Introduction
Post Operation Sindoor Pakistan’s military morale seems to be on the upswing. The bond with China is stronger than ever before. The newly promoted Army Chief gets invited for lunch with President Trump in the White House. And then, on 17 September, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signs a “strategic mutual defence agreement with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman” (SMDA) in the presence of Asim Munir. For Pakistan, do these developments suggest that they are no longer isolated on the world stage.
To quote the joint statement; “This agreement, which reflects the shared commitment of both nations to enhance their security and to achieve security and peace in the region and the world, aims to develop aspects of defence cooperation between the two countries and strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression.”
The timing is critical. Regional politics have been upended by two years of Israeli aggression including its war on Gaza and strikes on neighbouring states, capped by Israel’s attack on Doha, Qatar’s capital, which borders Saudi Arabia.
Describing the deal as the culmination of “years of discussions,” a senior Saudi said that “this is not a response to specific countries or specific events, but an institutionalisation of longstanding and deep cooperation between our two countries. This is a comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means.”
A Look at Pakistan – Saudi Military Relations
The agreement builds on nearly eight decades of close partnership between the two nations, rooted in shared Islamic heritage and long-standing defence cooperation. In 1951, the two nations signed a “Treaty of Friendship,” laying the foundation for decades of strategic, political, military, and economic cooperation. Pakistani troops went to Saudi Arabia in the late 1960s amid concerns about Egypt’s war in Yemen at the time. The military cooperation deepened after the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure in Mecca, when Pakistan’s Special Forces helped Saudi troops.
In 1982, the two sides institutionalised security ties through a Bilateral Security Cooperation Agreement. This agreement further cemented the security relationship, by the deputation of Pakistan Armed Forces personnel in Saudi Arabia.
Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan, in his book “Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb,” said Saudi Arabia provided “generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the nuclear programme to continue, especially when the country was under sanctions.”
In his 2024 book, “War”; Bob Woodward recounted a conversation in which Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed reportedly told US Senator Lindsey Graham, when the latter expressed concern about the prospect of a Saudi bomb, “I do not need uranium to make a bomb. I will just buy one from Pakistan.”
The pact which is a significant upgrade comes at a time when the geopolitical chessboard is in flux. Saudi Arabia has two primary adversaries, Iran and Israel, and relies on the US for its security needs. However, the fallout from Israel’s war on Gaza and its strikes on regional neighbours has made all Gulf states uneasy, as America remains Israel’s closest ally. Hence, one way of looking at it is that the agreement maybe an indication of declining confidence in US deterrence on the part of Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, it could have been orchestrated at the behest of USA?? Is the agreement an American-engineered ploy with an eye on India?
“Pakistan has nuclear weapons and delivery systems that can hit targets across the Middle East, including Israel,” Zalmay Khalilzad, a former US diplomat, wrote on X. Though Israeli ties with Riyadh have improved in recent years, the idea that Saudi Arabia might gain access, even indirectly, to nuclear deterrence from Pakistan will feed Israeli anxieties. This could therefore add a new layer to Pakistan’s precarious security environment, as it may give Israel an excuse to act against Pakistan.
The Bold Print of the Agreement
Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the agreement with Saudi Arabia reflects the “shared commitment” of both nations to strengthen security and promote regional peace, while also pledging to “strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression.” However, the clause to strengthen defence cooperation and joint deterrence across various military and defensive means is important. Does this imply that Pakistan’s missiles will now be positioned in Saudi or even point Westwards, as so far, the Pakistan security calculus has been India centric?
This seems unlikely even though their Defence Minister Khawaja Asif while talking about Pakistan’s nuclear capability has said: “our capabilities, will absolutely be available under this pact.”
“The agreement states that any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” By this declaration the pact aims to deter potential aggressors and raise the cost of hostile actions against either country.
Husain Haqqani, former Pakistan Ambassador to the US, posted on X, “Most likely, Pakistan will now be able to buy US weapons it needs, with Saudi money, which Trump administration seems willing to sell.”
But it is unlikely that any US administration will permit Pakistan to use their weapons against Israel.
So, what have Pakistan or Saudi Arabia really achieved? They were friends earlier too, as they are now. They had already signed a number of defence related agreements, so what is so different with this one? Pakistan’s military has been positioned in Saudi Arabia since the early 80s, so no change there also. Is it possible that this entire signalling is to do with India?
Implications for India
While outwardly the deal appears to be aimed at Israel, Yemen, and Iran, it has implications and consequences for India. In view of the present Indo-Pak relations, Pakistan’s entering into a formal defence pact with another country, could affect India’s security, diplomatic, and foreign policy calculus as external backing lowers Pakistan’s threshold for confrontation.
The Agreement could rebalance the Pakistan-Saudi relationship, which in recent years has been defined by Saudi financial bailouts for a struggling Pakistani economy. The question remains as to whether Saudi Arabia has committed itself to Pakistan’s disputes with India, and potentially with the Taliban-led Afghanistan.
