Introduction
On 23 May 2013, as Premier Li Keqiang began his day-long visit to Pakistan, the Chinese state-run Xinhua news agency, described the friendship between Beijing and Islamabad in glowing terms as “China and Pakistan have shaped a paradigm of neighbour-to-neighbour relations. Their time-tested friendship, is “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans,” It added that despite differences in ideology, religion, culture and social system, the bilateral ties have withstood various tests and vicissitudes of international situations.
Did we miss the seriousness or intensity of these words? Probably not, but we chose to turn a blind eye, because we have been obsessed by Pakistan as the primary enemy. The orientation of our Defence forces remained towards Pakistan, be it the Western Sea Board, or the array of airfields or the three Strike Corps of the IA, all poised westwards.
Then in 2020, the Galwan incident took the establishment by surprise, and the orientation began to change, which resultantly took away the sting from our Western borders.
Post Op Sindoor, it is clear that in India’s security calculus today, the threat from Pakistan and China can no longer be separated due to the fusion that has taken place. Op Sindoor was an eye-opener for Indian security planners regarding the extensive scope and depth of military cooperation between Pakistan and China. Further, other than collusive military support to Pakistan, politically too, China used its influence in the UN Security Council and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to obfuscate the truth and steer the narrative in Pakistan’s favour. China refrained from condemning the 22 April Pahalgam attack, in fact, China’s official responses mirrored Pakistan’s narrative — advocating a “quick and fair investigation” of the Pahalgam attack and expressing “full understanding” of Islamabad’s “legitimate security concerns.”
The Chinese media also played an active role in shaping perceptions amplifying Pakistan’s propaganda. The digital landscape also underscored China’s active alignment with Pakistan’s strategic messaging which included celebrating the alleged success of Chinese-origin military platforms deployed by Pakistan.
A recurring theme was the concern that the crisis could escalate into a nuclear conflict, prompting calls for international diplomatic intervention to prevent further escalation.
However, the challenge now is no longer restricted to the dimensions of diplomacy, economy, and strategic communications. This has metamorphosed to a degree where a conflict with Pakistan now openly involves China as Pakistan’s military capability in terms of weapons and technology is largely/mainly Chinese.
Deputy Chief’s Remarks
On 04 July, the Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen Rahul R Singh, while speaking on Operation Sindoor reinforced this important aspect of the China-Pakistan nexus, wherein he stated that China was an ever-present factor bolstering Pakistan’s military efforts through unprecedented battlefield collusion during Operation Sindoor.
Drones, cyber operations, and net-centric warfare elements employed by Pakistan showed unmistakable imprints of the “Chinese military playbook.”
The Deputy Chief also said that Chinese ISR systems provided real-time data, situational awareness, and surveillance capabilities to the Pakistani forces. Even civilian assets such as the Chinese fishing fleet were reportedly leveraged to monitor Indian naval deployments, while Pakistan’s Navy remained coastal-bound.
He stated that Pakistan had full visibility into Indian military deployments, which was made evident during the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO)-level talks by disclosing that; “When the DGMO-level talks were going on, Pakistan actually was mentioning that ‘we know that your such and such important vector is primed and ready for action. I would request you to perhaps pull it back.’ It is apparent that Pakistan was getting these inputs … from China.”
Operation Sindoor was also a test bed for China’s defence industry, validating its platforms and collecting performance data in real combat. As per him that 81% of Pakistan’s military hardware acquired in the last five years is from China. He said that China was using Pakistan as a “live lab” to test its weapons against various other weapon systems. It is well known that Pakistan is the biggest buyer of Chinese military hardware but it is now the ‘military software,’ which is concerning.
To quote Siemon Wezeman of SIPRI, “any state producing or buying weapons is keen to see how the product does in real conflict. Tests and exercises can demonstrate the capabilities of weapons, but the ultimate test is combat.”
Lieutenant General Singh revealed that during Operation Sindoor, India faced not just Pakistan, but effectively three adversaries on one border. “Pakistan was the front face. We had China providing all possible support … Turkey playing a very important role in providing substantial support to Pakistan, including Bayraktar drones and trained personnel.”
This brings out Turkey’s active role in supporting Pakistan against India, indicating a broader geopolitical alignment that extends beyond traditional Pakistan-China cooperation.
