So much got called out, as an aftermath of the 4-day retaliation by the Indian Armed Forces, that it would take a while to configure the path ahead. India has signalled a strong response, even if it means having to go on her own. But then the world is watching us, standing by us, in our war against terror, and this should equally hold us in good company. In a recent conversation, we bring together Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh, Director General and Ambassador Nalin Surie, Distinguished Fellow, both of Delhi Policy Group, a renowned think tank, as they delve into ‘Operation Sindoor: Security Implications and Geopolitical Aftermath.’
Hemant Krishan Singh: Nalin, I would like you to begin with your reading of the international response to the Pahalgam atrocity. We saw that after initial expressions of sympathy following the terrorist attack and even the UN Security Council’s call to hold perpetrators to account, this was followed soon after by appeals for de-escalation.
Nalin Surie: I think you have to divide the reactions which we got after the Pahalgam attacks into two clear segments. The first segment was we got when 26 Hindus got slaughtered. There was a usual condemnation. Some countries said yes, the perpetrator should be brought to justice. And the usual process is continued in the expectation that India will act as it has had in the past. It will be assuaged by these kinds of statements of condemnation.
Now, they went a step further this time, actually, the United Nations Security Council of which Pakistan is currently a non-permanent member, issued a presidential statement which as you know is non-binding, which is like a statement which condemns terrorism. It also said that the perpetrators must be brought to justice, etc. But it did not take into cognizance the fact that a certain Indian religious community had been singled out and slaughtered. I think the messaging to us is very clear, be assuaged by this statement, we are all on your side, we all hate terrorism etc. and hopefully you will react and do things the way they should be done.
We of course took our time to prepare our counter-reaction. I think the response from the Cabinet Committee on Security the next day on 23rd April was very clear. I believe the international community and our neighbours Pakistan made a big mistake in not reading the subtext of that statement, of the CCS statement. I think the determination of the government on this occasion to do more than just act in a manner that is demonstrative was quite clear, at least to me.
The fact that we decided to put in abeyance the Indus water treaty was a clear sign of that and the other steps which had been announced. No doubt, I think our neighbour Pakistan to the west, began their preparations. They have the background of Balakot and the earlier strike against terrorist infrastructure camps in POK. I think the fact that nothing happened for a few days may have brought in a sense of complacency that maybe India is going to go the the normal way.
And then suddenly we unleashed this new electronic-based warfare. We attacked terrorist infrastructure camps, consciously avoided civilian and military targets and we punished the terrorists. There were 21 camps we identified. We attacked some of them, in effect leaving the message out in the open that if need be, we can attack the remaining 12 camps also.
I think, that not just Pakistan, but the international community had been caught off guard, is a reflection of how well this operation was planned and how non-conventional it was in its formulation and its execution. The expected reaction came from Pakistan.
We had said that we would not react unless our military targets or civilian targets were hit. That is exactly what they did. And they probably again expected and so did the international community that maybe this would be the tit-for-tat, would be over. Again, they did not read the signal which had been made clear by the spokespersons in their interventions in public. And we hit back hard at military targets and caused a lot of damage.
I think that is when both Pakistan and their main supporters and those who worry most about the India-Pakistan being a flashpoint, got really worried. As usual, telephone calls started being made. The line taken by India was consistent, it was focused, remained consistent and focused. Obviously, some countries thought that they could take credit for bringing about what we are calling a cessation of firing, not a ceasefire. Whatever the terms used, I think the fact is that they got worried enough for the Pakistani DGMO to call our DGMO and say, look, we should stop this and we agreed because they said they would agree. But I think we also made it clear that as far as we were concerned, this is only a suspension of the action.
The statement which the Prime Minister made on the 12th of May, I think is now a fundamental change in strategy. I think this is probably going to make the world wake up and listen for a change. And more importantly make our colleagues in Pakistan, especially in the armed forces, wake up and listen.
The second aspect of the reason for this long explanation is that the second sort of reaction which came in, was suddenly now, please de-escalate, stop the fighting. You’re both nuclear weapon states. The usual old argument came into play. I think in this occasion also, even after the second set of arguments, it became clear to us. That look, on issues like this, we stand alone. There was no real desire to recognize the fact that this is an effort at instigating ethnic cleansing, creating communal disharmony. We will be able to use the international community to the extent that it’s willing to help us. But in the ultimate analysis, we have to fight this battle ourselves. This time the government has laid out in unmistakable terms what the tactics and objectives and strategy are going to be.
