We focus on South Asia, India’s immediate neighbourhood. Here, we have some perspectives, solutions, on the way forward.
Navin Berry: Last few months, we’ve had quite a few startling revelations, so to say. We find that South Asia; we thought we were the dominant power within our South Asian region. Now we begin to see that China is also in South Asia. So, is that true? How the South Asian scene has changed? It’s not just Doklam. There is also Bangladesh, there is also Myanmar. Sri Lanka, Maldives are playing quiet. Mr. Bisaria, I would like to start with you. Has the reality of South Asia dawned upon us in the diplomatic community that we need to take a fresh look at what is South Asia, where is our interest in it?
Ajay Bisaria: I think this conversation about South Asia is an old one, whether we have lost South Asia, given the internal dynamics in each of the neighbours. We often ask this question whether we have lost them and particularly with the rise of China and China’s activism in South Asia. But I would like to make the argument that we have a fairly robust South Asia policy and that is Neighborhood First. It’s seen multiple avatars. It’s not just this government, but from the 90s, where we’ve tried to privilege the neighborhood and that basically means having asymmetric relationships and I think the larger compact that India offers is that you be a supporter of my security and I will be asymmetrically a part of your prosperity.
That is what helps India give $4 billion to Sri Lanka during a crisis or $8 billion of lines of credit to Bangladesh. Now, each of these countries will have a certain internal dynamic where they will throw up some regimes friendly to India, some not at different points of time. We have to play the long game of having cultivated publics in those countries.
Also, the fact of a rising China within Asia, competing to be the Asian hegemon, in order to go on to its larger aim of competing with the United States to be the global hegemon is a reality which we cannot change by very smart policy. So, I think we have to be chipping at it. We have to be spending that money in South Asia. We have to be asymmetric about it. And we have to be realist about it. You know the Taliban has come to Afghanistan but we have spent 3 billion dollars in projects there so we have a certain goodwill and despite the fact that the Taliban does all these human rights abuses we will have to deal with it in some shape or form as long as it is not directly threatening our security. So, I think net, I would say India is doing a fairly decent job of being asymmetrically involved in the neighbourhood but it needs to step up that act and do a way better job of offering attractive propositions to each of the neighbors.
Kamal Malhotra: Well, my perspective is that China is already the hegemon in East and Southeast Asia and that it has made significant inroads into South Asia. There are at least five or six of our neighbors where China is a major player. You just have to list them. And of course, most recently, Bangladesh, which I think is a result of India’s serious mistakes over the last 15 years, since 2008 in particular. The neighborhood first policy is fine on paper, but in practice, if you talk to a lot of our neighbors, they are not happy with India. Whether it’s Sri Lanka, whether it’s the Maldives, of course I’m not even counting Pakistan; Bangladesh now. I mean Bangladesh was not a country we should have lost. And I think it’s a very significant setback.
Navin Berry: Is there a chance you’re being premature in saying you’ve lost Bangladesh? Because too many times, it can happen that we are a little too restive.
There will be, like there is a change of regime in Bangladesh. It will have some consequential impact on our relationship with them for a period of time but as these people settle in their jobs, the new regime, they will also come to realize; after all, we cannot be dismissed, we also have, so to say, they also share a border with us.
Kamal Malhotra: My point is a slightly different one, which is that we should never have lost. We should never have gotten ourselves into the situation we currently are with Bangladesh. It was the one neighboring country where we had, the strongest positive relationships over a long period of time, starting of course from 1971, and we are now where we are. And there have been significant inroads of both Pakistan and China into Bangladesh quite recently. I mean in the case of China, increasingly Pakistan, for a long period of time, in alliance with the people who are now in power.
So, I think that it’s a very unfortunate situation that we have a neighborhood where we can’t clearly talk about long term friends at the moment. I have not even talked about Nepal.