During Operation Sindoor, Chinese origin systems were visibly employed by Pakistan. The Pakistan Air Force’s deployment of Chinese J-10C fighters armed with PL-15 beyond-visual-range missiles, alongside HQ-9 Air Defence systems, demonstrated enhanced capability through operational integration honed over the years of joint exercises such as the Shaheen-series. This interoperability was not just symbolic. It was translated into tactical advantages in real-time combat.
China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system played a critical role, including missile guidance for the PL-15, reaffirming the direct integration of Chinese systems into Pakistani battlefield operations. The Chinese satellite network BeiDou continuously searched, identified, and tracked targets on the Indian side, and thereafter the data was fed to the fire control systems of the aircraft that were being tested by China through the air force of its autonomous region–Pakistan. Therefore, the air-to-air missiles could have found a target on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC).
On 12 May, Air Marshal A K Bharti, Director General – Air Operations, presented visual evidence of missile remnants and named China-supplied weapons in the Pakistani arsenal used against the Indian Armed Forces. “You can see the pieces of it on the screen,” he said, showcasing debris of the PL-15 long range missile that fell inside Indian territory, including a relatively intact rear section recovered from Hoshiarpur in Punjab.
Reports also indicate the fusion of the Swedish Saab 2000 Erieye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platform alongside Chinese systems to target Indian aircraft, reflecting a sophisticated convergence of multi-origin platforms, many of which are enabled or integrated by Chinese technologies. Pakistan’s announcement on 06 June of China offering it its fifth-generation J-35 stealth fighters, the KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft, and the HQ-19 ballistic missile defence system reinforces its position as the foremost recipient of Chinese frontline military hardware.
The Pakistan Army can be considered as an extension of the PLA with operations, C3I and logistics jointly coordinated. This engagement is only deepening. It is no longer just military hardware which is well known, but what is more concerning is the military software.
China Downplays Remarks
On 07 July China downplayed the Deputy Chief’s remarks and its Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said at a media briefing that “I am not familiar with the specifics you mentioned. Let me say that China and Pakistan are close neighbours, enjoying traditional friendship. Defence and security cooperation is part of the normal cooperation between the two countries and does not target any third party.”
At the same time, Mao said the India-China relationship is in a “critical moment of improvement and development” and Beijing would like to promote steady growth of bilateral ties with New Delhi.
When pointed out that China’s active support in providing live inputs to Pakistan during the conflict was contrary to her assertion that the close ties do not target any third party, Mao said, “I am not sure how that allegation came about. Different people may have different perspectives.”
“What I can say is, China-Pakistan relations do not target any third party. This is China’s policy. On India-Pakistan relations, we support the two sides in properly addressing differences through dialogue and consultation and jointly keeping the region peaceful and stable.”
In sync with these remarks the Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir, claimed that India’s assertions about Islamabad receiving external support during the four-day conflict were “factually incorrect.”
In an address to graduating officers at the National Defence University in Islamabad, he said that “Insinuations regarding external support in Pakistan’s successful Operation Bunyanum Marsoos are irresponsible and factually incorrect and reflect a chronic reluctance to acknowledge indigenous capability and institutional resilience developed over decades of strategic prudence.”
The Growth of Pakistan-China Collusivity
The handing over of Shaksgam Valley by Pakistan to China in 1963 was a defining moment in Pakistan-China relations. In 1964, Pakistan became the first non-communist country to begin its flights to China. In March 1965, Pakistan denounced the “Two China policy” of the US. China now began to regard Pakistan as a trustworthy partner in South Asia. In the 1965 India-Pakistan war, China fully supported Pakistan. China has always stood by Pakistan at all international forums and the friendship only grew and grew.
Nuclear Capability. China has played a major role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. In 1990s, China designed and supplied heavy water Khushab Reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan’s production of plutonium. When China joined the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group in 2004, it ‘grandfathered’ its right to supply Chashma 1 and 2 Reactors.
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighbourly Relations. Signed in 2006, It binds the two nations to desist from ‘joining any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other side’.