I’m not surprised with the international reactions. But I think the way we have responded this time, particularly the second set of attacks, will make the international community understand that this time India means business. India will not be assuaged by simple statements of condemnation. The reality of what has happened has to be recognized.
Hemant Krishan Singh: Moving on to the question of a possibility for conflict between two nuclear powers and that’s been a long-standing refrain which we are quite used to from the West, whenever it comes to any kind of tension between India and Pakistan. There is conventional space for response below the nuclear threshold.
Do you think that the clarity with which India has said that there will be no nuclear blackmail anymore, has this refrain now been put to rest to some extent?
Nalin Surie: I think if you look at India’s reactions in recent years, we have incrementally been calling the nuclear bluff. Starting with Kargil, we demonstrated that you can intervene militarily and keep the nuclear danger well behind the shadows. And this particular set of operations, because they were so clearly targeted and focused, ensured that there was no reason for anybody to react by any other means but the means that you had adopted. So, I think this bogey of nuclear blackmail has been called.
The era of nuclear blackmail is over. The signaling is quite clear. We are going to react in a manner of our choosing if a terror attack takes place on India. The focus of our attack will be to take out those terrorists and the terrorist sites. By and large the international community, implicitly if not explicitly, acknowledges our right to go after the terrorists.
Hemant Krishan Singh: In the midst of this nuclear and military grandstanding by Pakistan, we saw the IMF’s decision to reward Pakistan with a new loan. I think this really stood out as an example of Western duplicity and double standards. What is behind this open-ended largesse and indulgence of Pakistan?
Nalin Surie: The unfortunate reality is that Pakistan has its uses and it has been functioning as a good surrogate for various powers over the years. And its usefulness derives partly from its geostrategic location, the fact that it is the only Islamic country with a nuclear weapon; the fact that it can still be used to influence events in Central Asia, in Afghanistan, in Iran.
These are all issues of interest to a lot of countries and there is also the China factor to bring into play. China is a firm ally of Pakistan. And as you know, China’s role in the IMF is growing day by day.
I would say purely speculatively that part of the reason why this loan was sanctioned was to put pressure on Pakistan to ask for a ceasefire. And if you look at the timing, it’s all so packed that it happened soon after the loan was approved. And the sudden request by Pakistan to ask for a DGMOs call, I think there is some major relationship between these two factors.
Hemant Krishan Singh: Well, the United States clearly has an implicit veto right with its 16% voting share, but obviously chose not to exercise that, even though there were some initial questions that there might be such a possibility. So, the next question which I have is another troubling one. You see that you have a failing military terror state and that state is trying to suddenly take a shot across our border to revive the India-Pak hyphenation, bring back the Kashmir issue in the international discourse etc. This is the international repercussion which I am referring to. How far do you think this ploy has succeeded?
Nalin Surie: It’s an interesting question and I’ve always wondered why people have been arguing in recent days that the actions we have taken have brought back the hyphenation. My view is just the contrary as I’ve discussed with you before. As far as I’m concerned this has destroyed the hyphenation. And you made it very clear that you hit me and I’m going to hit you back so hard, that there’s nothing you’re going to be able to do about it. And I have now used instruments, arrows in my quiver which I never used before. And in spite of all the pressure that was put on us from outside, the government listened, you listened to your friends and allies politely, you give them the polite responses that those pressures deserve and you do exactly what you need to do.
Hemant Krishan Singh: Let’s talk about the little bit of the elephant in the room – about the role of the United States in this episode. After repeatedly for several days professing indifference, the US leadership then turned to claim that it had brokered peace. Was this the US once again coming to the rescue of the Pakistani military, its long-term client or client state? How should we read this sudden undertone of even-handed parity and equating countries which are not comparable in any context.
Nalin Surie: That’s a million-dollar question, isn’t it? I think there are several aspects to this which need to be looked at very carefully. One is, old mindsets don’t change very easily in any system. The United States leadership is probably trying to bring in revolutionary change from the top.
But has the system changed? Answer is no. The accuracy of our strikes on both occasions, the first strikes and the subsequent strikes to respond to Pakistani strikes on our military and civilian targets. These probably got people in Washington worried. Nobody in the West wants to see a defeated Pakistan.
