This box item, widely circulated on the Net, is unsettling reading. I have always been reluctant to dismiss a series of seemingly connected developments as mere coincidences, particularly when they occur on such a large scale and involve institutions of considerable economic and strategic significance. But I recognise that suspicion, however compelling, cannot substitute for evidence. The challenge, therefore, is to distinguish a genuine pattern from an apparently convincing sequence of unrelated events.
I have been an avid and voracious reader for nearly five decades, having read thousands of books, and perhaps considerably more, in English, Hindi, Urdu (in Devanagari script) and Sanskrit. My reading has ranged from serious academic and philosophical works to popular fiction, including several New York Times (NYT) bestsellers, some of which are occasionally dismissed by discerning readers as mere literary entertainment and even “trash”. Yet popular fiction can provide enduring insights into human behaviour, power, deception and the workings of institutions.

One such observation, which has stayed with me for nearly fifty years, comes from Ian Fleming, the creator of the iconic James Bond. In one of his memorable formulations, Fleming writes: “‘Mr Bond, they have a saying in Chicago: Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it’s enemy action’.” The underlying message is that repeated coincidences, especially in a closely connected setting, deserve closer examination. One should neither dismiss them casually nor jump to conclusions. This couplet by Iqbal clearly stresses the need to avoid premature conclusions and maintain a sense of balance and proportion for a comprehensive assessment and perspective:
“अच्छा है दिल के साथ रहे पासबान–ए–अक़्ल
लेकिन कभी–कभी इसे तन्हा भी छोड़ दे।”
Interpretation: Reason must temper emotion, but one should not allow rationality to dominate every situation. Wisdom lies in maintaining an equilibrium between the heart and the mind.
Accordingly, the appropriate response is to investigate whether apparently isolated developments reveal a deeper structural pattern. It was in this spirit that I examined the contents of the following note at some length. The central question is whether the events described represent an extraordinary coincidence, a manifestation of systemic vulnerabilities, or evidence of a synchronised effort by interested commercial and financial actors. This distinction is important because there could be “a method in madness”, and the implication of each possibility is vastly different.
The Allegation and Its Chronology
The following box item is reproduced from D Divaakaran Wall
America is under attack. But by Whom? The American Media will now start blaming Iran, China, Russia or North Korea. Many may whisper digital IDs and technocracy. All this may be true. But not on this attack.
If you want your answer, look at Wall Street. In America, corporations move the machinery. Investors price the future. Fear can become a very profitable product.
Now follow the dates. 8 October. Anthropic launches a program named ‘Cyber Mission.’
Its mission? Defend power grids, electricity, water utilities, transportation, government networks, vulnerable software and industrial technology.
Its partners? CrowdStrike. Palo Alto Networks. Booz Allen Hamilton. Accenture. Deloitte. PwC. Rockwell Automation.
26 October: Anthropic files its IPO registration. 3 November: Microsoft web-app disruptions. 9 November: Cyber incidents at two American hospitals. 10 November: Anthropic’s IPO roadshow begins. Now watch the sequence. 11 November: Nvidia’s CEO resigns. 12 November: Microsoft 365 suffers a major global outage. 13 November: America grounds flights nationwide. 13 November: Workday’s HR systems fail. 14 November: Aviation delays ripple nationwide. 15 November: AWS reports a regional cloud outage. 16 November: United Airlines suffers a separate system failure. 16 November: Banking systems start failing.
Cloud. Hospitals. Aviation. Payroll. Infrastructure. Banking. And now the grand finale? 18 November: IPO pricing. 19 November: Nasdaq debut.
Here is the plot twist. Anthropic isn’t just selling chatbot answers. It is expanding into AI cybersecurity and government security work.
Now, follow the money. Who owns Anthropic? Amazon. Google. Lightspeed. Menlo Ventures. Coatue. ICONIQ. Spark Capital. GIC. Fidelity. BlackRock-affiliated funds. Sequoia. And who is lining up for another $26 billion investment? Google. Nvidia. Microsoft. AMD. Broadcom. Micron. TSMC. Who is arranging the IPO? Goldman Sachs. Morgan Stanley. JPMorgan.
Imagine the sales pitch: “Your systems are fragile. Your citizens are frightened. We have the AI to save you.” Fear becomes demand. Demand becomes a growth story. Wall Street prices the story. What a beautiful coincidence. Elites love those.