AM Sanjeev Kapoor: My take on the whole thing is both in 1970-71 when the unrest in Bangladesh East Pakistan began, the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, after he took power, was continuously briefed by Indian intelligence that he would be murdered and the army will take lead into that. He didn’t pay heed. Similar thing happened when Sheikh Haseena was informed by our RAW and other agencies to say that the army is becoming too powerful. The whole issue which we are discussing is that there is a deep state which we all know. Just look at the mayor elections of New York which have happened two days ago. This complete funding by the deep state, the leftist ideology, they are pushing in their agenda and people at the correct place. Yunus has been brought from nowhere and put in Bangladesh. So, the larger game being played at global level is my take on the whole subject that we have to look at it the people do not want India to rise and they are in collusion with our neighbors to make sure that this agenda is fulfilled.
Iqbal Malhotra: I have a broader point to make about South Asia. Like globalization, there’s a concept of deviant globalization, which is the integration of international crime syndicates and criminal organizations. Now, Afghanistan today is the biggest contract manufacturer of meth amphetamines and heroin. And this contract manufacturing is done for the ISI, for the directed S of the ISI that controls this. Recently there was this talk about the Taliban making overtures to India. The fight was between the ISI and the Taliban that they were not getting enough money. Now, if you look at the scale of money involved in this, in 2019 the London School of Economics did a study where they went to the biggest meth market, wholesale market in the world. It is called the Bakwa market in a province of Afghanistan. There, they did a study and they discovered that one metric ton of crystal meth you could purchase in the Bakwa market for 320,000 US dollars. And in 2019, that same metric ton retailed in North America on the streets for 40 million dollars. Now this was 103 times the price at which it was acquired. Now the ISI has got in touch and is in partnership with the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel. I have written two books on this subject. So, I have studied it deeply. And they are earning revenue on their non-official GDP account of about 30 billion dollars plus which is how they are paying for these J-10 fighters and the J-35s and all this network-centric warfare and everything else.
How can a country which is expecting a bailout of 1 billion dollars from the IMF actually fund the acquisition and the life cycle procurement of Chinese J-35s. There is a logic behind why things happen. So, you cannot just disregard this and you cannot say that we have to build bridges with them when you know that look, this is a hostile area. There is a NARCO state which has an independent nuclear deterrent which is integrating now, look at Mr. Trump, his family is invested in the cryptocurrency business. They have a hedge fund in the US which has located itself in Dubai. That hedge fund has invested 200 million dollars in a cryptocurrency platform. He goes and does a deal with Mr. Munir because Mr. Munir wants to launder his money and Mr. Trump wants to make money. So, there are so many linkages and you cannot look at it very simplistically or childishly and say that look this is the way we look at things traditionally. This is a very complex scenario. It’s a chess board where the Russians are playing chess, the Chinese are playing Go, somebody else is playing some other game and all these games are intercrossing, interlinking.
For example, the Chinese, they say, were supplying five 747 freighter loads of equipment to the Iranians and the transponder of those aircrafts was shut down when they crossed over into Iranian airspace. At the same time the Iranians were launching missiles at Haifa port which was up in flames. And half of Haifa port is owned by the Chinese and half of it is owned by Mr. Adani. So, there is a contradiction there.
Now why didn’t Putin criticize Israel? Because out of 7 million Israelis, 1 million speak Russian. They are Russian Jews. And Putin and Netanyahu have a certain equation and certain friendship. And their deep states of both countries have deep ties. So, it is a very complex equation.
AM Sanjeev Kapoor: Yesterday the Israeli ambassador was asked this question how did you manage China and Russia during this 60-day period which you gave to Iran and he mentioned what Iqbal is just saying that we have very good equation with Russians. This is what the ambassador is saying. We have very good equations with Russians and we have deep ties with which we were sure that they will not do anything. And when we left Syria, he said, we gave them a place in Syria. So, the Russians were given a place in Syria, courtesy Israelis, so he says give and take continues in this kind of a diplomacy.
Rear Admiral Anil Chopra: Oh, while there are many, many, as you rightly said, access to the chessboard, I think sometimes, in our thinking we can get overcomplicated. And one of the things that the Israeli attack on Iran showed, besides whatever else is there, is the limits of Russian and Chinese military power to be able to project it far away from their shores. This is everything else apart from the diplomacy, the games. The fact is that China and Russia, even if they wish to, will not do anything in Iran. They just don’t have the military capability. So, my point again is simple.
