability to shape or reshape the world order whereas collectively they definitely have the profound implications on the specter of unipolarity or some semblance of multipolarity which we have seen since the emergence of China.
In these unending, long, drawn-out conflicts, new paradigms of warfighting are emerging along with possible countermeasures. These may solidify into principles and define theories of warfighting in the future which will also include those to do with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons which were used once to ‘end a war’ were then used throughout the cold war to ‘deter a conflict’ are now ‘nuclear deterrence has been turned on its head’ by President Putin and its threatened use is being used to provide ‘the strategic space to undertake conventional operations.’
Coupled with this is the emergence of a loose alliance of nuclear and quasi-nuclear states, including China, North Korea, Pakistan and Iran, to India’s North there is an emerging convergence of interests which will be India biggest security dilemma in the coming decade and pose a challenge for Indian strategic planners to deal with.
India’s Immediate Neighbours
China has unsettled land borders with both India and Bhutan. The PLA has a belligerent history, marked by aggression against India in 1962. Though there has been progress on the standoff in Ladakh since May 2020 resulting in an agreement on patrolling. But there have been unilateral Chinese attempts at salami-slicing in the Eastern sector in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim.
Apart from its direct confrontation with India it is also dominating India’s immediate neighbourhood, and as a result Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives, apart from Pakistan which is already in close concert with China, have seen an increase in Chinese presence and activities. The aggressive Chinese deployment and prolonged face-off in Ladakh further rekindled the focus on the collusive threat posed by China and Pakistan.
Pakistan today is going through one of its darkest periods, the year 2024 witnessed the highest number of terrorist attacks in the last ten years. The latest wave of militant raids in KP and Balochistan being a grim reminder of the resurgence of the menace with greater ferocity. The emerging nexus between what is being described as Talibanism and sectarianism is visible. There is growing political instability and to top it all its economic woes continue to surmount, with it now being reduced to asking for aid to clear its interest payments.
Bangladesh has seen the ouster of a democratically elected government; the fundamentalists are back in the driver’s seat and minorities are being targeted. In Myanmar a civil war has been ongoing since 2021 and rebel groups have seized control of key areas which the military are struggling to reclaim and are facing increasing setbacks. General Min Aung Hlaing’s regime has lost control of an entire border: the 270km (170 miles) dividing Myanmar from Bangladesh now wholly under Arakan Army control.
India’s Nuclear Neighbours
China and Pakistan are both nuclear powers and are actively seeking to expand and modernize their nuclear forces. China’s nuclear journey has played a considerable role in India’s own strategic outlook. While Pakistan has always been a major security concern, China’s aggressiveness in Galwan has resulted in a renewed focus on India’s Northern borders resulting in rebalancing and realignment of forces. To compound India’s concerns, Pakistan and China have a longstanding strategic partnership. The threat is now collusive and this has created its own security challenges.
The nuclearisation of Asia has further complicated this dynamic. Today out of nine, six nuclear weapon states other than USA, France and the UK are present in Asia. When India and Pakistan became declared nuclear weapons powers in 1998, nuclear deterrence did not lower the risks of conventional war. This deterrence has been unstable, primarily due to Pakistan’s continued reliance on non-conventional approaches.
India’s nuclear posture of ‘no-first-use’ and ‘massive retaliation’ against a nuclear attack has not assured deterrence against Pakistan’s – sub conventional war. Pakistan as per the ‘Arms Control Organisation’ is reported to have 170 nuclear warheads, which may be more than India’s stockpile.
Further, Pakistan has threatened using tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) to prevent India from conducting limited conventional wars. It believes that its nuclear doctrine, ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence,’ unveiled in 2013, further reinforces its deterrence capabilities across all levels of conflict. The threat of nuclear escalation, even at a tactical level, it feels could compel India to maintain a measured response in any potential conflict, making Pakistan’s TNWs a critical deterrent through credible signaling rather than actual battlefield use. But India’s stance is very clear as it believes in massive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage even if someone uses a tactical nuclear weapon. India’s 2016 surgical strikes following the Uri attack and the 2019 Balakot airstrikes challenged Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence posture. While Pakistan downplayed these actions to maintain its deterrence credible, they exposed the gaps in its ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence’.
In its annual “China Military Power Report,” the Pentagon said the PLA had expanded its arsenal by 20 percent in the 12 months from mid-2023 and was on track to have 1,000 operational warheads by 2030. The report also states that the PLA Rocket Force, which manages most of China’s nuclear arsenal, was developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles that would significantly improve its nuclear-capability.
China aims to be a global power by 2049 and its military strength is growing accordingly both in the conventional and nuclear space. It has developed the longest-range missiles as also the Hypersonic glide vehicles. But its doctrine is of “no first use.” Their white paper clearly states that China will not use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances which leads to strategic stability as far as India is concerned. But the issue is that its ballistic missiles have a dual use capability, so if they launch a missile, it is not clear whether it is carrying a nuclear or conventional warhead.
Hence, two large countries with unresolved borders, equipped with nuclear weapons, make it imperative for both countries to seek meaningful reconciliation and this is what seems to be emerging with the recent six-point consensus for a peaceful roadmap following the talks between the NSA and the Chinese Foreign Minister on 18 December 2024.
China and Pakistan are both pursuing new ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and sea-based nuclear delivery systems. North Korea continues its nuclear pursuits in violation of its earlier denuclearization pledges. Pakistan and North Korea are also pursuing the capability to deploy multiple warheads on ballistic missiles, something China already has. This would enable a rapid potential increase in deployed warheads, as well as the possibility for nuclear-armed countries to threaten the destruction of significantly more targets.
Conclusion
The largely unseen dynamic unfolding on to India’s North needs to be more acutely observed. The China-Pakistan–Iran–North Korea friendship and subsequent nuclear spectrum is full of strategic risks and instabilities, posing a concerning threat.
The region therefore is one of the theatres for nuclear posturing due to the military-technological modernizations, and expansion of nuclear arsenal and can be a driver of instability bringing the region closer to a nuclear crisis.
Today long-drawn-out conflicts with indeterminate objectives are emerging as the new normal. Hence, the complex interplay of conventional and non-conventional strategies in a nuclear environment makes India’s security distinct and means we cannot tiptoe around a nuclear threat or its fallout.
China’s regional dominance shows no signs of abating, and the global security landscape continues to change in multiple ways. Therefore, in order to protect its vital interests against threats emanating from Pakistan and China, as well as from the alliance and architecture of the quasi-nuclear states which have the ability to transform India’s security threats, India needs to safeguard itself by developing and maintaining its hard power which includes nuclear guardrails.
Having identified these challenges, we need to confront and deal with them and thereafter have the ability to surmount them. Though this challenge is not presently within our immediate consciousness but will have a germane bearing on our national security dilemmas in the years ahead.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Major General Jagatbir Singh VSM, (Retd), has held various command, staff and instructional appointments and served in varied terrains in the country. He has served in a United Nations Peace Keeping Mission as a Military Observer in Iraq and Kuwait. He has been an instructor to Indian Military Academy and the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. He has commanded the prestigious 1 Armoured Division. He is a prolific writer in defence & national security and is a Distinguished Fellow at USI.
