The 18th BRICS Summit, to be held at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi on 12–13 September 2026, arrives at a moment when the global economy is being pulled in several directions at once: strategic rivalry, trade fragmentation, wars and sanctions, climate shocks, technological disruption, debt stress and uncertainty over the durability of multilateral institutions. This situation reminds us of the 1859 novel A Tale of Two Cities by Charles Dickens: “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.” India’s fourth BRICS Chairship, therefore, carries an unusually demanding task: to convert a broad political aspiration for a more representative world order into practical cooperation among a diverse and enlarged grouping.
India has framed its chairship around the theme, “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”, informed by a people-centric approach and the idea of “Humanity First.” The formulation is notable because it does not treat geopolitics as an end in itself. Rather, it places everyday developmental concerns—food, health, livelihoods, small enterprises, energy access, climate adaptation and digital inclusion—at the centre of the BRICS conversation.
1 The G20 also includes the European Union and the African Union as members.
2 The G7 also includes the European Union as a nonenumerated member.
3 Argentina, slated to join BRICS, pulled out of the application process after the December 2023 election of President Javier Milei.
4 The G77 considers China to be one of its members, and China provides financial contributions to the G77, but it does not consider itself to be a member. G77 gatherings are typically titled as G77 + China meetings.
5 These countries have indirect representation in the G20 via African Union membership.
New Delhi should be judged by whether it secures a few funded, time-bound arrangements—not by the rhetoric of the Delhi Declaration. BRICS has become too large, too economically consequential and too internally heterogeneous for symbolism alone to suffice. Divergent views make the situation difficult, because as the Irish poet William Butler Yeats wrote in his poem “The Second Coming” way back in 1919,
“The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity”.
A Summit In A Fractured World
The original BRICS grouping emerged from a recognition that the Bretton Woods institutions no longer adequately reflect the weight of emerging economies. Two decades later, that argument has acquired greater force. The expanded BRICS, which is characterised by different political systems, economic priorities and strategic interests, now brings together countries that account for roughly 49.5 % of the world’s population, about 40 % of global output, and around 26 % of world trade. Its members also have substantial influence over energy markets: official data cited in current reporting place their combined share of global oil production at about 43.6 %. All this information is widely known, but as I have long argued, we need to leverage the position of BRICS in the global economy to discernibly alter the ground realities and the global financial architecture.
BRICS’ Weight in the Global Economy
This scale gives BRICS considerable geopolitical salience, but size by itself does not guarantee coherence or influence. The grouping has no founding treaty, common ideology or uniform political system. Its members differ widely in their histories, development trajectories and strategic outlooks. Some manage complicated bilateral relationships, while others face persistent regional tensions. The cohort brings together major energy exporters and importers, relatively open political systems and highly centralised ones, countries deeply integrated with Western markets and finance and others facing Western sanctions. It also includes countries with unresolved strategic differences. BRICS is, therefore, neither a treaty alliance nor a common market or monetary union. It is better seen as a platform for coordination among countries that broadly favour reform of the global governance system, even though they may differ significantly over the means, priorities and pace of that reform.
This duality will shape the Summit. The language of a “multipolar world,” “inclusive development,” “reformed multilateralism” and “sustainable growth” is likely to dominate the Delhi Declaration. Yet the credibility of these phrases will depend on whether they are matched by credible projects, financing mechanisms, interoperable standards and regular monitoring.
India’s agenda can be understood through four closely connected priorities: resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability.
First, resilience is about reducing exposure to shocks—whether they arise from food and fuel shortages, public-health emergencies, climate disasters or disruptions in global supply chains. India could press BRICS to build practical mechanisms such as food-security networks, cooperation on fertilisers and seeds, more resilient logistics systems, disaster-risk platforms and strategic health partnerships.
Second, innovation concerns widening access to the tools that will shape future growth: digital public infrastructure, scientific research, artificial intelligence, finance and advanced skills. India’s emphasis could be on interoperable digital-public-infrastructure systems, networks linking start-ups and MSMEs across BRICS countries, broad principles for responsible AI governance, joint research initiatives and skill-development partnerships.
