In the current narrative, where threats and counter threats could be confusing to understand, the Indian position post Pahalgam, has been one of self-constraint, responsible, and calls for the global order to recognize and punish terrorism in all its manifestations.
Introduction
The moment Pakistan feels threatened, it invariably flashes the nuclear card, with all kind of threats. Pakistani Minister Hanif Abbasi has now warned that Pakistan’s arsenal, including Ghori, Shaheen, and Ghaznavi missiles along with 130 nuclear warheads, has been kept “only for India.” In anticipation of a response, Pakistan’s nuclear sabre rattling post-Pahalgam massacre is a sign of weakness and panic.
It is no rocket science, for whom India has kept its nuclear arsenal. When our patience runs out, let the adversary be reminded of our immense nuclear capability, armed with resolve, and stated policy of massive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage.
India’s nuclear doctrine is a hallmark of strategic restraint. For over two and a half decades, New Delhi’s commitment to No First Use (NFU) in the draft nuclear doctrine, has earned it the global image of a responsible nuclear power. The doctrine contains adequate frameworks, crafted with flexibility to deter adversaries. In the given circumstances, it can always be reviewed, refined, and recalibrated and infused with conditional clarity and strategic ambiguity to speak the language our adversaries understand.
On the other hand, our Western neighbour repeatedly makes irresponsible statements with reference to his nuclear strategy. He retains the option of ‘First Use.’ His nuclear policy is vague and ambiguous. He also has no hesitation in turning around on a previously taken stance, and even in scenarios where there is no perceived threat, he brings up the nuclear issue, in national/international forums, to keep the nuclear card alive.
Nuclear Warfighting Has No Precedence. Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot be counted as a precedence. That was a case of the Atom Bomb versus the Samurai, a highly unmatched proposition, and in hindsight, highly unwarranted. However, it did expose the power and devastation of the bomb. There has been no incidence of two nuclear nations going to war using nuclear weapons against each other.
Deciphering India`s Nuclear Doctrine
Undoubtedly the use of nuclear weapons constitutes the gravest threat to humanity and to peace and stability in the international system. However, India had no choice but to opt for this option keeping in view the hostile nature and unreliability of its neighbours.
On 17 August 1999, Indian National Security Advisor, released a Draft Nuclear Doctrine which was then further refined by the Cabinet Committee on Security in January 2003.
Protecting the Indian State, from the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons by any State or entity, was the raison d’être of India’s nuclear deterrent.
The fundamental purpose of India’s nuclear weapons was that they were meant only for self-defence. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation, should deterrence fail. The main features of India’s nuclear doctrine were as follows:
I. Building and maintaining a Credible Minimal Deterrence;
II. A “No First Use” posture; nuclear weapons to be used only “in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian Forces anywhere;”
III. Nuclear retaliation to a First Strike will be “massive” and designed to inflict “Unacceptable Damage.”
IV. Nuclear retaliatory attacks to be authorized only by civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.
V. Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.
VI. India to retain option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against it with Biological or Chemical Weapons;
VII. Continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies, participation in FMCT negotiations, continued moratorium on testing;
VIII. Continued commitment to goal of Nuclear-Weapon Free World, through global, verifiable, and non-discriminatory disarmament.
Credible Minimal Deterrence. While every sub clause is important, the most important point is “CREDIBILITY.” If an adversary dares to use nuclear weapons against India, then he must know that India can, and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable. Several factors come into play to ensure credibility. These can be listed as three specific components, technological credibility, force credibility, and leadership credibility.
Simply defined, technological credibility means that, when the time comes, the bomb must work, and that too effectively. Force credibility means that there must be adequate numbers, including their dispersion, survivability, communication and Command and Control to create the requisite deterrence. Leadership credibility is the political resolve to use the weapon, when called upon to take the decision.
Safety and survivability can be achieved by dispersion and separating the warheads from the delivery systems. The concept of force credibility ensures that the confusion associated with dispersal, survivability, communication, and effectiveness, are integrated together into a synergistic whole.
Command and Control of India’s Nuclear Forces has been organised for very high survivability against surprise attacks and for rapid punitive response. They have been designed and deployed to ensure survival against a first strike and to endure repetitive attrition attempts with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a punishing strike which would be unacceptable to the aggressor.
Massive Retaliation
To understand the retaliation aspect, one needs to visualise as to how will this nuclear warfighting will really happen. Our mindset will take us to Hiroshima, which was one bomb at a time. This may not be so. In consonance with our stated policy to inflict unacceptable damage to the aggressor, there may be a requirement to launch numerous strikes, possibly employing the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), by land, air, and sea. Thus, through the triad Indian deterrent shall remain credible against all categories of weapons of mass destruction.
A sizeable nuclear weapons arsenal is essential, as we need to factor in the possibility of degradation, despite all precautions, in a first strike. The survivability of our nuclear forces, based on aircraft, land, and sea would have to be ensured by a combination of multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion, and deception.
The above factors define the very concept of nuclear warfighting. If all these factors are in place, then deterrence is in place.