CPEC. China has built an expansive network of strategic infrastructures as part of the CPEC, comprising expressways, the port of Gwadar, optical fibre cable networks, and more. The advantages of this are not merely restricted to boosting Pakistan’s economy but also has military implications. CPEC has legitimised the entry of PLA into Pakistan and resulted in the signature of several agreements for the military usable infrastructure in Gilgit–Baltistan and POK. Along with hydro-electric projects, dual use tunnels are being constructed. Such projects include elements of the PLA to provide security to the Chinese engineers and workers on site.
Pakistan’s Procurements and Modernisation Plans. The unsatiated desire to match India in the military domain was the driving force for Pakistan to plan and carry out its procurement and modernisation plans. The system of Governance and the position the Military enjoys in the overall structure allows for extraordinary expenditures and procurements, which otherwise may not have been possible given the economic situation of Pakistan. Post the 1965 War and resultant sanctions by the US, China emerged as the single and largest arms provider to Pakistan. Some procurements and modernisation plans are given below.
Army
(a) Armour: Pakistan is manufacturing 110x Al Khalid-1 tanks Heavy
Industries Taxila with Chinese assistance. Pakistan Army has also contracted to induct 360 of the latest Chinese VT-4 MBTs. There are also a number of projects that are being undertaken by Asia Pacific Department of China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO).
(b) Air Defence: Pakistan Army has purchased Air Defence systems from China, e.g., ESHORAD FM-90, QW-18 SAM systems, LY-80 LOMADS, FD-2000 HIMAD system and the HQ-9P and HQ-9B, long range surface to air missiles.
(c) Drones: Numerous Drones/UAV have already been procured by Pakistan, which are mainly of Chinese or Turkish origin. Many were deployed during Op Sindoor.
(d) Artillery: Pak Army has finalised procurement of 155mm Artillery gun systems including the Chinese Track Mounted Gun SH-15 and SH-1 MGS
Navy. Submarines: Pakistan has contracted 08 x Yuan Class AIP Conventional Submarines. The first four submarines are being manufactured in China while the remaining four would be constructed at Karachi Shipyard under transfer of technology.
Air Force: 162, JF-17 aircraft are under procurement. Pakistan also acquired 36, J-10CE aircraft. These aircraft are fitted with the PL 15, extended range (BVR) version of air-to-air missiles.
In addition, China reportedly provided Pakistan’s Air Force with a robust network centric warfare (NCW) system – spanning real-time sensor-fusion systems, command and control, space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), data links and electronic warfare support. This reportedly included AI-based data link and sensor fusion systems – for shared real time situational awareness – Beidou, Gaofen, and Yaogan satellites for navigation, surveillance, and electronic intelligence support, as well as electronic warfare (EW) systems for real-time interception, jamming and spoofing, while Chinese integrated and upgraded SAAB 2000 Erieye AWACS were provided extended range surveillance, enabled for coordinated stand-off operations. Also, in the foreseeable future, the Pakistani military will receive a further infusion of advanced technology Chinese equipment, including the J-35A stealth fighters – equipped with PL-17 missiles – as well as HQ-19 theatre-level ballistic missile defence and KJ-500 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft.
Conflict Scenarios:
The options for any future conflict can broadly be spelt out as a purely Indo- Pakistan conflict or one which gets expanded to include China; what is called a two-front or extended war. In today’s context as well as the emerging scenario, the former case seems unlikely, if at all, it may be restricted to the LoC. The initiation or use of proxies alongside a conventional conflict will remain in both scenarios. As regards the supportive role of China, in an Indo-Pak conflict, we got a first-hand demonstration during Op Sindoor, however, it could vary from technological support, border escalations, posturing of troops, occupation of disputed areas, or opening another front altogether. Since China has invested heavily in Pakistan and would not want its assets compromised in any manner, it is likely to support Pakistan both overtly and covertly in any dispute with India.
Similarly, in case of an Indo-China conflict, Pakistan is unlikely to sit and watch. Pakistan’s support could be as a planned collusive support in Ladakh/Kashmir or posturing in the IB Sector to tie down troops in the West. Either which way, Pakistan will want to draw maximum mileage from any Indo-China conflict.
