Operation Sindoor was not just a response to terrorist attack; it was a statement of intent and resolve. This decisive retort to the Pahalgam tragedy was the result of years of structural reform and strategic investment in India’s defence capabilities. The Indian Defence Forces acquitted themselves most professionally during Operation Sindoor achieving all military and political aims. However, with the current military dispensation in Pakistan, the war is yet not over. For Pakistan, its focus is on India and its revisionist policy endures.
The Armed Forces today are at the cusp of the next revolution in military affairs. This revolution is occurring at a time when the global security environment is facing turmoil and tumult, forcing militaries across the globe to re-evaluate their strategies and combat capabilities. No future war will be fought like the last one, our focus must be on futuristic, insightful, implementable new age technologies. We need indigenous solutions to meet our unique challenges and strengthen our comprehensive national preparedness.
All these have multiple lessons but what stands out is the need to develop hard power for which developing a strong military industrial base and being self-reliant is imperative.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s military is still smarting from the humiliating defeat of 1971. The defeat is probably the primary reason behind various actions carried out by Pakistan; Kashmir is just an excuse to focus its people’s attention away from its internal fault lines. To avenge that defeat, Pakistan has steadily built its military capability with the tacit support of China. The situation, though stated in as many words earlier too, is evidently clear now. The threat to India is from China and Pakistan collectively. We are up against two well-equipped adversaries.
Despite so many structural reforms did we go wrong somewhere? Why does the fourth largest economy have military criticalities? To answer these questions let us assess how India has reacted to some similar situations in the last 25 years.
Some Examples of Indian Response
- Parliament Attack. The 2001 Indian Parliament attack led to heightened tensions between India and Pakistan. Following the attack, the Indian government undertook significant defence measures, (including Operation Parakram). While specific figures for emergency defence purchases after the attack are withheld, the government did increase defence spending and fast-track procurement of critical military equipment. Various weapon systems including T-90 tanks, tank ammunition and upgrades were procured from Russia and Israel. Apart from this, one of the key benefits was the strengthening of India’s precision-strike capability, with the induction of BrahMos, which is now being produced in India with Russian collaboration. Additionally, the military improved its surveillance and reconnaissance abilities by acquiring Heron Mark 2 Drones. These emergency defence purchases significantly enhanced India’s military readiness and operational capabilities. The expedited procurement process ensured that equipment was delivered within 3 to 6 months, bypassing lengthy bureaucratic procedures.
- 26/11. Following the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, India recognized the urgent need to strengthen its security apparatus. The attacks exposed vulnerabilities in counter-terrorism preparedness, prompting the government to implement far-reaching reforms. One of the key responses was streamlining emergency procurement for security forces. The government authorized fast-track acquisitions to equip agencies like the National Security Guard (NSG) with modern weapons, surveillance systems, and protective gear. Additionally, intelligence-sharing mechanisms were enhanced, and the Indian Navy and Coast Guard also saw major augmentation and enhancements in a bid to strengthen India’s maritime security.
- Uri Attack. Following the 2016 Uri attack, the Indian government authorised emergency defence procurements to address critical shortages in ammunition and equipment. Over the years, multiple rounds of emergency purchases have been made, with the Indian Army alone spending `30,000 crore to replenish its firepower. Additionally, the Government empowered the armed forces to make emergency procurements of upto 15% of the defence modernisation budget, which amounted to `24,000 crore. These funds were used to acquire loitering munitions, counter-UAV systems, anti-tank guided missiles, and artillery ammunition.
- Pulwama Attack. After the Pulwama attack in February 2019, the Indian government granted emergency procurement powers to the Army, Navy, and Air Force to enhance operational preparedness. Initially, the financial powers of the three vice chiefs were increased from `100 crore to `500 crore for specific procurements. Additionally, each proposal was given a threshold of `300 crore. Amongst other fast track purchases, the Army procured Excalibur precision munition for all its 155 mm guns, that is co-produced by Raytheon and BAE Systems.
- Galwan Valley Clash. Following the Galwan Valley clash, the Indian government granted emergency financial powers to the armed forces, allowing them to procure weapons and ammunition swiftly. Each Service was given up to `500 crore per procurement project to enhance operational preparedness along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This funding was used to acquire advanced surveillance systems, ammunition stockpiles, and critical military hardware to strengthen India’s defence capabilities. Unprecedented budget allocation was given to Border Roads Organisation, to improve border infrastructure.
