Introduction
The Jaffar Express is one of Pakistan’s most prestigious long-distance trains. It is also a prime target for Baloch freedom fighters who have struck it four times in the past three years itself. On 11 March 2025, the Jaffar Express, left Quetta station at 9 am, packed with locals, and security personal. It laboured up the rugged mountains of Baluchistan, crossing several tunnels and bridges along the way. At around 1.30 pm as it approached tunnel 8 between Pehro Kunri and Gadalar stations, when an IED detonated the tracks, derailing the engine and bringing the train to a halt. Its nine coaches were occupied by approximately 450 passengers. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) stormed the carriages and took the passengers hostage. For more than 36 hours, Pakistan’s security forces were locked in a tense standoff with the BLA, in one of the most brazen attacks the country had ever witnessed.
Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry claimed that, under Operation Green Bolan, all the hostages were rescued while 33 terrorists involved in the attack were killed. The operation, resulted in the rescue of 354 passengers. However, 26 hostages lost their lives, including 18 military and Frontier Corps personnel, three railway employees, and five civilians.
However, the BLA, in their statement, claimed to have released the hostages. They claimed to have killed 60 security personnel, in response to military actions. They also confirmed that 12 fighters of the group were killed, including five suicide bombers from the Majeed Brigade. What is the truth, shall remain a mystery.
Again, on 16 March 2025, BLA’s Majeed Brigade, targeted a Pakistani military convoy of eight buses in Baluchistan’s Nushki district. 90 Pak army personnel were reportedly killed in this attack, though the official figures were less. In the 48 hours, from 15 to 17 March 2025, Baloch rebels launched 57 attacks. These assaults by various modes, resulted in death and injury.
The escalating insurgency has exposed the state’s weakening grip over its restive provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, as both terrorists and separatist groups grow bolder. Groups such as the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and separatist outfits such as the BLA have intensified their campaigns, exploiting the nation’s deepening economic instability and political turmoil following the ouster of Imran Khan in 2022. The fall of Kabul in 2021 and the subsequent return of the Taliban to Afghanistan have emboldened terror outfits, including the TTP, while also fueling violence from the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).
The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2025 now ranks Pakistan as the world’s second most terrorism-affected country, after Burkina Faso. According to the report, terrorism-related deaths surged by 45% in 2024 to 1081, while attacks more than doubled from 517 to 1099.
At the same time, Pakistan’s growing alliance with China has strained its relations with the US, leading to a decline in American support.
Recent Incidents
Even before the Jaffar Express hijacking, Pakistan witnessed near-daily terror attacks in Baluchistan and KP. Pakistan has faced a surge in terrorism, ranging from suicide bombings and targeted assassinations, to complex assaults on military bases and mosques.
On 19 February seven labourers hailing from Punjab were killed aboard a bus en route Lahore. Two days before that, an affiliate of the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group claimed responsibility for the killing of a police officer in Karachi’s Manghopir area.
On 03 March, a female suicide bomber of the BLA targeted a security forces’ convoy in Baluchistan’s Kalat, leading to the death a paramilitary soldier and injuring four others. A day later, on 04 March two suicide bombers affiliated with the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, a North Waziristan-based terror outfit, drove vehicles packed with explosives into a military base in KP’s, Bannu District. The attackers subsequently stormed the compound, resulting in at least 18 deaths, including five soldiers, and numerous injured. Before that, a suicide bombing targeted a mosque within the Darul Uloom Haqqania seminary in KP’s, Nowshera District, an institution historically linked to the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. The attack killed six worshippers, including the seminary’s Vice Principal and former senator Maulana Hamidul Haq. No group has officially claimed responsibility, but security analysts and officials believe ISKP was behind the bombing.
The Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), an umbrella grouping of Baloch insurgent organisations, has announced plans to “intensify the blockade on all important highways of Baluchistan to disrupt the logistical, economic, and military interests of the state”.
These are some of the major incidents that made headlines in the last month alone which reflect the evolving tactics of terror outfits, their growing brazenness, and their increasing operational capabilities.
Baloch groups, particularly the BLA and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), have significantly escalated their insurgency in 2024, targeting Pakistani security forces, infrastructure, and foreign investments.
The deadliest attack of 2024 was the attack at Quetta railway station in November, which killed at least 25 civilians and security personnel. This underscored the BLA’s growing operational capacity and its ability to carry out high-profile, high-casualty assaults.
According to MEMRI (Middle East Media Research Institute) Daily Brief of 21 February 2025, “The time for Baluchistan’s freedom has arrived. A moment like that of 1971, which led to the creation of Bangladesh out of Pakistan, is here again.
However, Pakistan’s military and ISI still do not want to admit it openly. In a press conference, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) chief declared, “We will take them on, their facilitators, and abettors whether inside Pakistan or outside. They will be dealt with sternly and in the way, those killing innocent people deserve to be treated.”