Critical Examination: What Does the Evidence Establish?
Divaakaran’s note highlights the growing dependence of modern economies on a relatively small number of powerful technology corporations, the concentration of financial interests around artificial intelligence (AI), and the commercial opportunities created by rising concerns about cybersecurity and infrastructure resilience. Its central proposition is that a succession of disruptions affecting essential American services coincided with Anthropic’s preparations for a major public offering and its expansion into cybersecurity. The suggestion is that these seemingly apocalyptic disruptions may have helped create a climate of fear in which demand for AI-based security solutions becomes more attractive to governments, corporations and investors.

This is an economically plausible hypothesis. This messy combination of risks feeding into each other is poignantly captured in Muin Ahsan Jazbi’s famous couplet:
“जब कश्ती साबित–ओ–सालिम थी साहिल की तमन्ना किस को थी
अब ऐसी शिकस्ता कश्ती पर साहिल की तमन्ना कौन करे”
Translation: When the boat was intact, no one longed for the shore;
now that the boat is broken, expecting safe arrival appears futile.
However, the note moves quickly from identifying a possible commercial beneficiary to insinuating that the beneficiary may have had a role in causing or facilitating the disruptions. That is a much more serious allegation and requires substantially stronger evidence. A careful review shows that the note blends three distinct types of information: verified corporate and financial developments, reported technical outages whose underlying causes still need proper classification, and speculation about potential coordination among commercial and financial players. Merging these distinct categories risks drawing an unsupported conclusion.
Intriguing Chronology Without Causation
Anthropic’s official announcements corroborate several major commercial milestones outlined in the note. On October 8, 2026, the company launched its Cyber Mission—an initiative backed by prominent technology, consulting, and infrastructure firms aimed at identifying software vulnerabilities, strengthening cyber defenses, and protecting critical infrastructure.
Shortly thereafter, Anthropic announced its IPO registration on October 26 and kicked off its roadshow on November 10. These milestones reveal a broader strategic pivot that the company is positioning itself not simply as a generative AI vendor, but as an essential infrastructure partner for both governments and enterprises.
However, analysing these events requires distinguishing between correlation and causation. While a tight timeline, such as an IPO roadshow overlapping with major infrastructure glitches, may appear suggestive, sequence alone cannot substitute for forensic evidence of sabotage or coordination. Similarly, assuming that financing timelines were engineered to capitalise on market fear oversimplifies the landscape; the overlapping stakes of big tech, cloud providers, and semiconductor giants suggest broader structural capital concentration rather than a coordinated scheme.
Independent financial reporting also confirms the proposed November 18 pricing schedule and November 19 Nasdaq debut. According to Reuters, the offering comprises 825 million shares priced between $70 and $78—potentially raising roughly $64.4 billion—alongside a separate $26 billion private placement. Because these are distinct financing vehicles, their figures should not be conflated. By contrast, the note’s claims regarding technical disruptions—specifically those affecting Microsoft web applications on November 3, two hospitals on November 9, and AWS on November 15—lack the identifying details and independent verification needed to establish what happened or why. Ultimately, this serves as a methodological reminder that a timeline is a useful starting point for an inquiry, not proof of a causal link. The mere fact that two events occur in quick succession does not mean one caused, enabled, or intentionally profited from the other.
Technical Failure and Cyberattack – Vastly Different
Perhaps the most consequential flaw in the original note is its opening assertion that America is “under attack.” While rhetorically dramatic, this framing treats an unproven assumption as a fact.
A service outage isn’t automatically a cyberattack. Systems go down for many reasons—buggy software, capacity bottlenecks, failed updates, worn-out hardware, human mistakes, sloppy upkeep, or an actual breach. Treating every glitch as a deliberate attack misses the bigger picture: underlying weaknesses caused by ageing systems, intricate rollouts, and tightly coupled dependencies. Because every cause calls for a distinct engineering and policy response, it is important not to be swayed by whimsical considerations and get the diagnosis right.
Reporting from the Associated Press (AP) offers well-documented, non-malicious explanations for several of the cited incidents:
- Aviation: The nationwide disruption stemmed from a system upgrade that overloaded ageing equipment, triggering communications and radar failures.
- Microsoft: The outage was traced to a network-capacity upgrade, with the underlying fault surfacing after a subsequent network configuration change.