- Pahalgam Terror Attack. In the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) approved `40,000 crore under emergency powers for the procurement of arms and ammunition. These funds are being used to modernise and upgrade operational capabilities, including acquiring loitering munitions, surveillance drones, artillery ammunition, air defence systems, and various missiles and rockets. These purchases will bolster counter-drone and air defence systems, helping the armed forces neutralise aerial threats more effectively. The rapid acquisitions will ensure that India remains prepared for evolving security challenges.
All the above responses clearly bring out, that enemy action kick started defence procurement each time. Emergency procurements were ordered only as reaction and response to crises? Clearly, there must be inherent shortcomings that need to be addressed. Holistically, in anticipation of every possible crisis, we need to relook at our defence procurement procedure, enhance capital budget, and make Atmanirbhar totally Nirbhar.
Indigenous Defence Production
On 24 May this year, in a Mann ki Baat radio address, the PM announced, “Our soldiers destroyed terror bases; it was their indomitable courage, along with the power of weapons, equipment and technology made in India, it also included the resolve of Atmanirbhar Bharat.”
Under the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” initiative, India’s indigenous defence manufacturing has reached unprecedented heights. In FY 2023-24, the value of domestic defence production hit a record `1.27 lakh crore, with nearly 65% of India’s defence requirements being met domestically, reversing decades of dependency on imports.
India’s robust defence industrial base, comprises of 16 Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), approximately 430 licensed private firms, and 16,000 MSMEs. Through various joint ventures and transfer of technology the systems have been tailored to our needs. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and AI-led surveillance played a critical role in Operation Sindoor, allowing Indian forces to strike with precision.
However, this process of indigenous defence production or Atmanirbharta requires more intense introspection and scrutiny. We must be honest about what we can produce and what we cannot. Also, we cannot have major components in a weapon system imported, and yet call it as indigenous.
- LCA Tejas. Take the Tejas aircraft for example. The Kaveri engine project, began in the late 1980s, with the aim of powering the Tejas. The project failed primarily because it could not meet the required thrust performance levels at high altitudes. It also had excessive weight, and combustion instability. The Kaveri engine was being developed by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), which is a laboratory under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). Presently the future of the aircraft is dependent on the import of the General Electric F404/414 engines from USA. Is Tejas an Indian fighter jet, in the true sense?
- Pinaka. The Pinaka Rocket Launcher is another example. The weapon comprises six launch vehicles, accompanied by loader systems, radar and links with network-based systems and a command post. There are two versions of the Pinaka – Mark I, which has a range of around 40 kilometres and the Mark-II version that can fire up to 80 kilometres. It is pertinent to state that the base vehicle of the Pinaka System or the prime mover is imported from Czechoslovakia. Thereafter the integration of the components is done by L&T and Tata Advance Systems Ltd. Since the prime movers are delayed in arriving from Czechoslovakia, the Indian Army has so far received only part of its order of integrated Pinaka Mk1 weapon system. After all the procurement procedures have been met with, are such slippages acceptable?
These examples are not isolated; they illustrate that there are still some hurdles to becoming totally self-reliant. Atmanirbharta is the only way forward, there is no doubt. However, atmanirbharta is not a quick fix solution that will get switched on like an electric bulb. It will take time, and we need to give it time.
Meanwhile, import is the only alternative. But import too, comes with its own bag of problems.
- Rafale. Let us take Rafale for example. While France offers India its finest military exports, they are notably reluctant on technology transfer. The absence of deeper tech-sharing agreements leaves India wanting. Despite persistent diplomatic overtures by New Delhi, Dassault Aviation remains unwilling to hand over the critical software backbone that governs the Rafale’s mission systems, weapons integration, and avionics suite. India’s goal is to embed indigenous weapons like the Astra beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, Rudram anti-radiation missile, and a host of smart munitions into the Rafale ecosystem to enhance combat autonomy. France’s unwillingness to share Rafale’s core source code remains a critical stumbling block in deeper defence cooperation. The French defence establishment fears that granting access could set a dangerous precedent with other Rafale operators demanding similar concessions.
- T90 Tanks. India’s purchase in 2001 of Russia’s T-90S was touted as a world-class upgrade of our battlefield capabilities. For `3,625 crore, India would get 310 new tanks; a full transfer of technology from Russia; and a licence to build 1000 tanks at the HVF in Avadi, Chennai. A decade later, HVF had built just 150, T-90S tanks, hamstrung by Moscow’s obstruction in transferring technology. With India’s production line stymied, the MoD bought 347 more ready-built T-90S tanks, handing Russia another `4,900 crore. It took another decade to partially resolve the problem.