The ties between China and Pakistan are expanding and deepening simultaneously. There is also no doubt that China’s geo political focus in this region is to use Pakistan as a proxy to restrain India. While speaking at an event hosted by the Observer Research Foundation on 08 July, the CDS General Anil Chauhan said; “There is a possible convergence of interest we can talk about between China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh that may have implications for India’s stability and security dynamics.”
Conclusion
A well enunciated ‘China Dream’ seeks to transform the Dragon into a ‘Great Power’ by 2050. The key components of this goal are to become the world’s top economy, have a world-class military and emerge as a technological super-power with accent on niche and disruptive technologies, to create a China-centric Asia and be well poised to achieve a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific Region. The BRI is Beijing’s de-facto grand strategy that seeks to connect continents and oceans through multi-modal connectivity and strings of economic zones to expand China’s strategic influence in the world. The three flagship continental transit corridors of BRI viz. the CPEC and China- Myanmar Economic Corridor, which would meander around the Indian mainland, and the aspirational China-Nepal Economic Corridor that would open an avenue to Indian Heartland, coupled with the MSR (Maritime Silk Route) that spans the Indian Ocean with Gwadar in the Arabian Sea and Kyaukpyu in the Bay of Bengal acting as strategic outposts, are rapidly changing the geo-strategic landscape in South Asia and Indo-Pacific, and could shift the balance of power in China’s favour, if left unattended/un-challenged.
As for Pakistan, all its national security policies/strategies are crafted and executed by the military. Its conventional military capability has been compensated by the military support it has received from China. As it is, Pakistan has overtime been successful in reducing its conventional military asymmetry with India. And while its ‘nuclear bluff’ may seem to have been called, Pakistan’s possession of an almost matching inventory of nuclear arsenal (number of nuclear warheads) does remain a threat in being.
Thus, for China, Pakistan has been a low-cost secondary deterrence against India, and was an ideal choice to partner with in its unfolding geo-political and strategic plans. President Xi Jinping, during his April 2015 visit to Islamabad had alluded, ‘China will be Pakistan’s net security provider’. As such, China uses Pakistan as a millstone to fix India in the South Asian orbit and pursues its stratagem ‘kill with a borrowed knife.’ China is starting to shed its foreign policy restraint to gain control over various nations/areas of interest, and wherein India is seen as a ‘strategic rival’ who cannot co-exist as a peer, the interests of both China and Pakistan seem to have coalesced against India. China-Pakistan Strategic Nexus is unequivocally the most formidable national security challenge for India. Security dynamics of the region are likely to be influenced by the emerging global trends. Due to the deep-seated differences, the China, India, and Pakistan tangle is likely to continue as the foremost ‘Hot Spot’ on the globe over the next few decades.
The collusion is no longer in the realm of fantasy; it is fast becoming a fact. The lesson from Operation Sindoor should guide India’s threat assessments, force modernisation, and operational thought process. This fundamentally changes India’s strategic calculus and defence planning, as it confirms the two-front collusive threat is an operational reality. We need to focus on securing our borders, protecting our economic interests, building our military capabilities, strengthening our internal unity, and reinforcing our friendships.
In the long run, India must understand and identify the adversary. Is it Pakistan or China individually, or both Pakistan and China, collectively. Therefore, in all our calculations, planning, thinking, and strategising we must jointly address both nations as one. In the future, there is unlikely to be a stand-alone war with either country. In any future conflict with either, the other will be involved. (Unless some other influences pan out, which can never be ruled out – Editor).
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Maj Gen VK Singh, VSM was commissioned into The Scinde Horse in Dec 1983. The officer has commanded an Independent Recce Sqn in the desert sector, and has the distinction of being the first Armoured Corps Officer to command an Assam Rifles Battalion in Counter Insurgency Operations in Manipur and Nagaland, as well as the first General Cadre Officer to command a Strategic Forces Brigade. He then commanded 12 Infantry Division (RAPID) in Western Sector. The General is a fourth generation army officer.
Major General Jagatbir Singh was commissioned into 18 Cavalry in December 1981. During his 38 years of service in the Army he has held various command, staff and instructional appointments and served in varied terrains in the country. He has served in a United Nations Peace Keeping Mission as a Military Observer in Iraq and Kuwait. He has been an instructor to Indian Military Academy and the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. He is a prolific writer in defence & national security and adept at public speaking.