In a world in which there are many, many chess pieces, the only real way for India to land up anywhere is through capacity and capability building. Call it peace through strength, call it deterrence, call it whatever. Here it was the case where you’re looking at Chinese or Russian reaction to Iran, but we are forgetting that they just don’t have the military power to match this. And in its own way, while we may say hundreds of people talking about the decline of the United States, it’s not there. It is still a unit full of the power. China is challenging it. It’s nowhere near. And if I may just bring in the maritime angle for a minute, the Chinese, any great power in history, from Spain, Portugal, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, has to have had the capacity to project power across the globe. And you can do it through the maritime flank. You can’t do it anywhere else for the simple reason that that is a common international thing. So, what I’m trying to say is China, again, we talk about it. It is very vulnerable in the Indian Ocean. I can assure you the vulnerabilities China faces in the Indian Ocean are so severe that they keep our northern border alive partly to make sure our funding and our focus remains northward. Because the Indian Ocean is a trap. It’s easy to come in and out of this ocean in peacetime. Try ingressing or regressing from this ocean during hostilities. Your capacity to influence things depends a lot on your military capability.
General Ashok Shivane: If you look at the global dynamics which are there, I think every region across the world, the chessboard is actually being altered by extra regional powers. Not only South Asia, take it everywhere, Europe, take it Middle East, take it anywhere, Africa, everywhere. Therefore, each region is being played up not only by national interest but also by spheres of influence, by regional powers across. China is playing strategically. It will not get into a war or even a skirmish of higher level than Galwan with India. But it will play the proxy through Bangladesh or through Pakistan. So, why we keep talking of collusion? Today we should be talking of fusion.
Why we are talking of one front, two front, three front, two and a half fronts? We should be talking of two in one front. And two in one front not only military. It is also diplomatic, political, technological and military. So, therefore, what India needs to do, the only way is you can is power ensures peace. You have to be powerful not only militarily but also economically. And if you are looking at calling our destination of Viksit Bharat, it will not happen unless we are Surakshit Bharat. And the threat to Surakshit Bharat today, my belief is, is going to be more internal than external. The threats external, are being focused but the internal threats are brewing, being played up with the fault lines and that is where I think the major threat to our destination lies.
Navin Berry: Which is what I was referring to earlier. When I said that we need to bring the opposition and the governing party, all together, on the same page, and this one step or one situation bonhomie of all political parties, where they went on these foreign trips, should not be a one-time affair but it should become the new narrative where opposition and the governing party are on the same page on all national issues.
General V. K. Singh: Sir, it’s not that magic wand that suddenly today your capability is zero and tomorrow it becomes 100 out of 100. This takes time and there is an interim. In that interim, is there a call for alliances? We saw that we were absolutely alone post this event. I think that could also be a thought. That is also capability building. And I don’t know who to turn to. Of course, we have some time-tested friends, but God knows if they are still there.
General P S Rajeshwar: At least for the military, I feel South Asia is very, very key, whether you are looking at the continental domain, near air domain. And even if you want to project power, you need some kind of a firm base from where to go. Even when I was looking at maritime power, which we have not actually kind of projected that we can. And in the future, we have to utilize this space. And therefore, South Asia is very key. While we try to be bigger than what we are today, by having linkages with all parts of the globe, the thing is like in the military, the word firm base. You don’t have a firm base. You cannot actually place any kind of bomb.
If that is weak, you will recall. And some of the recall will happen. Especially my fear is that if we are vulnerable in South Asia, there is a lot of work to be done to overcome that and we should never take our eyes off. It’s a very important thing. We already have two adversities which can affect us. So, I think South Asia and as our adversities rise and we will also rise as we are rising, they will try and cut down our advantages.
And I would say also the near waters that you have to commanded both boards – seaboards east and west, if we are vulnerable here in the naval domain or in the maritime domain or the air domain, then we have a challenge.