The Blame Game
A day after the hijacking of the Jaffar Express by the Baluchistan Liberation Army ended, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, went to Quetta to take stock of matters, while the Foreign Office shared details of external involvement in the incident. Prime Minister Sharif reiterated the need for national unity at this time of crisis, and acknowledged that the lack of development in Baluchistan was an obstacle to eliminating terrorism. The Foreign Office, meanwhile, reaffirmed the military’s earlier assertion that the train hijacking had been coordinated from Afghanistan, while adding that “India is sponsoring terrorism” in Pakistan.
Earlier, the government had repeatedly been raising concerns about the Afghan Taliban’s lack of action regarding TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan. Now, it feels that BLA terrorists are being allowed to entrench themselves across the border and plan attacks on Pakistan. The Pakistani Government blaming the Taliban, has stated that unless action is taken against all anti-Pakistan terrorists on Afghan soil, bilateral ties will not improve. Kabul denied the allegations.
Speaking during the UN Security Council briefing on Afghanistan in New York on 14 March, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Munir Akram stated that the Taliban had “failed to address the threat posed to the region and beyond by other terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, the TTP and Baloch terrorists, including the BLA and the Majeed Brigade, which are present in Afghanistan.” “The TTP also receives external support and financing from our principal adversary,” the envoy said in an apparent reference to India.
The DG ISPR linked the attack to Afghanistan, stating that the hijackers were in constant communication with their handlers across the border but also said that “in this terrorist incident in Baluchistan, and others before, the main sponsor is our eastern neighbour.” Given Pakistan’s tendency to blame India for almost every issue, such claims are difficult to accept without solid evidence The Indian government categorically rejected Pakistan’s allegations. “We reject the baseless accusations made by Pakistan. The whole world knows where the epicenter of global terrorism is. Pakistan should look within itself, instead of blaming others for its internal problems and failures,” Ministry of External Affairs Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said.
Afghanistan also denied any connection between the attackers and its territory. “Pakistan should focus on its security and resolving its internal issues instead of making irresponsible statements,” a statement from Kabul read.
What Fueled the Growth of Baloch Militancy
Bugti’s death only highlighted the shortcomings of military action, as it failed to address the true needs and aspirations of the tribal population. A lack of genuine engagement led to the rise of additional armed separatist groups, which now not only target Pakistani security forces and Chinese interests but also attack migrant workers.
In fact, the increasing alienation of the population due to deprivation of democratic and economic rights, use of force to suppress protests, and growing incidents of enforced disappearances has fueled anger, particularly among the youth. This has provided the separatist groups, sympathisers, and recruits.
The policy of persecution turned a young Doctor Mahrang Baloch whose father was murdered into a leading human rights activist against alleged enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Her increasingly vocal Baloch rights-based movement, the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC or Baloch Unity Committee), comprising mainly of women activists is gaining in popularity.
Further the massive rigging carried out in last elections in Baluchistan have led to anger at the blatant misuse of authority and corruption by those who conducted the polls leading to an erosion of the state’s writ. Pakistan has a strange relationship with democracy, including foisting an unrepresentative government on its people. Mandates are denied, winners declared losers, even court judgments flouted to stop one party from gaining its rightful share. This is having an impact and leads to a strong sense of alienation.
The continuing enforced disappearances and dumping of tortured dead bodies are pushing many of the victims’ family members towards militancy. Even those who have been peacefully protesting the state excesses are branded traitors.
The CPEC and associated issues have only helped in worsening the situation. Gwadar’s historic fishing communities, for example, have seen their livelihoods destroyed by corporate trawlers, while the wider population has been ravaged by state and private profiteers.
There is widespread incompetence at various levels, and public services are in shambles. Whether it is education, healthcare, infrastructure, or economic development, the government appears to be disconnected from everyday problems of the people. The result is that most of the population continues to live in poverty without access to quality education, healthcare, clean drinking water, or employment opportunities. Hence, people obviously become more receptive to those who promise an alternative system, even if it is based on violence and rebellion.
Another critical issue is the complete lack of ownership that Baloch people feel over their affairs. Despite being rich in resources, Baluchistan’s local population has little to no say in how they are managed or where the profits go. Whether it is Gwadar, Saindak, or Reko Diq, common Balochs feel that the key decisions are made elsewhere, often without any consultation with local stakeholders. The extraction of natural gas, minerals, and other valuable resources continues, but the benefits rarely reach the people who live in the province. People feel that their identity, history, and rights are constantly being sidelined.
It is apparent that the Baloch militants are now better organised and seem to have a stronger support base that allows them to operate effectively. The province is now fast turning into a full-blown insurrection with the growing alienation of the local population.
The fact is that the ground realities in Baluchistan have worsened to a point where these events are not just isolated acts of violence, they are symptoms of a much deeper problem. These groups are not growing stronger on their own. They are feeding off the frustration, anger, and hopelessness that many young people in Baluchistan feel today. When citizens believe that the state has failed to deliver justice, provide opportunities, or even listen to their concerns, they start looking elsewhere for a sense of purpose.
The Chinese Connection
The province is also home to one of Pakistan’s major deep-sea ports at Gwadar, a crucial trade corridor for the $62 billion CPEC, which aims to link southwestern China to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan.
