Strategic Crossroads: India’s China Dilemma Demands Realism, Not Rhetoric

“India’s real power is not in echoing China’s aggression but in showing the strategic maturity to strengthen the front, manage the tempo, and shape the game on its sovereign terms.”

India’s relationship with China cannot be boxed into neat categories. It is neither open hostility nor stable peace. What exists today is a delicate and deliberate calibration; a mix of pushback and engagement, suspicion and necessity. This is not merely a strategic rivalry. It is a kind of an extended game where the strength is often manifested in restraint and success, realised not through risk mitigation with an unblinking eye. Sometimes, denying the adversary its strategic intent is a silent victory.

This has resulted in a strategic redefinition since the confrontation at Galwan in 2020. The government has avoided slogans and drifted towards subtler signals. Reviving the e-visas that had remained dormant towards the Chinese tourists was not just a sign of goodwill. The decision was also economic, with knowledge that the people-to-people contact can act as a pressure valve. Similarly, there is always diplomacy. The National Security Adviser and Defence Minister of India have also maintained their contacts with Beijing at the top level. These are not symbolic photo opportunities. These are deliberate acts of statecraft.

(Press Release: Press Information Bureau)

None of this implies trust. Nor does it mean status quo. It is a strategic maturity of geopolitics and internal constraints. The transition to match asymmetry must have both strategic focus and strategic maturity. India cannot afford permanent conflict with its largest neighbour. It also cannot afford a strategic illusion. The policy today is not one of appeasement or aggression. It is a balancing maturity strategically based on long-term realism.

Economically, the asymmetry is large even if China faces many internal economic fissures. Although there is a crackdown on Chinese tech platforms and there are stricter checks on FDI, there is another explanation in the trading statistics. The weakness is deep-seated and laid bare by the big trade deficit with China that is currently approaching 48 billion dollars in the first half of 2025. Critical components (electronics, pharmaceuticals and solar panels) are imported by India and as raw materials get exported. The structural imbalance is not only commercial. It has strategic implications. This will need to be pragmatically managed through diversification and the Atmanirbharta drive.

Decoupling is not possible nor desirable, not at least abruptly. The supply chains are too deeply embedded, the dependencies too structural to unwind overnight. The government is rightly pushing for diversification. Incentive schemes, supply chain mapping, and new partnerships with countries like Vietnam, Japan, and Australia are part of the corrective effort. It should be viewed not a sprint but an essential marathon in motion.

The problem is even more acute in the sphere of rare earths and critical minerals. China is a leader in processing such resources, where it controls over half the supply in the whole world. India also possesses mineral reserves but does not have refining technologies, improved environmental capacity and industrial depth to convert resources into leverage. The policy responses must be with a sense of urgency, a long-term and sustained response and technologically oriented. It is not a battlefield of tanks and missiles but a field of refinery plants and metallurgical laboratories. The ability to act strategically will be determined by the rate at which India achieves internal capacity with external cooperation.

The situation along the line of actual control is one of unease. Disengagement has taken place, and buffer zones have been created, but mutual suspicion lingers. India has responded with infrastructure upgrades, ISR capabilities, and troop readiness. Operation Sindoor signalled a new doctrine of integrated battlefield awareness and real-time surveillance. It was not a declaration of superiority. It was a quiet assertion that surprises will not go unanswered. The capability is also a silent message to China, more so when the majority of weapons fielded by Pakistan were of Chinese origin.

China, for its part, continues its dual-track policy. It maintains military pressure through infrastructure development in Tibet and force presence along the LAC. At the same time, it includes India in the multilateral forums BRICS, SCO and G20 and leads them in a show of acting together. The intent is transparent: keep India within the diplomatic loop but outside the strategic circle.

India’s participation in these platforms is not an ideological commitment. It is geopolitical hedging. The country cannot afford to be absent where adversaries shape narratives. Meanwhile, it has seen a more heightened interaction with the United States and Indo-Pacific partners. There is increased collaboration in defence technology, including the maritime domain and intelligence sharing. Yet, India remains cautious. It does not see these partnerships as substitutes for self-reliance. The experience of past crises has taught one lesson clearly: India must anchor its deterrence in indigenous capability.