I think there are also two views in the West and maybe I’m being controversial here about how far the rise of India should be assisted. But the process of assisting India’s rise has begun. And I think if they look at what has happened with China, probably some elements worry that we can’t control China which we had helped rise, but will we be able to control a democratic India?
But I think so far as the US reaction is concerned, you know, the United States is the most powerful country in the world today – economically, technologically, financially and even militarily. But the problem I think is, that the United States has not come to terms in spite of their overwhelming power with their reduced circumstances. This is not a contradiction. You can be the most powerful country in the world, but your circumstances are much reduced. And the irony of this is that this reduced circumstance is of America’s own making. That sometimes if you’re sitting in Washington and you want a certain outcome and it does not happen, it makes you, probably gets you upset. That, why can’t I do this? I am the most powerful country in the world.
And I think the United States is a prickly democracy, India is a prickly democracy. These two prickly democracies have been trying for the last 25 years to get set on a path where the prickles get taken out and the positives get the upper hand. In the longer term, interest is what the government has to look at. What does worry me is, of course, that one statement that the two countries have agreed to discuss the entire gamut of outstanding issues in a neutral venue. That is simply not acceptable in India and cannot be accepted and I don’t see our government accepting such an approach. But I also find that the State Department has been backtracking on it. So, I think the ball is very much in the US court on this one.
Hemant Krishan Singh: We have a new policy which is zero tolerance against terrorism. And also, we have a new policy, but even more clearly clarifying that the framework of any talks with Pakistan is going to be limited to an end to terrorism and return of Pakistan occupied Kashmir. So how do you see this playing out?
Nalin Surie: I think that’s a difficult question to answer. So let me make an effort at suggesting that this new policy is quite well developed. I have been carefully re-reading what the Prime Minister said and I thought I found some gaps in the policy but I found that as I read his speech further, the gaps tend to disappear.
So, enough flexibility has been left in the policy, that if there is enough progress in the talks on terrorism, we can start looking at other issues. And Pakistan occupied Kashmir is very much part of the problem of terrorism apart from the question of territorial integrity. Obviously, the latter aspect will take much longer to happen. But I think the focus on addressing the problem of terrorism financed, aided, abetted from Pakistan will have to be addressed. And if I were Islamabad, I should be happy to start that dialogue because they claim that they are the biggest victims of terrorism in the world.
Now it’s not going to be easy because it has implications for Pakistan’s own internal politics and perhaps domestic stability. But I think the manner of this last atrocity in Pahalgam, the way it was conducted, is something which is going to be very difficult for India to forget in a hurry.
And frankly, if I were Pakistan, it would be in Pakistan’s own interest to dismantle the structure of terrorism that they have built in their own country, for their own good. After all, what is the biggest threat to Pakistan today? Domestic terrorism apart from other threats.
I think the other aspect which we have not discussed is the Indus Water Treaty. How will India now move forward on this whole issue of holding the IWT in abeyance? That will be an extremely important part of the policy going forward.
Hemant Krishan Singh: One final thought, we seem to be moving towards upgrading our relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. And there’s been a steady uptake in interactions. So, you think that this is something for which the time has come?
Nalin Surie: Yes, I think it’s time has come. I think we have to bear in mind that Afghanistan is a civilizational partner. Don’t forget Afghanistan is a direct neighbor of India before Pakistan was created in 1947. I think you know we shouldn’t forget our history and geography. Afghanistan is an integral part of Indian culture and civilization.
Yes, they have a regime in Kabul which we may find distasteful to some extent. But are there no other regimes in the world which are equally distasteful with whom we have relationships? I don’t want to name them. I think Afghanistan gives us other advantages also. In the fight against terrorism, if we can co-opt the Taliban government in Afghanistan, that can be a great help to us. Afghanistan can, let’s say it out bluntly, is very important for us strategically. It provides us strategic depth. So, the strategic depth which was used against India can now be used against somebody else. It is important for our relationship with Central Asia. It is important for our relationship with the countries which border Afghanistan, including Iran.
Hemant Krishan Singh: And Afghanistan, the Taliban regime is reaching out to us. They were positive in their response. They were sympathetic to what transpired in Pahalgam.
Let me say in conclusion that we will really see as a litmus test of the international community’s actual standing on the issue of zero-tolerance for terrorism, based on how they react to the listing of the TRF on the 1267 UNSC committee and also a return of pressure on Pakistan on FATF, realistic sanctions, etc. But that’s still to be seen and we’ll have to put in a lot of effort to push those two issues forward.
