An examination of Rishi Sunak’s strategic propositions, India’s diplomatic response and the evolving distribution of global influence. The Bloomberg New Economy Forum discussion held in New Delhi on 14 October 2026 brought together former British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand and former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd to examine the emerging role of middle powers in an increasingly fragmented international order. Although framed around the relevance of middle powers, the discussion exposed deeper questions concerning strategic autonomy, economic interdependence, technological dominance, international institutions and the changing nature of geopolitical influence. This paper examines the participants’ arguments through contemporary geoeconomics and international relations. Particular attention is devoted to Sunak’s proposition that countries can secure geopolitical relevance by becoming indispensable to global supply chains and critical technologies. His argument is examined alongside Jaishankar’s insistence that India cannot be adequately understood through conventional middle-power classifications, Anand’s emphasis on restraint in exercising economic leverage and Rudd’s advocacy of collective institutional influence. The analysis distinguishes explicit statements from reasonable diplomatic inference.
Introduction: The Reconfiguration of International Power
The international order that emerged from the Second World War was constructed around a relatively concentrated distribution of political, military and economic authority. The United States and its allies established institutions that shaped international finance, trade, security and diplomatic engagement, while the Soviet Union provided an alternative centre of geopolitical power. The collapse of the Soviet Union temporarily consolidated American predominance, creating an environment in which globalisation and institutional cooperation were widely expected to reduce traditional geopolitical rivalries.
That expectation has become increasingly difficult to sustain. China’s emergence as a major industrial, technological and military power, the renewed significance of economic sanctions, disrupted supply chains and advanced technologies have altered assumptions underlying globalisation. Economic interdependence, once viewed principally as a stabilising force, is also recognised as a source of vulnerability. Interrupting access to critical technologies, financial networks, energy supplies or industrial inputs can provide influence extending beyond conventional national power.
It was against this backdrop that the Bloomberg New Economy Forum convened its discussion. Britain, Canada and Australia have historically operated within Western security frameworks, whereas India has consistently sought independent decision-making through strategic autonomy. Their participation did not imply a shared conception of geopolitical power. Sunak focused on capabilities and flexible partnerships; Jaishankar questioned geopolitical classifications and highlighted dependencies; Anand advocated diversification without weaponisation; and Rudd emphasised collective institutional influence.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that the debate is no longer confined to identifying which countries qualify as major or middle powers. It increasingly concerns how countries acquire influence, how integration creates vulnerabilities and how governments preserve freedom of action in an interconnected world.
The Middle-Power Debate: Status or Strategic Agency?
The opening exchange between Sunak and Jaishankar attracted attention because of its humour, but its diplomatic significance extends beyond the immediate reaction. Sunak acknowledged that India might object to being categorised as a middle power, prompting Jaishankar’s light-hearted response that he was participating as a courtesy. The cordial exchange exposed a conceptual disagreement over how international power should be classified.
The term middle power traditionally describes countries possessing significant economic, diplomatic or military capabilities but lacking the comprehensive influence of great powers. Canada and Australia have often been associated with this approach, while Britain occupies a more complicated position because of its nuclear capabilities, permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council and extensive security relationships.
India’s population, economic scale, nuclear capability, geography and diversified relationships make conventional classification problematic. Yet India does not possess the comprehensive technological, financial and military reach of the United States or China. Jaishankar’s formulation of India as a power in the middle can be interpreted as shifting attention from hierarchical status towards strategic agency: the ability to influence competing centres without accepting subordination to either.
The deeper significance is that geopolitical status cannot be assessed solely through inherited institutional categories. Permanent Security Council membership reflects a particular historical distribution of power, not necessarily contemporary demographic and economic realities. Sunak’s subsequent arguments introduced another perspective: rather than asking where a country sits in a hierarchy, ask how it can develop capabilities others cannot replace.
Rishi Sunak’s Strategic Proposition: Becoming Indispensable
The most consequential element of Sunak’s contribution was his argument that countries unable to match the comprehensive capabilities of the United States or China could strengthen their position by becoming indispensable within particular sectors. Drawing on smaller but technologically advanced countries, he suggested that influence could develop through specialised capabilities whose absence would impose significant costs on others.