Third, cooperation reflects India’s larger argument that multilateral institutions must become more representative of developing countries and more responsive to their development needs. This could translate into joint proposals for reforming the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank, alongside stronger lending capacity at the New Development Bank. Easier trade procedures, better customs coordination and more predictable cross-border commercial arrangements could give this agenda a practical edge.
Finally, sustainability requires reconciling economic growth and poverty reduction with climate responsibility. For India, this means ensuring that developing countries are not asked to choose between development and decarbonisation. BRICS could therefore focus on affordable and accessible climate finance, renewable-energy partnerships, cross-border green-grid initiatives, adaptation measures for climate-vulnerable communities and nature-based solutions that protect ecosystems while supporting livelihoods.
The four pillars are mutually reinforcing. A country cannot build supply-chain resilience without better infrastructure and digital systems; it cannot make a credible green transition without affordable finance and technological access; and it cannot achieve broad-based innovation if small firms and poorer populations are excluded from capital, skills and connectivity.
Paradigm Shift From Broad Themes To Deliverables
India’s Chairship has appropriately placed resilience at the beginning of the agenda. The past few years have demonstrated how quickly disruptions can pass through global systems. Pandemic-era shortages, shipping disruptions, commodity-price spikes, droughts, floods and geopolitical conflict have exposed the vulnerability of highly concentrated supply chains. For developing countries, such shocks are not abstract macroeconomic events; they directly affect food prices, employment, public finances and social stability.
A useful BRICS resilience agenda would move beyond generic support for “secure supply chains” and focus on specific sectors.
- Food and agriculture: BRICS countries are major producers and consumers of grain, edible oils, fertilisers, livestock products and agricultural commodities. Cooperation could include early-warning systems for food shortages, better information-sharing on stocks and crop conditions, climate-resilient seeds, agricultural research partnerships, storage and cold-chain infrastructure, and more predictable access to fertilisers.
- Energy security: The grouping brings together important producers of oil and gas as well as two of the world’s largest energy consumers, China and India. This creates scope for cooperation on energy-market information, strategic petroleum reserves, renewable-energy supply chains, battery materials, green hydrogen, electricity-grid modernisation and cleaner industrial technologies. The objective should not be an exclusive BRICS energy bloc; it should be greater diversity, reliability and affordability in energy access.
- Health security: COVID-19 underscored the dangers of excessive dependence on a handful of countries for vaccines, medicines, diagnostics and medical equipment. BRICS could establish more durable cooperation in surveillance, vaccine research, generic medicines, public-health data systems and emergency procurement.
- Disaster preparedness: Climate-linked disasters have become a core development challenge. India’s experience with digital public infrastructure, early warning, disaster response and large-scale public-service delivery offers a possible basis for a BRICS platform on disaster-risk reduction, insurance, resilient infrastructure and municipal preparedness.
The priority should be to identify projects that are small enough to implement, large enough to matter and sufficiently practical to survive political shifts. A BRICS Food Resilience Network, a Disaster Data Commons, a Clean-Energy Supply Chain Forum and a joint health-security facility would be more valuable than a declaration containing dozens of unprioritised commitments.
Global South and Governance Reform
The strongest political case for BRICS lies in its claim to articulate the concerns of the Global South. Developing countries have long argued that decision-making power in the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other global institutions remains misaligned with contemporary economic and demographic realities.
India’s position is particularly important. It has consistently advocated a more representative and effective multilateral system, including reform of the UN Security Council and greater voice for developing countries in international financial institutions. The argument is not merely about status. It is about whether global institutions can respond credibly to debt distress, climate finance, pandemic preparedness, cross-border digital rules, trade tensions and development financing. However, calls for reform must be accompanied by a clearer institutional strategy.
First, BRICS should distinguish between representation and effectiveness. Expanding voice without improving the capacity of institutions to act will not solve the underlying problem. A reformed multilateral system must be more democratic, but also quicker in responding to crises, less conditional in development lending, more transparent in decision-making and more inclusive in setting technical standards.
Second, BRICS should push for more equitable access to development finance. The climate transition cannot be financed solely through costly commercial borrowing by lower- and middle-income countries. The central issue is not only the total volume of climate finance but its quality: whether it is concessional, predictable, timely and accessible to countries with limited administrative capacity.