- JPMorgan Chase: The bank characterised its service issues as strictly technical, explicitly ruling out a cyberattack.
Both the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Microsoft similarly confirmed they found no indicators of malicious activity.
To be sure, corporate statements should never be accepted at face value as definitive forensic proof. Independent technical audits, transparent incident reports, and rigorous regulatory oversight remain indispensable to separate the wheat from the chaff. Yet official disclosures represent relevant evidence, and the absence of a coordinated conspiracy does not diminish the urgency of scrutinising concentrated corporate power and fragile digital infrastructure.
A credible inquiry must weigh competing hypotheses, evaluate their evidence, and distinguish technical negligence from deliberate sabotage. Otherwise, the analysis collapses into circular reasoning, where every outage is presumed to be an attack, and that label is then used to validate the initial suspicion, missing the forest for the trees.
Underlying Pattern Exaggerated by Multiple Events
Much of the note’s rhetorical force comes from stacking disruptions across aviation, banking, healthcare, and cloud computing into a rapid sequence. The cumulative effect is alarming, creating the impression that nearly every pillar of the American economy was failing simultaneously or in quick succession. Yet the volume of news reports should not be equated with the number of independent breakdowns in the grammar of development. For instance, the aviation delays reported on November 14 appear to be the lingering aftershocks of the November 13 ground stop, rather than a separate failure. Likewise, reports of transaction issues spanning multiple banks do not prove that each institution suffered an internal collapse. Industry reporting traced those banking disruptions to a software fault at JPMorgan Chase that rippled outward to affect customers elsewhere, while Bank of America and Citigroup experienced no failures within their own systems.
This distinction is vital both statistically and analytically: a single technical fault can trigger multiple downstream bottlenecks, generate several distinct headlines and inflate the perceived scale of the crisis. A rigorous assessment must isolate originating root causes from secondary ripple effects, map their technical dependencies, and benchmark their frequency against historical outage baselines. Equating routine operational failures, such as upgrade glitches, capacity bottlenecks, or overloaded legacy hardware, with deliberate cyberattacks locks the analysis into circular logic. Without separating primary failures from media amplification, an inquiry risks mistaking a cluster of headlines for a coordinated wave of attacks. Making that distinction is essential to determining whether these incidents represent routine operational friction or a genuine systemic crisis demanding undivided attention and decisive risk management.
Cui Bono? Following the Money Is Useful, but Not Conclusive
The note’s most provocative claim links these infrastructure disruptions directly to the financial interests surrounding Anthropic. The underlying market logic warrants serious consideration: as businesses and governments grow more anxious about digital fragility, spending on cybersecurity, cloud resilience, and AI-driven threat detection naturally rises. Because Anthropic’s Cyber Mission is tailored to meet those exact needs, a string of high-profile outages undeniably reinforces the commercial urgency of its offerings. However, identifying a plausible commercial incentive does not prove that the company or its backers orchestrated the disruptions. In the political economy of fear, asking cui bono? (“who benefits?”) is a useful starting point for an investigation—not proof of guilt. Companies routinely profit from crises they neither anticipated nor engineered.

Moving from mere suspicion to a credible allegation requires concrete forensic and evidentiary links of unauthorised system access, coordinated directives, shared technical indicators, anomalous financial trades, or communications showing foreknowledge. A simple timeline provides none of these.
The chronology also contains developments that actively undermine the coordination thesis. Reuters characterised Nvidia’s leadership shake-up—occurring just ahead of Anthropic’s planned listing—as a blow to investor confidence in the broader AI narrative. Independent reporting also dates this CEO development to November 12 rather than November 11, as claimed in the note. Beyond underscoring the need to verify basic facts before alleging a conspiracy, this detail exposes an analytical contradiction: an event that dampens market enthusiasm for AI stocks cannot easily become a plot designed to inflate an AI IPO.
$26 Billion Investment: Deeper Financial Interdependence
The proposed $26 billion investment in Anthropic is arguably the most consequential financial issue in the entire discussion, meriting rigorous scrutiny without relying on unproven theories of engineered infrastructure disruptions. According to financial reporting, the backing includes commitments of $10 billion each from Google and Nvidia, $2.5 billion from AMD, $1 billion each from Microsoft, Broadcom, and Micron, and $500 million from TSMC Partners, all structured as non-voting Class N shares. What makes this deal particularly notable is the web of overlapping commercial and financial ties connecting these participants.