The semiconductor industry illustrates the proposition. The Netherlands occupies a critical position in advanced lithography through ASML, while Germany, Japan and South Korea contribute specialised technologies, materials and manufacturing capabilities. These countries do not dominate every dimension of international power, yet their participation in specialised industrial processes makes them essential to larger economies.
The significance extends beyond export earnings. A country possessing difficult-to-substitute technology acquires strategic relevance because others have a direct interest in preserving access. Concentrated expertise and the time required to establish alternatives create geopolitical leverage. A smaller economy need not replicate a superpower’s entire industrial infrastructure; it can cultivate world-class capabilities in selected areas and integrate them into international production systems.
However, indispensability introduces ambiguity. The same capability that makes a country valuable to partners may allow it to restrict access for political objectives. Defensive indispensability seeks protection by making disruption costly; offensive economic coercion uses dependence to compel behaviour. Sunak’s reported argument was primarily about resilience and relevance, not an explicit endorsement of coercion.
Nevertheless, the architecture he described can support both.
Strategic Autonomy: Convergence with India’s Diplomatic Tradition
Sunak acknowledged that strategic autonomy, long associated with Indian foreign policy, was becoming increasingly relevant to countries operating within established alliances. This suggests a change in how some Western policymakers understand the relationship between alliance commitments and independent national decision-making.
India’s strategic autonomy developed from a preference for avoiding permanent subordination to geopolitical blocs. Although its practical application has evolved, independent judgment remains central.
India maintains relationships with states whose interests frequently diverge, including the United States, Russia, European countries and economies across Asia and the Middle East.
For traditional American allies, strategic autonomy has different implications. Britain, Canada and Australia have security relationships deeply embedded in defence planning, intelligence and diplomatic institutions. Greater autonomy need not mean abandoning them. It may instead mean reducing concentrated dependencies in selected economic and technological sectors while preserving foundational security commitments.
Sunak’s position is thus better understood as strategic diversification than strategic separation. Countries can maintain alliances while developing independent sources of relevance and cooperating through issue-specific arrangements. India’s experience is relevant, but the concept is not universally transferable: geography, military capabilities, treaty obligations and threat environments create different constraints.
Flexible Coalitions and the Architecture of Multilateralism
Sunak’s scepticism concerning a single institution representing middle powers reflected his preference for overlapping partnerships organised around particular interests. Such minilateral arrangements allow relatively small groups to cooperate on defined issues without comprehensive agreement on foreign policy. Countries cooperating on maritime security need not share identical positions on trade or energy.
The attraction becomes clearer when comparing Canada’s economic integration with the United States, Britain’s European priorities, Australia’s Indo-Pacific exposure and India’s independent diplomacy. These countries may share concerns about technology or coercion while differing on regional security and international trade. Flexible coalitions can be more efficient than broad institutions requiring consensus across many issues.
Yet flexibility has limits. Established institutions provide continuity, procedures and ways of managing disagreement. Coalitions formed around immediate interests may be less predictable when cooperation imposes substantial costs. A future international system could therefore combine broad multilateral frameworks with smaller operational coalitions. For India, the test is whether participation produces concrete technological, economic and security outcomes rather than diplomatic activity alone.
Canada’s Counterpoint: Capability Without Weaponisation
Anita Anand introduced a qualification to Sunak’s thesis by emphasising that Canada did not intend to weaponise its competitive advantages. Canada’s strengths in energy, natural resources, agriculture and research can make it an attractive partner for countries seeking dependable supply chains. The value of such relationships depends partly on confidence that access will not be arbitrarily interrupted for political reasons.
Anand’s position attempts to reconcile economic strength with trust. A country can become indispensable because others value its capabilities without threatening to withdraw them. Reliability can itself become a strategic asset, encouraging long-term investment and commercial integration. Canada’s interest in diversifying markets, particularly given its deep relationship with the United States, makes this distinction practically relevant.