Having interpreted some relevant portions of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine, one realises the depth of the Indian Doctrine. This is the precise reason that any amount of sabre rattling, has no effect on a robust policy. The policy is clear and unambiguous, that the response will be massive and unacceptable.
Pakistan
Pakistan makes every attempt to obfuscate nuclear issues. Islamabad has developed tactical nuclear weapons, along with its first-use nuclear posture as an alternative to India’s conventional superiority. Pakistan hopes that in response to a tactical nuclear weapon, India might not up the ante and respond conventionally. However, as a stated policy, India does not differentiate between tactical or strategic nuclear weapons in its response strategy. Therefore, there is no room for ambiguity. For India, tactical or strategic, a nuclear strike is a nuclear strike, and will be responded to as per the stated policy of massive retaliation.
Pakistan’s claims that their nuclear programme is purely India centric and the 2750 Km range is to cater for India’s farthest island territories. The shallowness of such a claim is rubbished because a missile does not fly in one direction. It flies wherever it is programmed to fly, and if you change the direction of the missile, from 2750 Km South-East of Pakistan, to 2750 Km West, the missile will arrive in Israel, and similarly it can land in so many other countries in the region as 2750 Km is the radius. Therefore, an unreliable nuclear programme such as Pakistan’s is a matter of grave concern to regional security.
Another aspect or doubt keeps cropping up time and again, as to how safe are the nuclear warheads in Pakistan. Can they fall into the hands of the Jihadis or other non-state actors? The response is twofold. Firstly, a nuclear weapon system is a technological marvel that needs special platforms for preparation and launch. It also possibly requires series of codes for the chain reaction to start. A fusion/fission bomb is not a Diwali bomb that you light and throw across the fence. It is nearly impossible to fire such a weapon without the technological support system. Secondly, if any undesirable element is threatening the use of such a weapon, then it is obviously with inside infrastructural support. Further, the weapon comes from the Pakistani stockpile, for which Pakistan is responsible. It therefore, warrants no change to the Indian narrative. If there is any such attempt, it will be directly attributable to the State of Pakistan, and the response will be, as stated, “massive.”
China
SIPRI’s estimate of the size of China’s nuclear arsenal has increased to 410 in January 2025, and it is expected to keep growing. Depending on how it decides to structure its forces, China could potentially have at least as many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as either the USA or Russia by the turn of the decade.
China primary concern when it developed its nuclear weapons was to prevent its enemies from imposing war on China. Earlier, China believed that it faced nuclear threats from both superpowers and that was the underlying theme for their nuclear programme. China has also committed itself to never being the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstance. The asymmetry in the nuclear capability between India and China and the resulting differential calls for India to focus on adding teeth and credibility to its second-strike capability.
Chinese Nuclear Force is one of the most important pillars of China’s Armed Forces, which are well trained and effective. China’s policy of nuclear weapons deployment is to maintain retaliatory-strike capability. They excel in their infrastructure, which is so well developed that troops can live in the underground bunkers. The weapon systems are deployed deep in the ocean and ground to be able to sustain any kind of strike and still be capable of retaliation.
Overall, the Chinese stance sounds appropriate and responsible. The catch remains, trust and reliability, which in both cases is woefully suspect, as shown by the Chinese, time and again along the Line of Actual Control. However, in the Indian context our doctrine is firm and resolute. With the development of Agni V and VI with MIRV capability, required ranges have been achieved for requisite deterrence against China. India must modernise its nuclear delivery systems, cyber weapons, enhance its space-based surveillance and Anti-Ballistic Missile defence for strategic stability vis-à-vis China. India needs to improve its triad nuclear posture, upgrade arsenals, review doctrines, optimise new technologies like hypersonic systems for precision targeting and develop full spectrum capabilities with diverse nuclear warheads for any contingencies. A review of ASAT systems dovetailed in its deterrence matrix is also warranted.
Conclusion
The emerging regional security canvas warrants India to revisit and review its nuclear doctrine and strategic deterrence capabilities to understand how a country balances deterrence and diplomacy in an increasingly dynamic world with escalating threats. India should analyse the areas wherein emerging technologies could challenge its command-and-control systems cum targeting capabilities. Certain ambiguity such as the threat of use, being taken as first use would add teeth to the NFU.
Overall, the Indian Nuclear Doctrine sends a clear message of resolve, strength, and capability to the enemy. Nuclear weapons are weapons of war. They are offensive weapons that can cause tremendous damage. India, not only possesses the weapons, but also possesses the resolve. Since the resolve is firm, the deterrence is strong. Let no one make the mistake to challenge that.
Lieutenant General Ashok Bhim Shivane, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, (Retd) was commissioned into the 7th Light Cavalry in December 1978. He later commanded 50 Armoured Regiment. He was Director-General Mechanised Forces of Indian Army prior to retirement. He has represented India at the United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Guatemala. The General is a renowned speaker on leadership, counter-terrorism, motivational talks, geostrategy, geopolitics, national security, space capability building, military technology and international relations.
Major General VK Singh, VSM (Retd) was commissioned into The Scinde Horse in December 1983. An alumnus of St Columba’s School, and St Stephens College, the General is a fourth-generation army officer.