Third, the group should avoid defining itself only in opposition to the West. The most persuasive Global South agenda is not anti-Western; it is pro-reform, pro-development and pro-choice. Its objective should be to broaden options for developing countries, not replace one form of dependency with another.
Finance and De-Dollarisation: Momentum, But Not Replacement
Financial reform will be among the most closely watched elements of the summit. BRICS members have stepped up discussion of settlement in local currencies, cross-border payment mechanisms, central-bank digital currencies, correspondent banking, securities settlement and the possible expansion of alternative financial infrastructure. Initiatives commonly discussed under labels such as BRICS Pay and BRICS Clear reflect a wider desire to reduce transaction costs, mitigate sanctions-related risks and lessen excessive dependence on a small number of Western-centred financial channels.
This is more than diplomatic theatre. There is a practical case for increasing the use of local currencies in bilateral trade where trade flows are balanced, hedging markets exist, and businesses are willing to hold the relevant currencies. Faster and cheaper cross-border payment systems can also benefit exporters, remittance recipients, tourists, small firms and digital businesses. India’s Unified Payments Interface offers a significant example of how a low-cost, interoperable retail-payment architecture can widen financial access domestically and, through carefully designed partnerships, support cross-border transactions. But it is necessary to separate de-risking from claims of imminent de-dollarisation.
The Dollar’s Extraordinary Role In Foreign-Exchange Markets
Share of global foreign-exchange transactions involving the currency on one side in April 2025.
The dollar remains deeply embedded in reserve management, global trade invoicing, commodity markets, banking, securities markets and foreign-exchange transactions. IMF data show that the dollar’s share of allocated global official foreign-exchange reserves was 56.77 % in the fourth quarter of 2025; the renminbi’s share was only 1.95 %. Recent IMF data shows that in the first quarter of 2026, the dollar share was still 57.13 %, while the renminbi accounted for 1.99 %.
The Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) 2025 Triennial Survey provides an equally important measure of market depth: the dollar was on one side of 89.2 % of foreign-exchange transactions in April 2025. Global foreign-exchange trading averaged $9.6 trillion a day, demonstrating the extraordinary liquidity and network effects that support dollar dominance.
The dollar remains dominant in global reserves
Share of allocated global official foreign-exchange reserves held in US dollars and renminbi.
This does not mean that the existing monetary system is immutable – far from it. It means that reserve-currency transition is slow. A currency acquires international standing not merely because governments wish it, but because firms, banks and investors can use it freely, hedge it easily, borrow and lend in deep markets, and trust the underlying policy and legal framework.
BRICS currently lacks several preconditions for a common currency or a rapid replacement of the dollar:
- A unified monetary authority and common fiscal framework.
- Deep, integrated and liquid cross-border capital markets.
- Full currency convertibility across all major members.
- Harmonised banking, capital-account, insolvency and data rules.
- A common political and strategic vision strong enough to overcome national differences.
- Sufficient trust among governments, firms and financial institutions.
The more realistic route is a gradual, multi-currency architecture. It would include more local-currency invoicing, bilateral swap arrangements, interoperable fast-payment systems, better trade-finance channels, digital-payment experimentation and stronger development banks. That is a meaningful agenda, even if it falls far short of a post-dollar monetary order.
For India, the right objective is not dollar abandonment but financial resilience. Srinivasan Ramani succinctly summed up the Indian position in The Hindu (“Why is BRICS exploring cross-border payments?” September 6, 2026) when he said, “India’s own proposal, reported in January, is that members link their CBDCs for trade and tourism payments”. New Delhi should thus expand rupee settlement where it is commercially viable, improve hedging and liquidity for rupee trade, encourage the wider adoption of UPI-linked payment arrangements, deepen rupee bond markets, and strengthen the international usability of Indian financial infrastructure. At the same time, India must preserve the stability advantages of substantial dollar reserves and maintain deep economic and financial relationships with the United States, Europe, Japan and other advanced economies. A diversified system is not necessarily a fragmented system. Properly managed, it can offer countries more choice while preserving openness and financial stability.
Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) and AI
Innovation is likely to be among India’s most distinctive contributions to the BRICS agenda. India’s experience with digital identity, low-cost payments, consent-based data-sharing frameworks and public digital platforms has generated international interest in DPI. The key policy lesson is that technology can be treated not only as a private commercial product but also as public infrastructure, provided that it is secure, competitive, inclusive and governed by clear rules.
At a BRICS scale, however, DPI cannot simply be exported as a ready-made template. Member countries differ sharply in data-protection laws, cybersecurity capacity, telecommunications infrastructure, payment regulation, financial inclusion, language needs and political approaches to digital governance. The challenge is not to create a single centralised BRICS digital system. It is to build interoperable standards that allow national systems to communicate while protecting sovereignty and citizens’ rights.
A serious digital agenda could include:
- Interoperability pilots linking fast-payment systems for tourism, remittances and small-value trade.
- Common cybersecurity principles and incident-response cooperation.
- Open technical standards for inclusive public digital infrastructure.
- Shared research on multilingual artificial intelligence, especially for education, health, agriculture and public administration.
- Support for startups and MSMEs through cross-border regulatory sandboxes, digital trade facilitation and easier access to venture capital.
- Protocols on data protection, algorithmic accountability, auditability and responsible AI deployment.
Artificial intelligence deserves special attention. BRICS countries are not only consumers of AI; they are also potential producers of data, talent, computing capacity, domain-specific applications and multilingual models. Yet the divide in AI is likely to be sharper than earlier digital divides because it depends on advanced chips, cloud infrastructure, skilled researchers, large data sets, capital and energy-intensive computing.
India can argue for an AI agenda centred on access and public purpose: affordable compute, open and multilingual tools, ethical deployment, skills development, safeguards against exclusion, and the use of AI for climate forecasting, public health, agricultural extension and urban governance. At the same time, it should resist any framework that dilutes privacy, cybersecurity or democratic accountability in the name of technological sovereignty.
Sustainability: Growth Without Climate Fatalism
The sustainability pillar is indispensable because climate change has become a macroeconomic, social and geopolitical issue. Heat stress, water scarcity, extreme rainfall, crop losses, coastal vulnerability and disaster-related displacement are already affecting development trajectories. For BRICS countries, the policy dilemma is acute: they must expand energy access, industrial capacity, infrastructure and employment while also reducing emissions and adapting to climate risk.
The summit is likely to reaffirm support for the Paris Agreement and call for accessible, affordable and timely climate finance. Such language is important, but it must be translated into finance that is concessional and large enough to support real investment in adaptation, renewable energy, transmission networks, storage, resilient cities and low-carbon industry.
The New Development Bank can play a larger role here. Its value lies not in competing rhetorically with the World Bank or other multilateral lenders, but in financing projects that conventional institutions may neglect or fund too slowly. It can support renewable power, green transport, water systems, climate-resilient housing, public-health infrastructure and regional connectivity. It can also issue more local-currency bonds where feasible, helping reduce currency mismatch for borrowers.
BRICS should be especially attentive to adaptation. Global climate diplomacy often privileges mitigation because emissions can be counted and traded. But for many developing countries, the urgent issue is adaptation: irrigation, drought-resistant crops, flood protection, cooling systems, urban drainage, insurance, disease surveillance and resilient public infrastructure. A climate agenda that speaks only of net-zero targets but ignores adaptation finance will not meet the needs of the Global South.
There is also scope for cooperation on nature-based solutions, circular manufacturing, sustainable consumption and critical-mineral supply chains. Yet these areas require safeguards. The race for lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper and rare earths must not reproduce extractive patterns in which resource-rich countries bear environmental costs while value addition occurs elsewhere. BRICS should support responsible mining, local processing, transparent contracts, recycling and stronger environmental standards.
India’s Deft Balancing Act
India enters the summit with a distinctive strategic position. It supports a multipolar world and a greater voice for developing countries, but it also has strong interests in sustaining ties with the United States, Europe, Japan, Australia and other advanced partners. It participates in BRICS while also engaging in the Quad, the G20, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and a widening network of bilateral technology, trade, defence and investment partnerships. This is not a contradiction. It is the essence of strategic autonomy in a fragmented world. India’s interest lies in preserving room for manoeuvre rather than accepting any rigid bloc logic.