Nevertheless, unilateral restraint does not prevent coercion by others. Its effectiveness depends on reciprocal incentives, diversified partnerships and institutions discouraging coercive behaviour. Anand complements Sunak’s emphasis on capability development but gives greater weight to norms governing its exercise.
Jaishankar’s Warning: A World of Chokepoints
Jaishankar broadened the discussion beyond specialised manufacturing. Modern economies depend on concentrated networks involving advanced equipment, shipping, payment systems and major currencies. Control over these systems can create opportunities for disruption, restriction and political pressure. A country may possess considerable resources yet remain vulnerable when it cannot rapidly replace essential technologies or financial access.
His argument cautions against assuming economic interdependence is inherently benign. Integration creates efficiency and commercial opportunity but also asymmetrical dependencies. When access becomes politically consequential, the distinction between economic policy and national security diminishes.
Sunak and Jaishankar therefore approached the same structure from opposite sides. Sunak identified the benefits of controlling an indispensable capability; Jaishankar highlighted the risks faced by those dependent on it. The paradox is central to geoeconomics: specialisation raises productivity while concentrating vulnerabilities. Governments must distinguish manageable commercial dependencies from those capable of undermining national security or political independence.
The Unspoken American Dimension
The United States remained an underlying reference point. Its security and economic relationships with Britain, Canada and Australia provide substantial advantages, but changing American trade and industrial priorities have encouraged consideration of concentrated dependence. Sunak did not advocate dismantling security alliances and acknowledged their importance. His emphasis on independent capabilities nevertheless suggests that alliances alone may not protect against every economic or technological vulnerability.
A country may remain closely aligned with Washington in defence while pursuing greater autonomy in trade, energy and technology. Such differentiation does not necessarily weaken security cooperation, but it complicates the map of international alignment. India’s multiple partnerships offer a comparison, although its historical motivations differ from those of treaty allies. It would be unsupported to read Sunak’s comments as a coordinated proposal to distance Western countries from the United States.
The Chinese Dimension: Concentration and Diversification
China’s industrial development illustrates how sustained investment in manufacturing and processing can generate geopolitical influence. Countries dependent on concentrated supply chains may discover that commercial efficiency and strategic resilience do not always align. Yet diversification is expensive: alternate ecosystems require capital, technical expertise, infrastructure, labour, supporting industries and time.
Recognising a vulnerability is not equivalent to eliminating it. Governments may identify dependence on a supplier but find rapid substitution economically impractical. Strategic diversification therefore requires sustained industrial policy rather than diplomatic declarations. For India, domestic technological development can reduce selected vulnerabilities while creating capabilities valuable to partners, provided investment is guided by competitiveness rather than indiscriminate self-sufficiency.
Britain’s Strategic Position
Britain retains substantial diplomatic, military, financial and technological influence, including nuclear deterrence, permanent Security Council membership and extensive intelligence partnerships. Its departure from the European Union changed the institutional framework through which it engages with a major economic bloc, increasing the relevance of alternative partnerships.
Sunak’s preference for flexible coalitions is compatible with a British role built around overlapping networks in European security, Indo-Pacific trade and technology. But treating his remarks as a retrospective defence of Brexit would exceed the available evidence. The more defensible observation is that his framework provides a general model for influence through specialised capabilities and multiple partnerships, irrespective of formal institutional membership.
India’s Strategic Choices: Converting Scale into Indispensability
India’s long-term influence depends on converting demographic scale, economic growth and diplomatic relationships into durable capabilities. Participation in global production does not automatically confer control over critical components. A country can employ many engineers or manufacture large volumes without possessing technologies that are difficult to substitute.
Sunak’s proposition suggests evaluating industries not only for employment and exports but also for their potential to create globally relevant capabilities. Advanced engineering, pharmaceuticals, digital infrastructure, defence technologies, specialised manufacturing and space-related industries offer possibilities, although indispensability must be demonstrated through competitiveness and technological depth rather than assumed.
Jaishankar’s warning requires parallel scrutiny of India’s vulnerabilities in equipment, materials, energy, finance and emerging technologies. Comprehensive self-sufficiency would be costly and impractical. A selective resilience strategy should identify dependencies with unacceptable national consequences and prioritise diversification or domestic investment accordingly. Diplomatic flexibility must then translate into market access, technology transfer, productive capacity and credible security capability. Strategic autonomy is valuable because of the options it creates, not merely the positions it allows a country to declare.