Navin Berry: Admiral sir, I have a question for you taking off from what General Rajeshwar said. Looking at our position in South Asia, we have neighbors up in the north where the army comes into force, the air force comes into force. Looking down south, three, four countries, if you include even Mauritius further down, it’s our naval force that comes into picture more along with the air force. How do we stand there militarily in the seas in terms of let’s say perceived enemies of India?
Rear Admiral Anil Chopra: Now that you’ve asked me the question you’ll have to humor me for some time. There are one or two misconceptions about any Navy which need to be first thought out of the way. Navies don’t defend coastlines or peninsulas or the seaboard. Navies actually move out into the deep ocean, find the enemy, bring him to rest, and destroy them as far away from the coast as possible. Most naval battles between the regimes have been as long back as seven years ago. For example, the French and the British were far fighting in India. Our naval power, by grace of events, and God maybe, has managed to build itself up quite credibly during the last 75 years.
And we are now a blue force, a three-dimensional blue force, which makes its own aircraft carriers and its own nuclear submarines. But the Navy is an expensive business. Only economically strong countries can afford competent navies. And as an offside of what the General said, it is first you have to be strong economically before you can be strong militarily. And our recent economic upswing has reflected itself in bolstering our maritime forces and infrastructure. But as I said a little while ago, our focus is always taken away from the sea by the kind of stuff that we face on our land borders. And it’s part of a good Chinese strategy. It’s succeeding, because they managed. And navies don’t influence, are not forces, cross-border forces. They are not forces which are limited by borders or airspace. They can operate anywhere in the world, only 12 miles off any coastline. So, it depends on how much power you have.
If the US Navy, or the Chinese Navy, or the Soviet Navy, or the Royal Navy in the old days, they just could move anywhere on the globe. And they had the bases and the allies to do so. The Chinese, they don’t have a single base in the Indian Ocean, except Karachi. A place where you go and take a ship and get water and fuel and food is not a base. A naval base is where you can repair ships coming back from action, put them out to sea again, replenish their ammunition, their missiles, and the base has to be very secure.
I mean, Djibouti is a base. How can it be a base when it is surrounded by seven bases of NATO countries? Chinese can’t fight from there. They can go there to peace time and show a flag and take some R&R. There’s only one base, and that is Karachi. And why? Because Chinese and Pakistanis have set up dockyard facilities for repair of the same submarine that ships which the Chinese are going to deploy in the Indian Ocean. So, if he’s struck in action, or his propeller’s broken and he has to dry dock, he can’t go all the way back to China and certainly not in hostilities. So where does he go? The only place he can go is Karachi. And so, there’s, again, we’ve been talking about, it’s a very pointed collaboration to be able to repair both Pakistani and Chinese ships in the infrastructure which is being set up.
Iqbal Malhotra: I wanted to ask, you are talking about building capabilities, I think 2-3 years ago your latest aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was launched without a complimentary aircraft and even though this deal was done with the French, the first aircraft is coming in 2030, so what is going to happen to the next five years?
Rear Admiral Anil Chopra: Yeah, but you know, it’s a very important question I have to tell you. The latest USS Ford, the latest carrier which has come out of the United States, took 11 years to build. And when it was launched, the aircraft, it was not ready there. The HMS Prince of Wales and the HMS Queen Elizabeth II have been commissioned without aircraft. F-35s were yet to come to the UK from the US. To manage, to launch or commission an aircraft carrier and converge the aircraft coming at the same time is a tricky business. But for a normal ship today, a normal frigate, the build times are 6 to 7 years, even abroad. Because these ships have now become so complex, and there’s only about 300 to 400 subsystems, from sewage to weaponry.
The Navy’s been asking for three, because one third of the Navy fleet is always in maintenance or refueling. So, one third to one quarter. So we are, if you need aircraft carriers on both sides, you will need to have three. But we’ve never been able to get the funding or the go ahead because we just don’t have, we are bogged down in all the stuff that we’ve been talking about. And that’s the reality of the time. We don’t have the money.