While there are many unanswered questions regarding the pact specifically regarding what it does or does not cover, including deterrence, resource commitment, operational details, but that does not diminish the significance of this pact.
It seems that the pact is likely to have a limited role except bolstering Pakistan’s conventional capability by providing finances for its expansion. Pakistan is perpetually on the verge of either bankruptcy or requiring bailouts, will now benefit from an injection of capital.
In fact, Saudi Arabia is India’s fourth-largest trading partner, while India ranks as Riyadh’s second-largest partner. The annual trade in the 2024–25, reached USD 42.98 billion. India is also one of the biggest importers of Saudi oil. This makes it unlikely that Riyadh would take steps that might not be in India’s interests. So, is it fair to say Saudi troops are unlikely to fight against India.
Having said that, let us look at the sequence of events that led to the agreement. In April 2025, Asim Munir makes his “Kashmir is our jugular vein speech.” A few days later Pahalgam happens. Pakistan knows India will respond, and braces for impact. Operation Sindoor is launched and India acquits itself with punitive action and resolve. Donald Trump takes credit of enforcing the ceasefire (Possibly he knew more). Then he boasts of Pakistan downing Indian jets, almost as if America has downed them. Next, Asim Munir is lunching in the White House, which is followed by him saying “we are a nuclear nation, if we think we are going down, we’ll take half the world down with us.” Such a statement, surprisingly did not invite any response from anyone. He obviously had the hand of Trump on his head.
Fresh tariffs were thereafter levied on India, and an obvious anti-India stance adopted. Shortly thereafter, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia sign the “Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement.” On 25-26 September, we find Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Asim Munir, again in a huddle with Donald Trump in Washington. The Oval Office meeting was closed to the press but reportedly focused on bilateral cooperation in trade, regional security, and economic development.
Quoting from the joint statement following the agreement; “This agreement, which reflects the shared commitment ….. to achieve security and peace in the region and ….. strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression…..this is not a response to specific countries or specific events. The agreement further states that any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.
These wordings raise questions. Which region and which aggression is being referred to in the statement? When they say, this is not in response to a specific country or specific event, it is probably just that. Finally, any aggression against one will be considered as an aggression against both!
Therefore, the final question that comes to mind, is that, who is providing whom security? Saudi Arabia is providing Pakistan security against any aggression, on the other hand, US provides military protection to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in exchange for a reliable oil supply. So, in case India responds to another Pahalgam type incident against Pakistan, will Saudi also be at war with India? And if Saudi Arabia is indeed at war with India, then where does USA, who is Saudi Arabia’s security guarantor, fit into this matrix? Inadvertently, such a situation may find both US and China on the same side of the fence.
Such an arrangement will also legitimise massive arms supply into the region, which will be a win-win for American manufacturers. India’s security situation will take a turn for the worse.
Conclusion
Pakistan had signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with Washington in 1954 and became a member of the SEATO the same year. The following year, Pakistan joined Iran, Turkey and others in the Baghdad Pact or CENTO. While these pacts gave Pakistan confidence and resulted in the war of 1965, but these alliances did not yield US military intervention on Pakistan’s behalf, which points to the fact that defence agreements often come with caveats and context.
Even with China, despite extensive defence cooperation, Pakistan lacks a formal mutual defence pact. But for Saudi Arabia it is a signal that it is willing to diversify alliances beyond traditional Western security guarantees and an acknowledgement of waning American influence.
In the immediate term, this agreement will consolidate and formalise multi-prong defence cooperation already under way, and new avenues to expand it. The political and defence coordination between the two sides will deepen, while strengthening respective military capabilities of both countries.”
For Saudi Arabia, it strengthens defence against threats from Iran, Yemen’s Houthi militias, and the regional turbulence caused by Israel. However, Pakistan now risks entanglement in Saudi Arabia’s regional rivalries, particularly with Iran.
Though the robustness of the security pact remains to be seen as it is not clear whether it will extend beyond symbolism. But for India, there are strategic implications which are concerning as this pact with Saudi Arabia gives Pakistan political backing and financial cover, that could embolden it to escalate tensions.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Maj Gen VK Singh, VSM was commissioned into The Scinde Horse in Dec 1983. The officer has commanded an Independent Recce Sqn in the desert sector, and has the distinction of being the first Armoured Corps Officer to command an Assam Rifles Battalion in Counter Insurgency Operations in Manipur and Nagaland, as well as the first General Cadre Officer to command a Strategic Forces Brigade. He then commanded 12 Infantry Division (RAPID) in Western Sector. The General is a fourth generation army officer.
Major General Jagatbir Singh was commissioned into 18 Cavalry in December 1981. During his 38 years of service in the Army he has held various command, staff and instructional appointments and served in varied terrains in the country. He has served in a United Nations Peace Keeping Mission as a Military Observer in Iraq and Kuwait. He has been an instructor to Indian Military Academy and the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. He is a prolific writer in defence & national security and adept at public speaking.