Can Middle Powers Shape the International Order?
Kevin Rudd emphasised the collective weight of major democracies and technologically advanced economies outside the two principal centres of global power. Coordinated action on trade, standards, technology and institutions could amplify influence that individual countries cannot exercise alone.
But aggregate GDP does not automatically create collective political agency. Countries may share concerns about concentrated supply chains while competing for investment; they may support international rules while disagreeing on particular conflicts. Cooperation is therefore more plausible around specific convergent interests than through a comprehensive unified bloc. Broad institutions can provide legitimacy and continuity while smaller coalitions deliver operational focus. For India, the value of such arrangements depends on its ability to influence substantive decisions.
The Unresolved Contradiction
The deepest issue is the relationship between indispensability and coercion. Sunak’s thesis suggests that countries can protect themselves by becoming essential to others. Jaishankar shows that the same systems can expose dependent countries to pressure. Anand seeks restraint in exercising advantage, while Rudd points to institutions that can govern competing interests.
Economic specialisation raises productivity and mutual benefit but can also concentrate vulnerabilities.
When countries view mutual dependence as a reason to cooperate, specialised capabilities reinforce stability. When they view it as leverage for political pressure, the same structure encourages retaliation and costly attempts at substitution. Repeated coercive use of a dominant position may ultimately stimulate alternatives and erode that dominance.
A reconciliation is possible: countries can develop critical capabilities, reduce unacceptable dependencies and preserve reliable partnerships simultaneously. The challenge is balancing those objectives when security, commercial incentives and geopolitical competition pull in different directions.
Alternative Interpretations and Limitations
The importance of middle-power diplomacy does not establish that the world is already fully multipolar. The United States and China retain substantial advantages, while specialised capabilities do not necessarily produce comprehensive geopolitical influence. Nor is indispensability permanent: substitution, innovation and industrial investment can erode a previously critical position.
Diplomatic subtext also requires caution. Sunak’s remarks do not establish an intention to weaken Western alliances, Jaishankar’s objection to the middle-power label does not imply that India already matches American or Chinese capabilities, and Anand’s emphasis on restraint does not determine Canada’s conduct under every hypothetical circumstance. The panel was a public discussion, not a negotiated policy agreement. Interpretations of unspoken meaning remain analytical hypotheses, not verified private motives.
Conclusion: The Politics of Strategic Dependence
The Bloomberg discussion revealed an evolving understanding of how influence is acquired and exercised. Military strength, economic size and institutional authority remain essential, but advanced technologies, specialised manufacturing, financial infrastructure and concentrated supply chains increasingly shape strategic competition.
Sunak argued that countries can develop protection and relevance through capabilities others cannot readily substitute. Jaishankar emphasised strategic autonomy and the vulnerabilities created by chokepoints. Anand stressed reliability and restraint, while Rudd highlighted collective weight and international institutions. Their arguments reveal different aspects of the same problem: countries seek autonomy while relying on interdependence, seek leverage while needing trust, and seek flexible partnerships while depending on durable commitments.
For India, the debate over its middle-power classification matters less than its capacity to translate potential into lasting strategic capability. Diplomatic independence without sufficient technological and economic strength leaves vulnerabilities; industrial capability without dependable partnerships can limit the benefits of integration. The emerging order is not simply a redistribution of power among states, but also a redistribution of dependence across specialised networks.
The enduring strategic question is not merely which nations will become indispensable to the world, but whether their indispensability will make the world more secure or more vulnerable.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
An Indian Air Force veteran, corporate strategist, entrepreneur, mentor, and storyteller, Wg Cdr B Srikanth brings together diverse worlds of leadership, corporate real estate, facility management, security, sustainability, and technology. An author six books, his writings explore professional wisdom, human experiences, and unconventional perspectives on life and leadership. A passionate advocate of human-centric innovation, he mentors emerging businesses, challenges conventional thinking, and champions meaningful transformation.