Such issues plague all the three services. For a country determined to indigenise its defence production under the “Make in India” initiative, such gaps are both conspicuous and consequential.
India with no dearth of qualified manpower, the Make in India should have been a success story decades ago. Therefore, the need of the present hour is the need to identify the possible causes of lapses.
One reason that is evident is limiting the R&D facilities with a single organisation, the DRDO. The DRDO must be made accountable for all projects undertaken. In today’s date and time, technology is getting obsolete as you read, therefore every project needs to be time bound. We need to explore the capabilities of the private sector and give them more opportunities. Military technology must be current to provide the necessary deterrence. India’s dream of self-reliance to come true the troika of three major pillars that is defence industry, research institutes and the Services have to collaborate seamlessly.
Procurement Procedure
The Indian Defence Procurement Procedures, in spite of all the streamlining, yet remain extremely bureaucratic and tedious; as a result, acquisition delays very often run into years. On the contrary, our Western and Northern neighbours have a much nimbler process. They probably have none, they just buy what they want.
The present procurement process reeks of suspicion and lack of trust amongst all agencies involved. In this hour of national emergency, can mistrust and suspicion be allowed to derail the procurement procedure?
The time lag between the Request for Information and the order is nothing less than four years. Before that, preparation of the GSQR takes two years and after the order, it takes minimum two years to receive the first consignment. That is a total of eight years. This much delay between conception and fructification is unacceptable. The issue of delays not only effects the operational preparedness but with the rapid pace of technology, equipment can even become outdated by the time it is inducted.
Procurements cannot be delayed for lack of provisions. Rules must be user friendly, for the customers, end users, the Armed Forces as well as the manufacturers. There is no doubt that the laborious, time consuming and often rigid acquisition process also in itself creates delays in the acquisition cycle and even after the recent revisions a lot more needs to be done to ensure that time lines are adhered to.
A former Army Chief while speaking at the United Service Institution (USI), highlighted the issue of bureaucratic procedures and policies causing delays in defence procurement. He said, “There are certain procedural lacunae in the procurement process, which primarily arise due to the overbearing nature of our rules and guidelines in trying to ensure zero error.” He added that the problem “is also aggravated by our own interpretation of rules,” and that trying to plug every loophole causes delays in the process, He stated, it “results in the acquisition process being tied up in knots” and “what has happened is that the processes and procedures have become paramount, rather than the product, and these are holding hostage all our defence modernisation.” Conversely, the former Defence Secretary also speaking at USI highlighted the changes in policies being made to reduce the procurement periods from an average of five to six years to two to three years, which too is unfortunately too long.
Speaking at the 21st Subroto Mukerjee Seminar, the present Defence Secretary Shri RK Singh was candid when he described India’s defence procurement system as “broken” and plagued by delays. He stated that “our procurement policy, for a long time, has been broken, and I make no secret of that. It is true, we have not been able to do things on time.” This is the precise reason that emergency procurements get triggered post every terrorist attack.
There is utmost urgency in overcoming these hurdles by simplifying the acquisition procedures to ensure that technology obsolescence does not outpace procurement cycles. Time-bound acquisition cycles are vital to align industry investments with the government’s goals and to provide state-of-the-art solutions.
Current Projects
The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) has approved eight capital acquisition proposals worth about `540 billion in FY2025. Additionally, the Indian Army signed defence procurement contracts worth `85,000 crore during the financial year 2024-25, marking a 152% increase in capital expenditure compared to the previous year. These approvals are part of the broader plan to upgrade and modernise the armed forces. The key projects include new engines for T-90 tanks, Varunastra anti-submarine torpedoes developed indigenously by the Naval Science & Technological Laboratory, designed to strengthen underwater defence capabilities. The capabilities of the Indian Air Force (IAF) are also being enhanced.
With consistent efforts in indigenisation, strategic acquisitions, and rising production capacity, India’s defence sector is well on track for robust growth in the coming years. A new procurement category, ‘Buy Global – Manufacture in India,’ was also introduced to encourage foreign OEMs to establish manufacturing and maintenance facilities domestically.
India has also made strides towards self-reliance in military technology through public-private partnerships and international collaborations. The government has encouraged partnerships between foreign defence firms and Indian companies to bridge technology gaps and facilitate knowledge transfer. Recent agreements with global giants aim to provide advanced technical expertise, from aerospace to cybersecurity. Government schemes like Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) are fostering a culture of innovation, encouraging startups and SMEs to contribute solutions that address India’s unique military needs.