These firms are far from passive backers; they dominate the core layers of the AI value chain, supplying essential compute infrastructure, semiconductors, cloud services, and hardware. Because several participants act simultaneously as investors, key suppliers, and commercial partners, the arrangement raises legitimate questions about financial interdependence, strategic alignment, AI valuations, and whether these commitments reflect truly independent market demand.
As Global Finance has noted, these corporations stand to profit twice: first through the appreciation of their equity stakes, and second from the massive infrastructure spending generated by Anthropic’s expansion—a dynamic long recognised as “economic externalities” in the literature on economic development. This structure invites serious questions about circular financing, market concentration, valuation transparency, and the long-term sustainability of the broader AI investment boom.
Analysts must also distinguish between headline commitments, actual capital disbursements, and downstream commercial spending, as these figures are rarely identical. Understanding the true mechanics of the deal requires examining underlying contracts, commercial obligations, and how funds are ultimately allocated rather than taking headline numbers at face value. Ultimately, the core concern is whether a tight-knit cohort of interconnected tech giants is increasingly financing, supplying, and commercially validating an ecosystem in which they hold deeply overlapping stakes. This concentration of AI infrastructure, venture capital, and semiconductor investment creates pressing questions around market power and circular financing that demand strict regulatory oversight—an argument far more substantive and compelling than unverified claims of coordinated sabotage.
Lexicon of Change -Ownership, Control and Influence Differ
The box item lists several prominent investors and financial institutions associated with Anthropic. However, the question of who owns a company is more complicated than compiling a list of its shareholders. Equity ownership, voting rights, board representation, strategic influence, commercial partnerships and investment-banking mandates are different dimensions of corporate power, as I have brought out repeatedly in my papers on corporate governance and the widely acclaimed two-volume book Global Financial Meltdown published by Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, Delhi in 2011.
A financial institution arranging an IPO does not necessarily exercise operational control over the company. Similarly, an investor with a substantial economic interest does not automatically possess equivalent voting rights or the ability to determine management decisions. Reuters identifies Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley among the leading underwriters for the proposed offering. Their role is important because investment banks help structure, market and distribute securities and connect issuers with institutional investors. However, underwriting arrangements do not establish responsibility for unrelated technical disruptions.
A meaningful examination of corporate influence requires scrutiny of shareholding structures, voting arrangements, board composition, contractual rights, related-party transactions and the extent of commercial dependence among the principal participants. The broader issue is whether the concentration of financial and technological power creates an ecosystem in which a relatively small group of companies can exercise disproportionate influence over the direction of AI development, infrastructure investment and public policy. This question deserves far more attention than the speculative connections drawn in the original note.
Concentrated Technological Dependence: Deeper Structural Malaise
Ultimately, the most compelling takeaway from this unsavoury episode is not a hidden conspiracy, but the inherent fragility of modern digital infrastructure and the concomitant risks of excessive technological concentration. Rather than falling into the trap of post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning—if events occurred in sequence, one caused the other—we need a measured, first-principles approach to dissect the tension between systemic fragility and conspiratorial speculation.
Airlines, banks, hospitals, utilities, government agencies, and private enterprises all rely heavily on deeply interconnected digital networks. While this integration has driven remarkable gains in efficiency, speed, and productivity, it has simultaneously introduced dangerous new forms of systemic vulnerability. When infrastructure is tightly coupled, a single point of failure—whether an outage at a major cloud provider, a botched software update, or a localised network flaw—can trigger cascading disruptions far beyond the originating organisation. Both the aviation delays tied to ageing hardware and the banking bottlenecks linked to JPMorgan Chase demonstrate how isolated operational weaknesses can quickly become widespread crises. These incidents should compel policymakers and business leaders to rethink how we build resilience. Securing individual systems is no longer enough; the broader architecture must be sufficiently diversified and fault-tolerant to keep functioning even when a critical component fails.
Anthropic itself acknowledges that critical infrastructure poses unique operational challenges. Legacy industrial and operational technologies often rely on specialised hardware with complex maintenance demands, making upgrades or replacements risky and time-consuming. Even deploying routine software patches in these environments can take months.