The digital domain is another arena of contest. Chinese tech platforms were banned in the wake of Galwan. After that, India has sought to pursue a digital sovereignty policy. It all turned into the development of trusted telecom ecosystems, homegrown applications and secure data infrastructure. But the challenge is not about banning apps. It is about creating a parallel digital ecosystem rooted in trust, innovation, and resilience. India’s model of digital public infrastructure is being closely watched. It may not mirror China’s scale, but it offers an alternative, rooted in democratic transparency.

South Asia has witnessed the increasing Chinese influence. Beijing has acquired influence in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives through lending, infrastructure ventures and strategic engagements. India cannot counter this with nostalgia. It needs hard investments and strategic consistency. Regional diplomacy must move beyond symbolic visits. It must translate into tangible benefits — power sharing, connectivity, healthcare support, and economic integration. The region must not be treated as a buffer. It is considered a part of national security. Some of this has begun, with the recent visit of the PM to the Maldives. As has been widely felt, this could become a template for relations in the region. 

The United States, Japan and Australia have alliances that have assisted in establishing a wider structure of deterrence. Yet, the expectations should be realistic. The greatest danger, as it presents itself today, is not any confrontation with China, but its growing distance between the public discourse and policy practice. Domestic language tends to create a dominant, authoritative and demeaning tone. Washington remains a transactional partner. While convergence with India is evident, there are clear limits to how far it will go in a crisis. India is not a treaty ally. The support it receives in times of conflict will be guided by interests, not sentiment. Hence, the emphasis must remain on building independent capability; militarily, technologically, and economically.

The greatest threat today is not in confrontation with China but whether there is an increased disconnect between the narrative presented by the public and what the state is really working on. Domestic rhetoric is usually very strong, one that is unyielding. The truth is more complicated. Negotiations continue. Risks are being managed. The military balance along the LAC remains contested. There is no outright victory or defeat; only the constant test of endurance and resilience.

This gap in perception creates two dangers. First, it can lead to policy complacency, assuming that rhetoric substitutes for reform. Second, it sends mixed signals abroad,  diluting India’s credibility as a serious actor. Strategic policy must be insulated from the temptation of political theatrics.

We would do well to consider these five core principles to guide India’s future China policy. 

  • First, deterrence must be backed by genuine capability. Military modernisation, ISR systems, drone integration, and command restructuring need political ownership. 
  • Second, engagement must be strategic, not sentimental. Dialogue should continue, but without illusions. 
  • Third, economic resilience must replace economic bravado. India must identify and eliminate critical dependencies sector by sector.
  •  Fourth, regional diplomacy must be grounded in substance. Neighbours must see India as the partner of choice — reliable, generous, and responsive. 
  • Fifth, strategic communication must reflect truth, not image management. Foreign policy cannot be driven by optics. It must be rooted in outcomes.

India has not capitulated. But it is in a prolonged contest marked by asymmetry and ambiguity. The aim is not to equal China in every metric. It is to build a sovereign strategy insulated from Chinese pressure and rooted in Indian capability.

The road ahead will be uneven. But the tools for success already exist and demand clarity, continuity, and quiet confidence. The Himalayan unease may remain and need defence capability building. But it is the arenas of technology, trade, and regional diplomacy where the real contest will be won.

This is not a moment for triumphalism. Nor is it one for anxiety. It is a test of purpose. China is a competitor and a neighbour. Managing that duality requires patience and precision. It requires a willingness to act with resolve without losing perspective. India is not reacting anymore. It is shaping the terms of engagement.

That is not a weakness. That is a strategy. The Chinese strategic focus must be matched by Indian strategic maturity and plausible deterrence in pursuance of the strategic vision of Viksit Bharat 2047.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant General A B Shivane, is the former Strike Corps Commander and Director General of Mechanised Forces. As a scholar warrior, he has authored over 200 publications on national security and matters defence, besides four books and is an internationally renowned keynote speaker. The General was a Consultant to the Ministry of Defence (Ordnance Factory Board) post-superannuation. He was the Distinguished Fellow and held COAS Chair of Excellence at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies 2021 2022. He is also the Senior Advisor Board Member to several organisations and Think Tanks.


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