Some events in South Asia arrive as a silent wave but carry the weight of a tsunami tide. The verdict against Sheikh Hasina felt like one of those moments. Sheikh Hasina has been sentenced to death in absentia for the events of the July–August 2024 uprising. The tribunal’s findings will be debated sharply for a long time. Anyone who has watched Bangladesh over the years knows how quickly its fault lines harden when power shifts abruptly. This verdict has pushed the country straight into that zone where high politics seeps into the scaffolding of justice, detonated through unresolved grudges.
Hasina’s conviction for crimes against humanity during the 2024 unrest was bound to divide opinion. The crackdown was messy, and the state’s conduct in those weeks will remain disputed. Even so, the tribunal’s reliance on a trial in absentia, coupled with gaps flagged by legal observers, leaves enough room for doubt. In Bangladesh, once doubt enters the frame, everything becomes political theatre. The government may call it accountability. Her supporters see a settling of scores. Neither side will persuade the other.
The immediate reaction in Dhaka confirmed this. Demonstrations broke out before the authorities could find their footing. Police units responded with a force that suggested unease rather than control. Several districts saw sporadic vandalism, mostly symbolic, but it showed that the Awami League’s organisational networks have not evaporated. The interim government under Muhammad Yunus insists the process is neutral, but few believe it so.
The interim government under Muhammad Yunus has tried to present this moment as necessary for Bangladesh’s democratic renewal. But with elections planned in 2026, the transition begins by removing one of the country’s biggest political forces from the electoral field. A death sentence handed down in these circumstances will only deepen the belief among its supporters that the transition is designed to erase them from public life. That belief alone can distort the election atmosphere long before campaigning begins. A transition that excludes one of the two main political forces rarely delivers stability.
The legal request sent to New Delhi for Hasina’s extradition needs to be viewed with clear eyes. India’s treaty with Bangladesh contains provisions that allow refusal, especially in cases where charges are political, oppressive, or pursued in bad faith. This case touches all three. New Delhi cannot simply hand over a former prime minister who once cooperated closely with India’s security agencies. Nor can it ignore the fact that she faces a death sentence after a disputed trial. To pretend this is a routine extradition matter is to ignore the political reality.
India’s first response has been deliberately dry and procedural. The request will be examined; the treaty obligations considered; due process followed. This is the language governments use when they do not intend to be hurried. It is also the only safe position. Extraditing her too quickly would damage India’s credibility. Refusing outright would give Dhaka an excuse to turn the issue into nationalist theatre. The only viable tactic is to let the process move slowly and keep the temperature down.
India cannot afford to treat Bangladesh’s internal situation as background noise. Hasina’s years in office brought stability to India’s Northeast by shutting down militant sanctuaries that once operated across the border. The land boundary settlement and the maritime delimitation created predictability. Transit through Bangladesh, long stalled, finally opened up. The gains were real and not easily replaced by goodwill alone.
A Bangladesh in prolonged turmoil carries risks for India. They come in familiar forms: pressure on border management, renewed migrant flows, small extremist groups fishing in the noise, and opportunistic politics on both sides of the border. The rise of Islamist radical forces in Bangladesh, fuelled by Pakistan’s ISI, has an anti-India agenda for a proxy war from the Eastern front. The Northeast remains fragile today, and its future is tied to cross-border stability. That cooperation cannot be taken for granted during a transition that begins with a political upheaval.
There is also the larger strategic setting. Islamabad will see an opportunity to revive its traditional outreach to groups long hostile to Hasina’s politics. Beijing will calculate whether this fluid moment gives it space to deepen its economic grip. Western governments, once sharply critical of Hasina’s authoritarian streak, now appear unsure of how far the interim arrangement can carry the country. Hedging will become the default posture. In such an environment, India cannot remain a bystander.
India needs to prepare for three immediate contingencies.
- First, the possibility of escalating unrest. Once economic frustrations mix with political anger, demonstrations can evolve quickly. That kind of unrest is unpredictable and often spills across borders.
- Second, Dhaka may decide to push the extradition issue harder if domestic sentiment turns volatile. India could find itself portrayed as obstructing justice, even if it is merely following procedure.
- Third, the diplomatic space will not remain empty. If India hesitates in engaging Bangladesh’s political players, others will move in.
What should India do? The answer is not complicated but requires consistency. Keep the extradition matter within a slow, carefully managed legal process. Make no sudden announcements. Maintain quiet, increased vigilance along the border without turning it into a public spectacle. Essentially follow an agile and balanced diplomatic stance based on:
- The first is to let the extradition process move slowly and firmly within legal boundaries. This protects India’s institutional credibility and prevents any suggestion of partisanship.
- The second is to maintain quiet, steady oversight of the border. Any disruption—whether migration, smuggling upticks or militant opportunism—must be caught early.
- The third is to remain in conversation not just with the interim government but with other political currents that still shape Bangladeshi society. Silence is often misread in Dhaka; a steady hand need not be invisible.
- Lastly, India should engage closely with partners who have stakes in Bangladesh’s stability. Gulf states, Japan and the EU have economic and political influence there that can reinforce calm if used wisely.
Bangladesh is now poised between two paths. One leads toward an attempt at rebuilding institutions, repairing damaged trust and crafting a transition that brings more voices into the democratic space. The other leads toward cycles of retaliation, where each side treats the past as a weapon rather than a lesson. The verdict against Hasina has not clarified which direction the country will choose. It has merely raised the stakes.
For India, the next few months will be volatile, complex and unpredictable. Bangladesh’s future course will affect India’s border security, its economic corridors and the equilibrium of the Bay of Bengal. None of these areas tolerates complacency. The moment demands from India steadiness without detachment, engagement without overreach, and a recognition that stability in Bangladesh is tied, quietly but unmistakably, to safeguard national security and pursue national interest.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Lieutenant General A B Shivane, is the former Strike Corps Commander and Director General of Mechanised Forces. As a scholar warrior, he has authored over 200 publications on national security and matters defence, besides four books and is an internationally renowned keynote speaker. The General was a Consultant to the Ministry of Defence (Ordnance Factory Board) post-superannuation. He was the Distinguished Fellow and held COAS Chair of Excellence at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies 2021 2022. He is also the Senior Advisor Board Member to several organisations and Think Tanks.