The challenge is particularly evident in relation to China. China’s economic scale gives it considerable influence within BRICS, yet India will seek to prevent the forum from being seen as an extension of any one member’s geopolitical agenda. New Delhi’s role is most credible when it acts as a bridge-builder: supportive of institutional reform, development finance and technology cooperation, while avoiding language or initiatives that turn BRICS into an explicitly confrontational anti-Western platform.
A successful Indian chairship would therefore pursue five broad goals:
- Keep the Global South central. Frame BRICS around development, representation, resilience and public goods rather than narrow power rivalry.
- Prioritise practical cooperation. Focus on a manageable number of projects in payments, food systems, health, energy, disaster preparedness and startup collaboration.
- Promote a multi-currency system, not monetary adventurism. Support local-currency use and payment connectivity while protecting macroeconomic and financial stability.
- Lead on inclusive digital governance. Use India’s DPI experience to promote interoperability, affordability, privacy and public-purpose innovation.
- Make climate finance actionable. Push for adaptation finance, affordable capital, green infrastructure and a stronger role for the New Development Bank.
C. Raja Mohan, who is possibly one of India’s most famous foreign policy commentators, has cogently argued in The Indian Express ( “A possible G3 is casting a shadow over BRICS”, September 9, 2026), “As India’s work in BRICS continues, its place in the changing global architecture will depend on how rapidly it builds national power and how deeply it develops partnerships beyond BRICS”. Way to go!
Economic Diplomacy and Institutions – Syntax of Transformation
Victor Hugo’s famous formulation—“Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come”—is often invoked in discussions of a changing world order. The demand for more representative global governance has indeed become harder to dismiss. Yet ideas acquire power only when institutions, finance and political will give them operational form.
BRICS has the demographic scale, economic weight and political visibility to influence parts of the global order. But it will not reshape that order merely by criticising existing institutions or invoking multipolarity. Its members must demonstrate that they can cooperate across differences, finance credible projects, build trusted systems and deliver results that improve the daily lives of people in developing countries. As Faiz Ahmad Faiz wrote powerfully,
“दिल नाउम्मीद तो नहीं, नाकाम ही तो है,
लम्बी है ग़म की शाम, मगर शाम ही तो है।”
English Translation:
The heart is not hopeless; it has merely known defeat.
The night of sorrow may be long, but it is a night nonetheless.
Sumant Sinha, Chairman and CEO of Renew, has made a pertinent observation in The Economic Times (“Minilateralism Means Business”, September 8, 2026): “BRICS diversity should be viewed as a strength. Its purpose is not to eliminate competition among members, but to identify areas where cooperation can create additional value, investment and growth. Which is why sector-specific coalitions are the right approach.” This is perhaps the most realistic way of looking at the grouping. Its diversity may limit the scope for grand bargains, but it also creates considerable room for practical, sector-specific cooperation.
The success of the New Delhi Summit should consequently be judged not by the length of its declaration but by what it sets in motion. Can BRICS make food and energy supplies more secure? Can it make cross-border payments and trade easier for MSMEs? Can it build meaningful partnerships in digital technology, science and innovation? Can it mobilise affordable finance for development and climate adaptation? And, above all, can it strengthen the multilateral system without adding to its fragmentation? These are difficult questions, and none has an easy answer. Yet even measurable progress on a few of them would give India’s 2026 chairship a tangible legacy—moving BRICS, however gradually, from a forum that articulates common concerns to one that delivers practical solutions.
Anant Goenka, writing in The Economic Times (“Work Together, Not Groupthink”, September 8, 2026), makes a related point: “In an age of fragmentation, BRICS can demonstrate the powerful idea that nations need not think alike to work together.” That observation is particularly relevant today. The world is changing with extraordinary speed, driven by technological innovation, scientific advances, shifting economic power and an unprecedented flow of information. In such a world, countries do not have to agree on everything to cooperate on what matters. For BRICS, that may ultimately prove to be its greatest strength.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Manoranjan Sharma is Chief Economist, Infomerics, India. With a brilliant academic record, he has over 250 publications and six books. His views have been cited in the Associated Press, New York; Dow Jones, New York; International Herald Tribune, New York; Wall Street Journal, New York.