India is also investing in the digitalisation of its defence sector through advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and cybersecurity. The ministry of defence has established various AI research centres and collaborates with tech firms to integrate machine learning and AI technologies into critical military functions. These digital transformations aim to enhance the precision and efficiency of India’s defence operations while enabling quicker responses to emerging threats.
Conclusion
While atmanirbharta is, and must be the most important long-term goal, as of now, certain defence imports are unavoidable. Therefore, our continued friendship/partnership with those countries who have always risen in our support is important. This requires enhanced diplomatic outreach. We cannot afford to antagonise our friends while wooing others whose trust is relatively lesser known.
In recent years, the Indian government has implemented a series of transformative initiatives aimed at bolstering the country’s defence production capabilities and achieving self-reliance. These measures are designed to attract investment, enhance domestic manufacturing, and streamline procurement processes. From liberalizing foreign direct investment (FDI) limits to prioritizing indigenous production, these initiatives reflect a robust commitment to strengthening India’s defence industrial base.
It is also well known that most countries rely on others not only for technology but also rare metals for components. In addition, there are a host of systems, sub systems and critical components that are either manufactured as joint ventures or imported from trusted defence partners. Hence, while it is understandable that our defence platforms will also follow a similar path but we need to ensure that the road is smooth.
Considering the scope, scale and nature of the reforms undertaken, it would only be fair to suggest that the past decade has witnessed a paradigm shift as regards atmanirbharta is concerned but it is imperative that there is a whole nation approach with regards to self-reliance which involves both public and private sector manufacturers, defence research and development, quality assurance, the users and academia. Finally, it is the government policies and procedures that need to focus on this critical pillar of hard power.
This is an era of undeclared war. Our PM has already stated that henceforth any terrorist action by the enemy will be considered as an act of war. We need to build up our capabilities. Operation Sindoor has brought to the fore the necessity of hard power and for this its instrument needs to be nourished.
To summarise again, we will do well to ponder over the following:
- There is no denying there are numerous success stories where our indigenous efforts have paid rich dividends. The most important has been the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP). This is the very programme because of which we have been successful in creating our nuclear deterrent. The story started almost 4 decades ago when the Government of India decided to approve a project to make 5 different kinds of missiles for different purposes. The former president of India late Dr APJ Abdul Kalam was appointed as the head of the project in 1983. After the initial flight trials of Prithvi and Agni missile in 1988 and 1989 respectively, the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) banned other countries to share any technology that can help India in its missile development program. The IGMDP team formed a consortium of laboratories, industries, and academic institutions to make components of the missile indigenously. On 8 January 2008, DRDO announced the competition of IGMDP. By now, DRDO has successfully developed 3 variants of Prithvi, 5 variants of Agni, Trishul as a technology demonstrator, 2 variants of Nag and 1 variant of Akash air defence system was developed. Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam was given the title of “Missile Man of India” as a result.
- Decidedly, the planners would be considering this as a national emergency to put into practice the learning from the four-day retaliation. As the government has said, Operation Sindoor is still work in motion. While permanent changes to the DPP will take time, it is a moot consideration that we buy military hardware off the shelf from friendly foreign countries. Software, where critical to power the hardware already acquired, must be procured on an urgent basis; future purchases must be comprehensive given also that these need to fully integrate-able with existing platforms.
- Power equations have changed dramatically since this four-day retaliation. Our defence needs possess a new reality behind them. As we remain embedded in our self-reliance programmes, we are also running against time. It is safe to assume the government must be addressing all these issues and concerns.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Maj Gen VK Singh, VSM was commissioned into The Scinde Horse in Dec 1983. The officer has commanded an Independent Recce Sqn in the desert sector, and has the distinction of being the first Armoured Corps Officer to command an Assam Rifles Battalion in Counter Insurgency Operations in Manipur and Nagaland, as well as the first General Cadre Officer to command a Strategic Forces Brigade. He then commanded 12 Infantry Division (RAPID) in Western Sector. The General is a fourth generation army officer.
Major General Jagatbir Singh was commissioned into 18 Cavalry in December 1981. During his 38 years of service in the Army he has held various command, staff and instructional appointments and served in varied terrains in the country. He has served in a United Nations Peace Keeping Mission as a Military Observer in Iraq and Kuwait. He has been an instructor to Indian Military Academy and the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. He is a prolific writer in defence & national security and adept at public speaking.