As the CPEC and related infrastructure projects began in 2010, the Chinese presence in Baluchistan began growing. BLA strongly opposed the CPEC. Huge swathes of land were forcibly acquired, but the promised compensation was never paid. Large sections of Gwadar city were fenced off effectively restricting access to the locals. Expectations of thousands of jobs, modernisation of infrastructure, and boosting of economic growth not only amounted to naught but displaced the locals and destroyed their properties.
The largest conflict driver in Baluchistan today is Gwadar. The Balochs were excluded from Gwadar’s development process. The Project was run entirely by the Federal Government which employed only a few Balochs in construction, instead relying on Chinese engineers and labourers. There is a perception that China’s ulterior motive behind the CPEC is to drain the natural resources of Baluchistan.
The resentment against the project led to a series of attacks on Chinese personal. Suicide bombers struck vehicles carrying Chinese engineers, the Pearl Continental Hotel at Gwadar was hit by a bomb, and other Chinese nationals were systematically targeted. The attacks virtually stalled the CPEC and forced the Pakistani Army Chief to fly to Beijing to give personal assurance for the safety of the project. Two full army divisions were earmarked to protect the CPEC. However, it was easier said than done because the terrain was treacherous where only the Baloch could operate, having learnt the art of ambush over the past 250 years. Keeping the road and rail lines open between Baluchistan and the rest of the country proved to be a nightmare.
The repeated BLA attacks have prompted concern about the risks posed to major infrastructure projects located in Baluchistan, including the port of Gwadar and a planned mining project at Reqo Dik in Chagai District.
An Assessment
The attack on Jaffar Express is likely to provoke a severe retribution from Pakistan’s political and security establishment—an approach that has historically been its default response, rather than seeking dialogue or negotiation.
Pakistan needs to implement an effective strategy to counter the insurgency by developing a multi-pronged approach that combines military, intelligence, and law enforcement operations with political and socio-economic measures. Human Rights abuses, disappearances, and staged encounters do more harm than good and agitate the population and can be counterproductive to the very institutions they are fighting to protect.
Baluchistan’s people should be given priority in jobs and training in local and foreign projects. The locals must benefit from the CPEC and not be oppressed by it.
Pakistan’s Political, economic, and military situation has hit its nadir. There are voices against the Army Chief Asim Munir. Drastic predicaments may invite drastic actions like a Mutiny, or a Civil War.
This is not Pakistan’s problem alone; it is also China’s problem.
However, having raised various concerns, the fact remains that Pakistan and China are all weather friends. There has been no letup in supply of military equipment by China to Pakistan. Pakistan is reportedly set to acquire 40, J-35 fifth-generation stealth aircraft from China. They already have the JF 17 and J10C fighter aircrafts that were procured earlier. In addition, the Heavy Industry Taxila set to make 600 Haider Tanks or the Chinese VT-4/MBT 3000 and Submarine deliveries are continuing on schedule.
In such an alarming situation The Pakistani establishment is likely to play its time-tested trump card. To divert the attention by staging an incident in the neighbouring country, as has happened in the past. This calls for vigilance.
In the long run, India must identify the adversary. It is not Pakistan or China individually, but both Pakistan and China, collectively. Therefore, in all our calculations, planning, thinking, and strategising we must take both nations as one. In any future incident/conflict with either, the other will be involved. The extent of the involvement may vary.
Conclusion
With terror networks expanding and state authority eroding, Pakistan’s security challenges are reaching a breaking point. The question now is whether the government can reclaim control or will the insurgency further spiral out of hand.
While there is a visible security angle to the Baluchistan crisis, at its heart it is a political problem, which needs a political solution. A solely militarised response has failed to deliver.
Unfortunately, Pakistan while feeling the pinch of terrorism in its West and making statements regarding ‘elimination of all forms of terrorism’ does exactly the opposite when it comes to its Eastern border with India in J&K and Punjab. Hence statements such as these are of little consequence because they act differently.
Pakistan has been unable to move beyond clichés to pursue a lasting solution. The current round of insurgency in Baluchistan has raged for almost two decades, and was originally triggered by the regime of General Pervez Musharraf, who, had announced ‘they won’t know what hit them.’ Today Pakistan does not know what has hit them.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Maj Gen VK Singh, VSM was commissioned into The Scinde Horse in Dec 1983. The officer has commanded an Independent Recce Sqn in the desert sector, and has the distinction of being the first Armoured Corps Officer to command an Assam Rifles Battalion in Counter Insurgency Operations in Manipur and Nagaland, as well as the first General Cadre Officer to command a Strategic Forces Brigade. He then commanded 12 Infantry Division (RAPID) in Western Sector. The General is a fourth generation army officer.
Major General Jagatbir Singh was commissioned into 18 Cavalry in December 1981. During his 38 years of service in the Army he has held various command, staff and instructional appointments and served in varied terrains in the country. He has served in a United Nations Peace Keeping Mission as a Military Observer in Iraq and Kuwait. He has been an instructor to Indian Military Academy and the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. He is a prolific writer in defence & national security and adept at public speaking.