Consequently, AI-driven cybersecurity cannot be treated as a silver bullet for infrastructure fragility. While AI can accelerate threat detection, uncover vulnerabilities, and streamline incident response, it cannot fix problems rooted in obsolete hardware, chronic underinvestment, lax governance, or over-reliance on a handful of dominant vendors. A credible policy response must, therefore, pair technological innovation with unglamorous, foundational commitments of system redundancy, rigorous maintenance, operational discipline, independent audits, and clear institutional accountability.
Political Economy of Fear and Commercialisation of Security
There is, nevertheless, a wider political-economy issue embedded in the original note that should not be overlooked. Fear has always influenced economic behaviour. Financial markets react to uncertainty, governments respond to perceptions of national security threats, and corporations increase expenditure when they believe their operational continuity is at risk.
In the digital economy, cybersecurity has become both a strategic necessity and a substantial commercial opportunity. The growing importance of AI has further expanded the market for companies capable of offering advanced security solutions. This creates an inherent tension. Private companies have legitimate incentives to develop and market products that address emerging risks. However, the commercialisation of security also creates the possibility that public anxiety may be used to accelerate technology adoption, influence procurement decisions or justify substantial expenditure without adequate scrutiny. Governments must therefore avoid becoming overly dependent on the technology companies, whose products they seek to regulate or whose services they require to secure essential infrastructure, to avoid issues of “conflict of interest” and maintain an “arms-length” relationship for transparency, objectivity and rigorous evaluation.

Public procurement should be transparent, competitive and based on demonstrable effectiveness. Security assessments should be independently validated, and critical infrastructure operators should retain sufficient technical capability to evaluate the products and services they purchase. The objective should be to strengthen national technological resilience, not merely to transfer dependence from one technology provider to another.
Conclusion: Investigate the Pattern, Without Manufacturing Certainty
The original note weaves together real corporate milestones, technical outages, and financial ties into a compelling narrative. By placing these events side-by-side and highlighting powerful beneficiaries, it invites readers to connect the dots. However, a persuasive story is not the same as proven cause-and-effect. Rigorous analysis requires answering what happened, how, and why and separating coincidence, commercial advantage, structural interdependence, and deliberate coordination. Each claim demands a higher standard of proof.
The record shows that Anthropic expanded its cybersecurity ambitions ahead of a major IPO while critical U.S. digital systems suffered disruptions. Overlapping financial and commercial ties around the company also raise valid concerns about the concentration of capital and strategic influence. Yet, there is zero evidence that Anthropic, its investors, partners, or IPO underwriters orchestrated or encouraged those outages.
Rejecting unverified sabotage claims, however, does not mean ignoring real risks. The concentration of tech power, the reliance of vital public services on tightly linked platforms, cascading failure risks, and entangled financial interests all demand scrutiny.
An independent inquiry must look past suggestive timelines to examine incident reports, historical outage baselines, forensic logs, procurement contracts, and governance structures. We cannot afford to be naïve about corporate power, nor can we fall prey to conspiracy theories. Stoking panic only to trade one tech monopoly for another is bad policy. Instead, we need transparent public procurement, independent technical audits, and built-in infrastructural redundancy. Just because powerful institutions benefit from a crisis does not mean they engineered it—though it is certainly reason enough to watch them closely.
As Ian Fleming famously noted, repeated coincidences deserve investigation. Still, any inquiry must follow hard evidence rather than turning suspicion into certainty. The deeper takeaway is more urgent than any conspiracy theory: in our hyper-connected economy, fragile infrastructure, concentrated tech power, and tangled financial interests create severe systemic risks—even without deliberate sabotage. Governments, regulators, investors, and citizens must confront that reality head-on. We watch warily.
I rest my case.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Manoranjan Sharma has been the Chief Economist for 25 years with Canara Bank and Infomerics Ratings.
Globally recognised as an expert in global economy, Indian economy, banking, finance, MSMEs, sustainable development and financial inclusion, he has chaired sessions at national and international conferences and is recognised as one of the 30 global experts by the UN Virtual University (UNVU) for SDGs.
He has been on over a dozen Advisory Councils in seven states, viz. Member, Rajasthan Governor’s Advisory Council; Governor’s Senate Nominee on Rajasthan University; Governor’s Senate Nominee on SNDT University, Mumbai; and Expert on selection panels for IIMs, Vijay Patil School of Management, SAIL, IDBI Bank, Canara Bank, Bank of India, Union Bank of India.
He has been published widely and quoted extensively in major Indian and international media and publications.



